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Abstract  
Scholars of non-profit law and policy have mainly focused on understanding the 
regulatory frameworks in which organisations operate with limited interest in the intra-
organisational consequences of legal regulation. Simultaneously, third sector and interest group 
researchers whilst recognizing the impact of external factors on organisational form and 
behaviour, have not explored the impact of non-profit law related to legal forms and maintaining 
indirect benefits such as legal personality and tax beneficial status on the internal governance of 
organisations. To address this gap, the main research question of this study is whether and how 
does non-profit law related to legal forms and indirect benefits affect - or fail to affect - the internal 
governance of non-profit membership organisations in developed democracies?  
This thesis draws on resource dependence and institutional isomorphism theory. My main 
argument is that non-profit law affects organisations’ internal governance by shaping two of its 
central aspects: members’ formal voting rights and their usage on the one hand, and board 
professionalisation on the other. These aspects of internal governance are important because 
they outline the governing model of an organisation that can range from membership centred - 
where members engage in rule-based participation, meaning that they actively use the formal 
rights granted to them by organisational statutes and are represented on the boards - to a 
leadership centred model where members do not engage in rule-based participation and boards 
are dominated by external professionals. Furthermore, I argue that organisations with leadership 
centred models offer many opportunities for consultative participation, whilst organisations with 
membership centred models offer significantly fewer opportunities for consultative participation. 
Analytically, the study bridges legal analysis of regulatory requirements with organisational-level 
research on changes in internal governance in ten systematically selected non-profit membership 
organisations operating in the UK and the Netherlands - two contrasting regulatory regimes, 
representative of common law and the civil law non-profit tradition respectively. This exploratory 
qualitative comparative study utilised multiple sources of evidence including statutory regulation, 
secondary sources, organisational documentation, semi-structured interviews and email 
correspondence with legal experts and organisational actors.  
The findings suggest that in the UK, where non-profit law does not regulate the powers 
of organisational members, non-profit membership organisations vary in terms of who is granted 
formal voting rights: the wider members or the executive board. In contrast, non-profit 
membership organisations in the Netherlands provide a central role to organisational members 
and, in turn have a strong predisposition for rule-based participation. Furthermore, organisations 
operating under lower regulatory constraints across different legal regimes have executive boards 
filled in with organisational members as opposed to externally recruited professionals. 
Organisations that operate under high regulatory constraints in the UK have executive boards 
replete with professionals recruited from outside of the organisation. Finally, differences in 
consultative participation across organisations can be better explained by country and policy 
specific dynamics and organisational mission than by the governing model of the organisations.  
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“Modern organisations are immersed in a sea of law”  
(Edelman and Suchman 1997, 480) 
 
“Non-profit organisations should be viewed as products of a political system in 
which the state is the key supplier of the rules” (Bloodgood et al. 2013, 717) 
 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1. The Research Topic and the Research Question 
 
Non-profit regulation sets the institutional environment in which non-profit 
membership organisations form and maintain themselves (Guo 2007; Gugerty 
and Prakash 2010; Bloodgood et al. 2013). In developed democracies, the state 
has adopted a more pronounced regulatory and managerial role regarding 
voluntary organisations through the provision of legal status, fiscal benefits and 
state funding (Toepler and Salamon 2015; Fraussen 2013). The rise of the 
“regulatory state” and the changes in the welfare systems across developed 
democracies has increased the responsibilities of non-profit organisations 
(Brandsen and Pestoff 2006; Phillips and Smith 2014, 1142; Akingbola 2004). 
Since the 1980s, the role of non-profit organisations has expanded as the state 
increasingly contracts them in public service delivery (Kramer 1994; Salamon and 
Flaherty 1996; Cunningham and James 2011, 226; Smith and Smyth 2010, 277). 
These changes have altered the “status and style of state regulatory institutions 
and the regulatory toolbox used to shape the behaviour of charities and non-
profits, including registration, reporting and standards of conduct that are linked 
to privileges […]” (Phillips and Smith 2014, 1143). Due to the expanded role and 
benefits afforded to non-profit organisations in developed democracies, they face 
increased demands for effectiveness, impact, accountability, and transparency 
(Cornforth 2003; Billis 2010; Steen-Johnsen, Eynaud and Wijkström 2011; for 
discussion of Anglo-Saxon countries see Phillips and Smith 2014). The state 
imposes reporting and accountability requirements on organisations in order to 
be able to: control the financial transactions of organisations and; strengthen the 
capacities of organisations to sustain themselves financially and pursue their core 
missions effectively. 
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Despite a strong focus in the literature on the consequences on non-profit 
organisations from state funding and the contracting of public services, we need 
to recognize that only some non-profit organisations are dependent on state 
funding and the regulatory constraints related to its maintenance. In contrast, all 
of the non-profit organisations operating within a legal regime are constituted by 
the state through rules on legal forms and the majority of them are regulated via 
rules related to maintaining indirect benefits, such as legal and tax beneficial 
status. While the regulatory requirements related to the maintenance of tax 
benefits have attracted some attention in the third sector literature (Phillips 2013, 
883), only a few authors pay brief attention to the legal structures in which non-
profit organisations maintain themselves and the accountability regimes attached 
to them (Cordery et al. 2016, 281-282). To overcome this gap, this study sets to 
explore the constitutive and regulatory functions of non-profit law related to the 
adoption of legal forms and the maintenance of indirect benefits in developed 
democracies. The non-profit law which is the focus of this study encompasses 
mainly statutory legislation enacted by legislatures and -to a limited extent- case 
law produced by courts.1 Regulatory (or legal) constraints are hence defined as 
a set of legal requirements, costs, and obligations that organisations have to 
comply with when operating in a certain legal form and in order to maintain receipt 
of indirect state benefits. This study explores the ways in which non-profit law 
potentially affects the internal governance of non-profit membership 
organisations2 which are defined as self-governing, organised, private, voluntary 
organisations with membership, and that pursue aims that will benefit their 
members and/or the broader public (Salamon and Anheier 1997). Understanding 
the internal governance of non-profit membership associations is important 
because they constitute the core of civil society in democratic countries (Freise 
and Hallmann 2014, 7). 
                                                          
1 In this thesis I use law and regulation interchangeably, but this does not include bureaucratic 
rules i.e. what policy researchers regard as regulation. Only in limited situations does this study 
focus on obligatory rules issued by state agencies that specify legal constraints in line with the 
primary law. In this study I will not focus on the self-regulation of non-profit organisations (Bies 
2010), but only on the legal regulations for which compliance is obligatory. Compliance is 
assured in most cases by state agencies or by the courts (Bolleyer 2018, 37).  
2 Also referred to in the literature as associations. The term has been avoided here so as to 
distinguish the organisational form of a membership group i.e. association from the legal form of 
the association present across countries with civil law non-profit tradition.  
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Non-profit membership organisations are exposed to different regulatory 
constraints depending on their legal form, access to tax beneficial status, and the 
legal regime within which they are situated (Cornforth 2011, 1123). Differences 
in non-profit law related to legal forms and tax beneficial status create the 
possibility of conducting comparative research which focuses on the impact of 
different legal regimes on the internal governance of non-profit organisations 
(Cornforth 2011). I am interested in exploring the impact of legal forms in different 
legal regimes on formal voting rights of members, as well as the impact of 
exposure to regulatory constraints related to indirect benefits on board 
professionalisation in non-profit membership organisations. In summary, this 
study is interested in shedding light on the following question:  
Whether and how does non-profit law related to legal forms and indirect benefits 
affect – or fail to affect – the internal governance of non-profit membership 
organisations in developed democracies?  
The question of how a regulatory environment shapes organisational structures 
has not been a matter of sufficient academic attention (Kerlin and Reid 2009 803; 
Hustinx et al. 2014). The first contribution of this thesis is that it analyses non-
profit law related to legal forms and indirect benefits, aspects of law that affect 
many organisations in the population but have not been studied comparatively 
from an intra-organisational perspective. This thesis’ second contribution is that 
it bridges research on non-profit law with organisational level research on non-
profit governance, which have rarely been integrated in the same study (see 
Bolleyer 2018). Thirdly, the thesis brings conceptual and theoretical insights from 
both third sector research and interest group research when examining intra-
organisational change, two fields of study that overlap in the study of non-profit 
groups but have developed separately.  
The first two aspects of internal governance that I am focusing on in this study – 
formal voting rights for members and board professionalisation – are important 
because they outline the governing model of an organisation. An organisation 
can have a leadership centred model of governance, characterised by lack of 
formal voting rights and their use (i.e. absence of rule-based participation) and 
presence of board professionalisation. This is in contrast to a membership 
centred model of governance which is characterised by the use of formal voting 
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rights and absence of board professionalisation. The third aspect of internal 
governance that I focus on is, consultative participation3, which is a way for 
organisations to complement other types of membership involvement that are 
rule-based (AGM attendance, voting on issues and election of leaders) or to 
compensate for their lack thereof. This thesis is concerned with whether non-
profit law encourages one model of governance over the other. My main concern 
is not to evaluate groups against the ideal of internal democracy but to recognize 
that groups with diverse governing models produce different kinds of democratic 
effects (Warren 2001; see discussion below). My goal is to investigate the extent 
to which the law shapes internal governing models as opposed to other factors 
such as the core mission of the organisation (political, service provision or leisure) 
or the type of membership.  
In this thesis, I define legal forms as the types of organisational structures an 
organisation can adopt from a legal perspective. Indirect state benefits 
encompass legal personality and tax beneficial status, which are the two types of 
benefits most frequently accessed by non-profit membership organisations.4 
Legal personality means that an organisation is an incorporated body according 
to law and its members have limited liability. Tax beneficial status entails the 
provision of tax credits and exemptions for organisations whose purposes are in 
line with the public interest. Organisations with legal personality enjoy various 
benefits such as: contracts can be signed in the organisation’s name; a bank 
account can be opened for it; the organisation can own, rent, and sell assets; its 
founders have limited liability; it has increased legitimacy in front of government 
stakeholders; and it can apply for funding programs which are often eligible only 
for legal entities. Beneficial tax status is granted to organisations whose core 
purpose and activities are in line with the public benefit criteria defined by the 
state. In most democracies, tax benefits are granted directly to the organisation 
as well as to its donors. Tax beneficial status is usually accessed through a 
                                                          
3 In comparison to rule-based participation, member input through consultative representation is 
not binding for the leadership of an organisation because it is not rooted in formal voting rights 
enshrined in the organisations’ statutes. 
4 Indirect benefits differ from direct monetary state resources such as grants and contracts 
(Bullain and Panov 2012). There are other indirect state benefits available to non-profit 
organisations in developed democracies such as: non-financial support in the form of trainings, 
office equipment, marketing support etc., however, the forms of indirect benefits I am focusing 
on in this study are most common across countries/regulatory regimes, most frequently 
accessed by organisations. 
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registration process similar to the process of registration for accessing legal 
personality (Salamon and Flaherty 1996). The process of incorporation is 
normally less burdensome and costly than the process of accessing tax beneficial 
status.  
Non-profit governance is defined as the way in which organisations organise 
internally in terms of member enfranchisement and executive board composition. 
Some organisations may grant members formal voting rights while others will not. 
Formal voting rights are defined as the rights of ordinary members to attend the 
annual general meeting and elect their representatives. Rule-based participation 
is defined as the use of formal voting rights that are enshrined in organisational 
rules (governing documents such as statutes, constitution, articles of association 
etc.). Also, organisations may differ in the extent to which executive boards are 
composed of members as opposed to professionals recruited from outside of the 
organisational membership. In this thesis the focus is on board 
professionalisation, defined as the external recruitment of skilled volunteers with 
professional competencies, such as the skills, experience, and knowledge 
relevant for organisational maintenance, to fill in unpaid positions on the 
executive organ. Consultative participation is defined as the opportunities for 
members to comment on organisational matters and programmatic priorities. 
Unlike rule-based participation which entails the exercise of voting rights and 
results in binding decisions for the leadership, consultative participation does not 
generate binding outcomes. Leaders are free to tailor opportunities for 
consultative participation in line with an organisation’s needs.  
Steen-Johnsen et al. (2011, 565) suggest that we can learn much about how 
agency is organised and goals attained by studying internal governance 
structures across different national contexts of civil society, subsectors, and non-
profits. In order to answer my research question, the study focuses on two 
countries – the UK and the Netherlands – which represent different traditions of 
non-profit law and contrasting regulatory regimes. The UK is representative of the 
common law non-profit tradition, which is a relatively complex and constraining 
regulatory environment in comparison to the Netherlands, which is considered to 
be a permissive regulatory environment and representative of the civil law non-
profit tradition. The UK model of charity law and regulation has been followed by 
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other countries in the Anglo-Saxon world (Phillips and Smith 2014). The countries 
in this cluster have experienced substantive reforms of their non-profit law in the 
last decade and non-profit organisations in these countries have been subject to 
converging pressures in terms of increased accountability and oversight (Harding 
et al. 2014, 2; Phillips and Smith 2014). Therefore, findings about the impact of 
non-profit law on organisations’ internal governance in the UK are instructive for 
organisations in similar legal contexts. Dutch non-profit law remains largely static, 
with changes mainly concentrated in fiscal laws that regulate tax beneficial status. 
This is reflective of other developed democracies falling within the civil law non-
profit tradition. 
The organisations selected in the two countries are ten small5 non-profit 
membership organisations that operate on national level. Six organisations were 
selected in the UK and four organisations in the Netherlands that operate in the 
field of environment and health, these being two policy fields related to different 
availabilities of state funding and organisational density. Health organisations 
organise direct interests of members (patients or health professionals), whilst 
environmental organisations organise broader social interests. The selected 
organisations operate in different legal forms depending on the legal regime 
(common law or civil law) and differ in the configuration of indirect benefits, some 
having all indirect benefits (legal personality and tax beneficial status) whilst 
others one indirect benefit or none. Smaller national non-profit organisations are 
the most common type of membership organisation. The organisational literature 
on interest groups has focussed on large and dominant groups (Fraussen and 
Halpin 2016), whilst the third sector literature has focused on organisations of 
various sizes operating at both local and national level. This study enhances 
understandings of the internal governance of smaller organisations, and 
organisations which vary in their core mission and type of membership.  
Analytically, the study synthesizes legal analysis and in-depth organisational 
level analysis, which is a novel approach. Methodologically, the study implements 
a qualitative comparative approach, drawing on multiple sources of data including 
laws, bylaws, expert interviews, publicly available documents, newsletters, 
                                                          
5 Small in terms of membership size, ranging from min.250 to max. 10000 members, and not in 
terms of budget or staff size.  
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websites, 30 semi structured interviews and additional e-mail correspondence 
with organisational actors. The study recruited interviewees who take different 
positions in the organisation as an attempt to overcome the executive bias 
commonly present in the study of non-profit groups.  
In the next section, I will firstly discuss the relevance of studying the internal 
governance of non-profits and the gaps in the literature on non-profit law, the third 
sector, and interest group research that I aim to address. The chapter ends with 
an overview of the following chapters of the thesis.  
1.2. Why Care about the Internal Governance of Different Non-Profit 
Organisations?  
 
Why is it important to understand if and how law affects formal voting rights and 
board professionalisation? Why does it matter if the law incentivises the adoption 
of a governing model with a prominent role for members in decision making 
(membership centred model) over a leadership centred model with centralised 
decision making and a leadership composed of externally recruited 
professionals? Both political theorists and social scientists have associated non-
profit membership organisations with important social and political benefits 
(Warren 2001; Skocpol 2003; Salamon and Flaherty 1996; Dekker 2014). 
Drawing on Warren (2001) we can distinguish between individual democratic 
effects from membership involvement in internal governance, and political system 
(institutional) effects underlining the different functions that political and service-
oriented groups play in contemporary democracies.  
All non-profit membership organisations – independent of the type of membership 
and their core function e.g. advocacy groups, service providers as well as inward-
looking leisure groups – are valued for the opportunities that they provide for the 
development of broad political and civic skills (Freise and Hallmann 2014; Warren 
2001). Through active involvement in non-profit membership organisations, 
citizens can enhance their “sense of efficacy or political agency, information, 
political skills, capacities for deliberative judgement, and civic virtues.” (Warren 
2001, 71). This understanding of democratic effects is based on a Tocquevillian 
perspective on associations as schools of democracy and the assumption that 
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social participation in groups is democratically relevant (Jordan and Maloney 
2007, 2) because it generates political involvement (Dekker 2014, 46). According 
to Dekker (2014, 46), through their participation in associations: 
“People learn to participate in a meeting, to chair a meeting, to write a letter etc. 
[…]People also learn to tolerate and to deal with diverging opinions; they become 
informed about what is happening in their neighbourhood and in the wider 
society; the organisation provides social contact; it might broaden the sphere of 
interest, etc.”  
Therefore, understanding whether the development of some forms of 
membership involvement such as rule-based participation and board 
professionalisation are more likely in some legal regimes than in others is 
important.  
Freise and Hallmann (2014, 1) argue that contemporary non-profit membership 
organisations satisfy three core functions in the political system: 1. social 
integration of citizens, 2. the representation of citizen interests in front of decision 
makers and, 3. the delivery of social services to citizens. From a political system 
perspective, non-profit membership organisations are valuable insofar they 
shape the policy agenda in accordance with citizens needs and because they 
“provide services that reflect the true needs of the people they serve” (Guo and 
Zhang 2011, 325; Jordan and Maloney 2007, 2). Representational capacities, 
defined as the potential of organisations to “‘act for’ and ‘stand for’ particular 
constituencies” (Guo and Zhang 2011, 329; Guo and Musso 2007) are also 
important for advocacy and service-oriented organisations to be able to articulate 
citizens’ concerns in the public sphere and effectively shape, monitor and 
implement policy in line with members interests.6 Having leadership elections and 
member-led boards is not only important for devising organisational programs 
and services in line with members interests (Guo 2018), but also for assuring 
organisational continuity through membership retention. Some authors have 
argued that the decline of organisations with grassroots members (Putnam 2000, 
49; Schlozman et al. 2015) and the increase of “mailing list” organisations with 
“check book” membership (Putnam 2000, 51; Skocpol 1999; Jordan and Maloney 
2007) has led to a decline in social capital (Putnam 2000) and the quality of 
democracy (Skocpol 2003). Therefore, it is important to understand whether the 
                                                          
6 Warren (2001, 78, 83) calls these democratic effects ‘public sphere’ and ‘institutional’ effects of 
associations. 
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state in developed democracies, through legal means – intentionally or 
unintentionally – shapes the internal governance of organisations towards an 
enhanced or diminished role of members and constituencies. 
In this thesis, whilst I argue that membership involvement is important for both 
service providing organisations and political groups (see Guo 2018), I agree with 
Halpin (2006; 2010) that internal democracy is more-or-less important for different 
types of groups depending on their membership type. I recognize that for political 
groups that represent interests beyond the direct membership and rely on 
solidarity as “a nondemocratic form of political representation” (Halpin 2010, 85), 
representational capacities are less important.7 At the same time, I want to stress 
that this does not mean that groups that represent broader social interests –  such 
as environmental groups  –  do not involve members in governance and that they 
do not develop representational capacities.8 In line with Guo and Musso (2007) I 
expect that most non-profit organisations involve members to some extent and 
hence, exhibit some level of representational capacity. This can be limited to 
maintaining channels for communication with members and occasional 
opportunities for non-binding consultation on organisational policy and agenda, 
something that Guo and Musso (2007) call ‘participatory representation’. The 
thesis explores the variation of governing models across groups with different 
missions and membership types operating under different legal regimes.  
                                                          
7 Halpin (2006; 2010, 88, 95) proposes that not all types of organisations should be evaluated 
against the internal democracy ideal because some organisations do not represent the direct 
interests of members. However, in some groups that represent interests beyond the direct 
membership, it is not clear if members do not have direct concerns that the leadership want to 
take on board. For example, an environmental group which aims to protect marine life and 
coastal areas may organise both members that are directly affected by pollution on the coast 
(i.e. beach users, surfers etc.) and members that are not directly affected but are concerned 
about the issue. While the group advocates for a broader social issue which concerns a broader 
constituency including non-human subjects, it should also cater to the direct concerns of 
members living in coastal areas. The political efficiency of the group will depend on the 
expertise it mobilises in terms of scientific reports and the mobilisation of support from the wider 
public. Nonetheless we can still ask the question: to what extent are members’ concerns 
reflected in the organisational agenda, because there are indeed members who join the 
organisation due to their direct interests. This shows that even in so called ‘solidarity groups’ 
there is a potential for ‘meaningful’ membership involvement beyond check book participation, 
and this is important for both the legitimacy of the group in front of stakeholders and the 
maintenance of members. Whilst some members may be content with check book participation, 
others may expect opportunities for membership involvement. 
8 In fact, Binderkrantz (2009) in her study of internal democracy of groups in Denmark does not 
find significant difference between public interest groups (solidary groups) and groups that 
represent direct members interests (sectional groups). 
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1.3. Identifying Gaps: Studying the Intra-Organisational Consequences of 
Non-Profit Law  
 
Non-profit regulation has been studied either from a legal and policy perspective 
or from an intra-organisational perspective focusing on the potentially negative 
effects of legal pressures on non-profit organisations. Research on legal forms 
has been conducted largely by legal scholars who focus on describing the 
requirements for accessing and maintaining these forms in different legal 
regimes, and their evolution over time (Salamon 1997; Warburton 1986; van der 
Ploeg 2009; Cordery et al 2016; Stewart QC et al. 2011; van der Ploeg et al. 
2017). Similarly, in terms of tax benefits, the discussion is centred on the variation 
of regulation across legal regimes (see for example Moore 2005; Breen et al. 
2009; Moore, Hadzi-Miceva and Bullain 2008; Phillips and Smith 2014). On the 
organisational side, whilst third sector and interest group scholars have 
extensively investigated the impact of state funding and related regulatory 
constraints on the organisational form and practice of non-profits, the effects of 
legal regulations related to legal forms and indirect benefits remain unknown. To 
remedy these gaps, this thesis firstly adopts an organisational perspective on the 
study of non-profit law related to legal forms and indirect benefits in the UK and 
the Netherlands. This means that the thesis does not evaluate the law vis-à-vis 
its conformity with internationally formulated standards of non-profit law and does 
not evaluate the mechanisms and efficiency of enforcement across regimes. 
Instead, it analyses the legal constraints from the perspective of intra-
organisational governance. The focus is on the legal constraints the 
organisations have to comply with to be able to operate in the legal form chosen 
by the organisation, and to maintain indirect state benefits. In addition, the study 
synthesizes the legal analysis with organisational level analysis to be able to 
assess whether and how legal constraints shape aspects of intra-organisational 
governance.  
Legal and policy approaches are useful because they help us understand the 
development and variation of non-profit law between countries and portray the 
increasing complexity of legal environments in contemporary democracies 
(Bolleyer 2018, 15). Comparative research on classifying regulatory models and 
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regimes for non-profits has been a growing area of interest (see Salamon 1997; 
O'Halloran et al. 2008, Bloodgood et al. 2013; Breen et al. 2016; van der Ploeg 
et al. 2017; Bolleyer 2018).9 This thesis, to be able to explore empirically the 
potential consequences from non-profit law on internal governance, relies on 
knowledge about the legal environments for non-profits generated within the non-
profit policy and legal literature. However, legal and policy scholars often 
emphasize the need for improved regulation and demand more accountability 
from organisations towards the state, and by that they demonstrate a limited 
interest in the potential consequences of this trend on intra-organisational 
governance. They focus primarily on the efficiency of oversight, prevention of 
abuse of state benefits, and organisational compliance (Bolleyer 2018, 12-13). 
For example, there is a growing literature particularly focussed on the Anglo-
Saxon cluster of countries that highlights the evolution of accountability 
requirements, the effectiveness of regulatory tools, and the regulatory 
compliance of charities and other non-profits (Irvin 2005; Breen 2013; Hyndman 
and McMahon 2010; Fletcher and Morgan 2013; Phillips 2013, Phillips and Smith 
2014, McDonnell and Rutherford 2018). This thesis represents a departure from 
such approaches concerned with regulatory compliance, and instead, it is 
interrogating the organisational consequences of increased legislation. 
Third sector researchers, unlike policy and legal scholars, have been focused 
mainly on the effects on organisational form and behaviour resulting from 
potentially restrictive non-profit regulation10 (Bolleyer 2018, 12-13; Bolleyer and 
Gauja 2017) and legal regulation related to contracting public services (Smith 
2011; Smith and Smyth 2010; Toepler 2010). Regulatory constraints on political 
activities have been enshrined in public benefit regulation, lobbying regulation, 
and other rules related to combatting terrorism. In addition, dependence on state 
funding has affected groups’ political activities (Chavesc et al. 2004, 296; Lang 
2012; Leech 2006; Lu 2016; Almog-Bar and Schmid 2013, 17). The increase of 
state funding availability for non-profits has raised repeated concerns regarding 
                                                          
9 Also, few studies have focused on mapping and comparing self-regulatory initiatives of the 
non-profit sectors across countries (Breen et al. 2016, Bies 2010). 
10 The third sector literature has focused on the increased regulatory constraints related to 
counterterrorism measures in developed democracies (Bloodgood and Tremblay - Boire 2010; 
Bolleyer and Gauja 2017). The interest group literature has been primarily concerned with the 
consequences of different lobbying regulations (Lang 2012; Ozymy 2010; Holman and 
Luneburg 2012; Keeling, Feeney and Hogan 2017). 
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their increased centralization, professionalization and bureaucratization (Lang 
2012; Macmillan 2010, 5; Toepler 2010; Salgado 2010; Suarez 2010). The 
increased involvement of non-profit organisations in public service delivery and 
their operation under quasi market conditions has opened a line of research 
which highlights the hybridization of organisational characteristics in non-profit 
groups (Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005; Billis 2010; Hustinx et al. 2014; Smith 2014). 
These approaches are useful because they highlight the potential consequences 
of legal regulation on organisational behaviour and organisational form, and they 
advance an organisation-centred perspective towards the analysis of non-profit 
law. However, as mentioned before, limited attention has been paid to the 
consequences on internal governance from increased exposure to increasingly 
complex reporting and accountability requirements related to the maintenance of 
indirect state benefits, which are relevant for many non-profits within the 
population, including service-oriented and advocacy-oriented organisations (but 
see Bolleyer 2018).  
There is negligible representation in the literature of an investigation into the 
influence of legal forms and the maintenance of indirect benefits from an intra-
organisational perspective, which is the main concern of the thesis. In terms of 
legal forms, the only study I have encountered on this topic is limited to the 
analysis of legal forms in the UK vis-à-vis the normative model of associational 
democracy (Smith and Teasdale 2012). In terms of the organisational 
consequences of regulation related to indirect benefits, an exception is Morgan’s 
(1999) study which focuses on the responses of smaller unincorporated charities 
in the UK when exposed to the new accountability and reporting regime 
introduced with the 1993 Charities Act and the Charities (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 1995. He observed how changes in the regulation led to the 
development of the treasurer and the bookkeeper roles in small charities 
including the regulatory push towards semi-professionalisation of charity 
treasurers via accountancy and software training (Morgan 1999). Finally, in a 
chapter on government funding policies Toepler (2010, 133) suggested that direct 
monetary benefits have a stronger effect on organisational form than indirect 
state benefits. He hypothesized that the receipt of contracts has a strong effect 
on the bureaucratization of the organisation, in turn the receipt of grants has a 
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moderate effect and the receipt of tax credits has a weak effect. These 
hypotheses have not been empirically assessed. The three studies, each in its 
own way, serve as an inspiration for this thesis.  
1.4. Situating the Study within the Non-Profit Governance Literature  
 
This thesis combines theoretical and conceptual insights on internal governance 
derived from third sector and interest group literatures.11 The two literatures 
overlap in their interest in membership involvement and professionalisation of 
non-profit membership organisations. The third sector literature is concerned with 
membership engagement and the representational capacities of different types 
of non-profit organisations (Bramble 2000; Cnaan 1991; Guo 2007; Guo and 
Musso 2007; Holmes and Slater 2011). Similarly, interest groups scholars have 
demonstrated interest in studying intra-organisational democracy and forms of 
membership involvement across different types of interest groups (Maloney 
2009; Maloney and Jordan 2007; Binderkrantz 2009; Holyoke 2013; Lansley 
1996; Barakso and Schaffner 2007). Both literatures have studied the impact of 
external factors on organisational adaptation through professionalisation (Hwang 
and Powell 2009; Klüver and Saurugger 2013; Saurugger 2012; Salgado 2014). 
This thesis advances the knowledge on the relation between a specific external 
factor – non-profit law – and membership involvement, both rules-based and 
consultative, and a specific subtype of professionalisation – board 
professionalisation – by which it contributes to both literatures.  
In terms of internal governance research, third sector scholars have focused 
largely on non-profit boards, their evolution, relations with other actors, 
composition, and functions (Abzug 1996; Wood 1992; Abzug and Galaskiewicz 
2001; Ostrower and Stone 2006; Guo 2007; Ostrower and Stone 2009; Cornforth 
and Macmillan 2016; Cornforth 2003; Cornforth 2012). Cornforth (2011, 1129) 
has identified the need for a broader conceptualisation of non-profit governance 
                                                          
11 The third sector literature focuses on both service and advocacy oriented non-profit 
organisations in the context of topics such as philanthropy, volunteering and service-delivery, 
whilst the interest group literature focuses on interest groups, including non-profit and for-profit 
entities that have the aim of influencing the public policy agenda. The interest group literature 
focuses mainly on understanding policy influence and success.  
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that goes beyond studying board behaviour and that focuses on how governing 
structures evolve under external factors:  
“A broader conceptualization of non-profit governance needs to recognize that 
boards are part of a broader governance system, including regulators, auditors, 
and other key external stakeholders, such as funders, that can place 
accountability requirements on an organisation and its board. It also must 
recognize more fully how various internal actors such and managers, staff, 
members, and other specially constituted bodies like advisory groups may 
contribute to carrying out governance functions. This opens up a variety of new 
research questions about how different regulatory and funding regimes influence 
governance structures and practices within non-profit organisations and how 
different actors, such as managers, membership and advisory groups, contribute 
to carrying out different governance functions and how they manage the 
relationships and inevitable tensions between them.” 
This thesis aims to address these gaps in the literature by investigating how non-
profit groups organise internally across contrasting legal systems, with a focus on 
various aspects of internal governance, and how their governing models evolve 
under – different and often increasing – legal pressures.  
Some interest group scholars suggest that little is known about the way in which 
interest groups are governed internally (Berry and Wilcox 2009, 60) and that 
research on the internal governance and structure of membership associations 
is “thin relative to research on member entry and retention” (van Puyvelde et al. 
2016, 895). In the past, the population ecology approach has been widely 
employed to investigate how environmental pressures affect interest group 
populations’ formation and survival (Gray and Lowery 2000; Halpin and Jordan 
2009; Halpin and Thomas 2012). Halpin (2014, 1) points out that issues of 
organisational design in the interest group literature “are – and remain – themes 
for the footnotes of studies of ‘other’ things like influence, formation, maintenance, 
and population- level analysis.”12 Halpin (2014, 4-5) conveys how the literature 
on organisational formation has focused largely on explaining the collective 
action problems of establishing a group, whilst the organisational maintenance 
literature focuses on the development of organisational forms from a dominantly 
incentive exchange perspective13 (see Olson 1971; Moe 1980). He (2014, 5) 
                                                          
12 Whilst this still holds true, there has been a renewed interest in studies of organisational form 
and change of interest groups in the last decade (see Minkoff et al. 2008; Fraussen 2012; 
Fraussen 2013; Halpin and Daugbjerg 2013; Halpin 2014). 
13 Specifically, the organisational maintenance literature has developed an understanding of 
organisational form and development as a result of the leadership’s rational responses to the 
changing motivations of membership through adjustment of incentives (i.e. material, purposive, 
solidary) (Halpin 2014). 
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identifies the need for research that goes beyond the incentive exchange 
perspective and investigates how interest groups “adjust or modify the 
organisational models they commence their ‘careers’ with to survive.” This thesis 
adopts a lifecycle approach to the study of internal governance and follows 
changes in response to legal constraints. In that sense this thesis not only 
responds to calls in the literature for understanding organisational form over time 
but also expands the scope by looking at organisational changes in response to 
external pressures.14  
1.5. Thesis Outline  
 
In this chapter I have presented the topic of my research and my research 
question. I have also discussed the relevance of studying the internal governance 
of non-profit membership organisations. Finally, I have situated this study within 
the literature on non-profit regulation, as well as third sector and interest group 
literatures concerned with organisational form and internal governance. In this 
last section I present the chapter breakdown.  
In Chapter two, I define and discuss the central concepts of the study and the 
general theoretical perspectives. I also elaborate on theoretical expectations 
about the way regulation related to legal forms (the legal regime) and indirect 
benefits shapes aspects of internal governance. This study relies on institutional 
theory of organisational isomorphism and resource dependence theory and 
incorporates the idea of the organisational entrepreneur as a mediating factor 
through which law affects internal governance. The main argument is that non-
profit law shapes the governing model of an organisation by affecting two central 
aspects of governance: formal voting rights and their use and board 
professionalisation. The first expectation of the thesis is that the regulatory 
requirements related to the legal forms available for membership organisations 
have consequences for the adoption of formal voting rights and rule-based 
participation. The second expectation is that regulatory requirements related to 
maintaining indirect benefits have consequences for board professionalisation. 
The final expectation of the thesis is that opportunities for consultative 
                                                          
14 For research on organisational adaptation to state funding pressures see Guo (2007), 
Fraussen (2013), Salgado (2010).  
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participation vary across different governing models. The organisations’ 
governing models flux between membership centred, where members engage in 
rule-based participation and are represented on the boards, to leadership centred 
model where members do not engage in rule-based participation and have 
boards dominated by external professionals. 
In Chapter three I present the overall methodological approach and the research 
design implemented to assess the theoretical expectations presented in the 
second chapter. Analytically, the study synthesizes a legal analysis of available 
legal forms and regulatory constrains related to indirect state benefits, and an 
organisational level analysis of non-profit governance in ten smaller non-profit 
membership organisations in the UK and the Netherlands. Chapter three explains 
the two levels of case selection, including countries and non-profit organisations. 
Furthermore, it details the legal and organisational data with particular focus on 
document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The chapter also describes 
the stages of data analysis, the operational definitions of the central concepts and 
the alternative factors accounted for in the analysis. 
Chapter four is the first of five chapters in which I develop my empirical analysis. 
Chapter four conveys a legal analysis of the legal forms available for non-profits 
with members and the regulatory constraints related to the maintenance of 
indirect benefits in the UK and the Netherlands. The chapter first presents the 
general legal set-up for non-profit membership organisations in the two countries. 
Then it describes the differences in requirements for members’ rights to 
participate at an annual general meeting and appoint members of the board. 
Furthermore, it presents the analysis of differences in the intensity and character 
of requirements for maintaining legal personality and tax beneficial status 
(reporting and monitoring). In the end, the chapter concludes with a summary of 
findings and country-specific expectations. The analysis shows that in the UK 
adopting formal voting rights for the wider membership i.e. right to participate at 
an annual general meeting and elect the board in organisations operating in any 
legal form available is optional, whilst in the Netherlands the legal forms available 
for membership organisations grant special powers to the members to control 
and elect the board and attend the annual general meeting. Reporting 
requirements and statutory supervision are higher and more constraining for 
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organisations which have ‘all indirect benefits’ in the UK and the Netherlands, 
while organisations operating with only legal personality or ‘no indirect benefits’ 
are exposed to lower regulatory constraints in the two countries.  
Chapter five builds on the findings of the legal analysis related to the differences 
in requirements for members’ rights for available legal forms in the two countries. 
The chapter engages with the first aspect of internal governance of interest to the 
study - adoption and change of formal voting rights of non-profit membership 
organisations. Based on the legal analysis, the expectation is that in the UK 
organisations are more likely to adopt governing models which do not grant 
members formal voting rights, whilst Dutch organisations are more likely to grant 
formal voting rights to their members. The chapter firstly presents the analysis of 
four organisations with legal personality and two organisations without legal 
personality in the UK, and secondly, it presents the analysis of four Dutch 
organisations with legal personality. The chapter concludes with a summary and 
discussion of the findings and their implications. The findings show that 
organisations studied in the UK have more diverse governing structures than 
those in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, as expected, the four organisations 
under study have a democratic structure where the members enjoy formal voting 
rights. 
Chapter six assess whether formal voting rights as stipulated in an organisation’s 
governing document are used in practice (i.e. rule-based participation) across the 
ten organisations. Organisations are assessed on whether they hold an AGM for 
the wider membership, and whether members elect the members of the 
executive. The expectation is that organisations with formal voting rights 
stipulated in the governing documents will experience some level of rule-based 
participation by members. The chapter firstly presents the findings on rule-based 
participation in the British and Dutch organisations which have formal voting 
rights. And secondly it assesses the rule-based participation of organisations 
which limit such rights to members of their executive, in order to understand what 
led to this change. The findings show that six out of seven organisations which 
granted formal voting rights for members have – as expected – some level of 
rule-based participation by their wider membership. Organisations where formal 
voting rights were limited to the executive board, before the formal change 
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occurred demonstrated limited rule-based participation or an absence of such 
participation by their wider membership. 
Chapter seven builds on the findings of the legal analysis related to analysis of 
differences in the intensity and character of requirements for maintaining indirect 
state benefits - legal personality and tax beneficial status. The chapter engages 
with the second key aspect of internal governance of interest to the study - board 
professionalisation. The organisational level assessment aims to capture whether 
organisations representative of different indirect benefit configurations show 
signs of board professionalisation. The expectation is that non-profit membership 
organisations maintaining indirect benefits which are exposed to high reporting 
requirements and external supervision will undergo board professionalisation, 
whilst organisations which are exposed to lenient reporting requirements and little 
or no external supervision will not. The chapter presents the findings for 
organisations in the UK and the Netherlands exposed to high regulatory 
constraints, followed by the findings for organisations exposed to low regulatory 
constraints or none in the two countries. In line with the theoretical expectations, 
the findings show that the three charitable companies in the UK which are 
exposed to high regulatory constraints and supervision, underwent 
professionalisation of the board. In the Netherlands, we find evidence that 
organisations operating with ‘all available’ indirect benefits (i.e. formal 
associations with ANBI status) have professionalised their boards, however, 
there is no evidence that this happened in relation to increased exposure to high 
constraints. The findings show that two out of three organisations exposed to low 
regulatory constraints in the UK, as expected, do not show signs of board 
professionalisation through external recruitment of professionals, whilst 
organisations exposed to low regulatory constraints in the Netherlands did not 
undergo board professionalisation.  
Chapter eight builds on the findings from Chapter six and seven, and illustrates 
how organisations cluster in terms of their governing model based on the two key 
dimensions of governance: rule-based participation and board 
professionalisation. The chapter then investigates whether opportunities for 
consultative participation differ across organisations with different governing 
models. Four organisations, three in the UK and one in the Netherlands, have a 
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leadership centred model of governance, with an absence of rule-based 
participation and presence of board professionalisation. The expectation is that 
organisations with a leadership centred governing model offer many opportunities 
for consultative participation in order to maintain the link with their members. Four 
organisations, two in the UK and two in the Netherlands have a membership 
centred model of governance with rule-based participation and an absence of 
board professionalisation. The expectation was that organisations with a 
membership centred governing model offer few opportunities for consultative 
participation because they already invest in maintaining rule-based participation. 
The analysis shows mixed results across the different governing models, which 
indicates that consultative participation is shaped by policy specific dynamics and 
is used to both complement and substitute rule-based participation and member 
participation on the board.  
The thesis concludes with a summary of findings and a discussion of the 
normative, theoretical and empirical implications of the study. The final words are 
dedicated on avenues for future research.  
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2. Theoretical Framework  
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework which guided the empirical 
study. The main assumption underpinning this thesis is that organisations do not 
adopt or change a governance model in a vacuum and that the relations between 
key internal actors (members and leadership) are structured by law, and the roles 
these actors play in organisations are conditioned by legal pressures. The aim of 
this thesis is to disentangle the possible ways in which non-profit regulation 
affects internal governance of non-profit membership organisations through 
constituting certain legal forms and regulating the maintenance of indirect 
benefits. The first main argument is that the regulatory requirements related to 
the legal forms available for membership organisations have consequences for 
the adoption of voting rights in organisations’ statutes, defined as the rights of 
ordinary members to attend the annual general meeting and elect the executive 
board, and the use of these formal rights in practice. The second main argument 
is that regulatory requirements for maintaining indirect benefits have 
consequences for board professionalisation, meaning the recruitment of skilled 
volunteers outside of the organisational membership to fill in unpaid positions on 
the executive organ. The thesis furthermore argues that legal regulation by 
shaping these two aspects of governance – formal voting rights and their use and 
board professionalisation – defines the governing model of an organisation. The 
main theoretical argument is presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical Argument 
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The organisations’ governing model can range from membership centred, where 
members engage in rule-based participation (i.e. active usage of formal rights 
granted in organisational statute) and are represented on the boards (i.e. there is 
absence of board professionalisation), to leadership centred model where 
members do not engage in rule-based participation and have boards dominated 
by external professionals.15 The argument is that non-profit regulation, depending 
on the legal forms available in the legal regime and the configuration of indirect 
benefits the organisations maintain, will encourage one model of governance 
over the other. At last, the thesis develops expectations about opportunities for 
consultative participation across different governing models. The final argument 
is that organisations with leadership centred models will offer many opportunities 
for consultative participation, whilst organisations with membership centred 
models will offer only few opportunities for consultative participation.  
In this chapter, firstly, I present the broader theoretical lens through which the 
relationship between law and organisational governance is theorized. Secondly, 
I define the central concepts of the study. Thirdly, the chapter elaborates on the 
specific theoretical expectations about the way regulation related to legal forms 
(the legal regime) and indirect benefits shapes features of internal governance. 
Because of the exploratory nature of the study, theoretical expectations are 
formulated as useful ‘heuristic tools’ to structure the empirical analysis, and do 
not suggest that the study will engage in theory testing along a probabilistic logic.  
2.2. Theoretical Perspective on the Law and Organisational Governance  
 
To be able to perform their core functions, organisations first and foremost have 
to ensure their survival (Wilson 1995; Lowery 2007). The state enhances the 
chances of survival of different voluntary organisations by offering state benefits 
(Fraussen 2013, 408). Moreover, the state defines the choice of legal forms in 
which organisations can maintain themselves. The main argument is that 
regulation affects the internal governance in two ways: through the available legal 
                                                          
15 There is a continuum between membership centred and leadership centred models and 
organisations can be associated with one or another. Some cases might not fully be associated 
with a model but be closer to one end. For example, if an organisation has rule based participation 
whilst the executive board is increasingly professionalised, then the organisation will not fully 
match the membership centred model but be closer to it than to the leadership centred model.  
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forms within the non-profit regime (constitutive function of law) and through 
regulatory constraints related to the maintenance of indirect state benefits 
(regulatory function of law). 
Analytically, the study synthesizes legal analysis of non-profit law and 
organisational level analysis. Theoretically, it relies on institutional theory of 
organisational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) in conceptualising organisational 
response to the legal environment. In doing so I am following other studies of 
non-profit organisations that have shown the complementarity of the two 
approaches (Guo 2007, 461; Frumkin and Kim 2002; Mosley 2012).  
Neo-institutional theory of organisational isomorphism assumes that 
organisations will modify their characteristics to be compatible with external 
pressures and will converge in the same direction with other organisations facing 
the same type of pressures (Di Maggio and Powell 1983, 150; Ashworth et al. 
2007, 169; Rauh 2010). This means that organisations operating within the same 
institutional environment will become homogeneous in terms of their governing 
structures (Anheier 2005, 147).16 The focus here is on the coercive pressures of 
regulation exercised by the state (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Ashworth et al 
2007, 167), because the concept of coercive pressures is a central tool for 
understanding the impact of regulation on internal governance. Non-profit 
membership organisations operate in an organisational field where the state - 
through its institutions - imposes certain regulatory constrains (coercive 
pressures) in return for indirect benefits and organisational legitimacy:  
“In many case studies, coercive isomorphism turns out to be a critical element in 
the evolution of non-profit organisations. When organisations are subjected to 
external coercive scrutiny, evaluation, and regulation, they tend to react 
defensively and gravitate toward isomorphic transformation. As the pressures 
from the outside grow, organisations often find ways to either diffuse or eliminate 
this pressure by changing their internal practices. One of the easiest ways for 
organisations to change is to adopt those routines and structures that are defined 
by law or government agencies as legitimate - doing so may ensure survival by 
minimizing conflict” (Frumkin and Kim 2002, 2). 
                                                          
16 This vision of organisational change is representative of sociological institutionalism and the 
‘cultural’ approach in organisational theory (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 
30). 
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Whilst the focus is on the coercive pressures, the study recognizes that the 
concepts of normative and mimetic pressures can be useful in understanding 
leadership choices that diverge from the expected direction. Leaders who are 
motivated by professional norms will enhance regulatory compliance and mimic 
other organisations which they perceive as legitimate and efficient. According to 
institutional isomorphism, normative pressures are exercised through 
transmission of widely accepted norms i.e. through professions (Zucker 1987, 
444). Or in the words of Mosley (2012, 845) “[n]ormative isomorphism occurs as 
a feature of professionalisation, specifically shared understanding due to similar 
formal education and professional networks”. Moreover, organisations can adapt 
by imitating rules and practices that are successfully applied by other actors in 
the organisational field (mimetic pressures) (Zucker 1987, 444). Organisations 
copy other organisations which are perceived to have higher legitimacy (Mosley 
2012, 845).  
In addition to coercion, the state also uses inducements to achieve its goals (Scott 
1987, 509). Influence through inducements means that organisations adopt 
certain features and modes of behaviour in return for incentives offered by the 
state (Scott 1987, 504). Resource dependency theory proposes that 
organisations are constrained by the environment (external forces) because they 
depend on it for survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; De Corte and Verschuere 
2014). More specifically, resource dependence theory aims to “explain how an 
organisation’s strategy, structure, and survival depend on its resources and 
dependency relationships with external institutions” (Hodge and Piccolo 2005, 
172). The basic idea behind the resource dependence logic is that, when the 
organisation receives resources from the state, which are crucial for its stability 
and survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the organisational structure and 
strategy will be adjusted in line with the demands placed by state institutions 
(Hodge and Piccolo 2005, 174).  
According to the adherents of sociological institutionalism, in order to survive 
organisations adopt organisational structures which will “enhance the social 
legitimacy of the organisation” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 949). According to resource 
dependence theory, to be able to maintain state resources, organisations should 
adopt efficient organisational structures (Scott 1987, 502–503). The two 
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motivations are not mutually exclusive. For example, in order to maintain access 
to state funding the organisation is mandated by law to conform to the obligations 
in the funding contract, but also organisations voluntary choose to comply with 
certain norms of behaviour (quality of reporting and accountability, insiders 
political strategy etc.) in order to establish legitimacy in front of stakeholders and 
maintain their eligibility to continued funding from the state (Scott 1987, 503). 
Even though there is a disagreement of what motivates leaders to initiate 
organisational changes, whether this is related to economic efficiency or social 
legitimacy, the bottom line is that organisations adapt to external pressures to be 
able to survive. In other words, organisations “conform because law commands 
them to do so and imposes sanctions for noncompliance” (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997, 496). And the compliance is driven either by the material needs 
of organisations or the need for social legitimacy, or by both considerations. 
Organisations operating in the same legal forms and exposed to the same 
regulatory constraints will tend to have high degree of organisational similarity, in 
line with the assumptions of institutional isomorphism.  
This study does not assume that law ‘causes’ organisational responses 
automatically and recognizes the role of leadership in mediating change. The idea 
of the group leader as entrepreneur17 as developed by Terri Moe (1980, 37, 122) 
defines the entrepreneur as a rational actor who is driven by both economic 
considerations (e.g. financial sustainability of the organisation) and non-material 
motives (e.g. ideology and democratic values). The main goal of the entrepreneur 
is to ensure group survival by both managing exchange relationships with the 
members within the administrative structure and realising organisational goals in 
the political system (Moe 1980, 37). Building on the idea of the leader as an 
organisational entrepreneur, I agree with Halpin (2014, 105) that leaders cannot 
automatically determine the characteristics of the group as they wish, but they 
can shape the direction of organisational change by introducing their 
interpretations of the environment and, when circumstances allow, initiating 
change in accordance with their perceptions. “In this sense, legal regulation is 
often “enacted” (Weick 1979) at a fairly local level, with intraorganisational 
professional [leadership] playing a significant part in determining which 
                                                          
17 He uses the term political entrepreneur (Moe 1980, 36).  
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institutional norms and scripts get reflected in organisational structures […]” 
(Edelman and Suchman 1997, 499). Nevertheless, the main emphasis of this 
study is not on the role of agency, but on the potential role of law in the adoption 
of key features of governance.  
2.3. Conceptual Framework 
 
In the next section I will present the conceptual framework of the study. First, I 
will define the term non-profit membership organisation as used in this study. 
Secondly, I will provide definitions of non-profit regulation and specify the terms 
– legal forms, indirect benefits and regulatory constraints. Finally, I will define 
non-profit governance and specifically the aspects of interest: formal voting rights 
and rule-based participation, board professionalisation and consultative 
participation.  
2.3.1. Non-Profit Membership Organisation  
 
Non-profit membership organisations are part of the diverse organisational field 
constituting civil society18, a “functionally differentiated sphere of society” 
(Enjolras 2015, 3), distinct from the private economic sphere - the family and the 
state (Jenkins 2006; Anheier 2005). In this study non-profit membership 
organisations are defined as self-governing, organised, private, and voluntary 
organisations with membership, which pursue aims that will benefit either their 
members or the broader public. This definition is based on the structural 
operational definition proposed by Salamon and Anheier (1997, 33-34). The 
strength of this definition is in its ability to encompass a wide set of organisations 
that share structural and operational characteristics across different geographical 
contexts, and it is particularly useful for cross-national research (Salamon and 
Anheier 1997, 38-40). This definition is one of the most regularly used in non-
profit research (Guo and Zhang 2011, 326).  
Importantly, the definition of non-profit organisations used here additionally 
includes the element of membership. To study changes in membership 
involvement, the study has to focus on organisations who have the potential to 
                                                          
18 In the thesis, I will use the term third sector interchangeably with civil society.  
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engage individuals as collectives (for similar argumentation see Halpin 2010, 31). 
Members are defined simply as individuals who joined the organisation by 
accepting its mission and statute. I do not choose to define members through 
their voting rights in the organisation simply because the aim of this study is to 
investigate the (often changing) nature of being affiliated with an organisation, 
which can range from just receiving information of the work of the organisation or 
certain benefits (e.g. access to facilities; right to training) in return for regular 
membership fee payments, to having final authority on who will govern the 
organisation and what kind of programmatic priorities it will pursue (NCVO 2018). 
Moreover, some membership organisations may provide members with the 
‘ultimate authority to decide’ (Salamon and Flaherty 1996, 13) on paper, while in 
reality that authority may be exercised differently than what is formally stipulated. 
Therefore, this study adopts a minimal definition of membership that does not 
attach any expectations regarding the way they are engaged within the 
organisation.  
Organisations within the scope of this study are ‘non-profit-distributing’ and 
exclude ‘mutual benefit organisations’ such as cooperatives, mutual insurance 
companies, banking and building societies which have pronounced commercial 
orientation (Salamon and Anheier 1997, 42). Helmig et al. (2011, 6) group non-
profit organisations in two broad categories, organisations which are involved in 
direct service delivery (i.e. social services, health, education etc.) and those that 
fulfil expressive functions (i.e. human rights groups, environmental groups, 
professional groups, business and labour groups etc.). Interest groups or 
advocacy groups are defined as organisations whose main aim is to influence 
public policy without competing for public office (Beyers et al. 2008; Halpin 2010, 
34; Fraussen and Halpin 2016), and service-providing organisations, existing 
predominantly to provide services to members and/or the general public 
(Saurugger 2012). This distinction, even though analytically useful does not 
reflect the fact that many non-profit organisations are engaged in both types of 
activities, and some organisations can shift their dominant core purpose during 
their lifetime (Minkoff 2002). The definition of non-profit membership 
organisations adopted here is inclusive of organisations with variety of purposes.  
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Some authors distinguish broadly between sectional interest groups which are 
founded to represent and pursue the interests of their members and public 
interest groups founded with the purpose to benefit the broader public or 
vulnerable social groups (Salamon and Flaherty 1996, 31). Organisations which 
are pursuing the interests of its affiliates (which overlap with their constituency or 
beneficiaries) are also referred to as representative groups (Halpin 2010, 95). 
Public interest groups are also known as solidarity groups which aim to influence 
decision making in order to pursue certain collective good (e.g. clean 
environment, social justice, gender equality) and benefit a broader social basis 
than their direct members (Berry 1977, 7; Binderkrantz 2009, 659; Weiler and 
Brändli 2015, 748). In this type of organisation there is often little overlap between 
the organisational mission and members’ benefits (Halpin 2006; Binderkrantz 
2009, 659). In the words of Halpin (2010, 95) “the affiliates and the 
beneficiaries/constituency are mutually exclusive in solidarity groups.” The 
definition of non-profit membership organisations adopted here includes both 
organisations which predominantly cater to members interests, and organisations 
which predominantly cater to non-members’ interests (e.g. the broader public, 
future generations, non-human populations). 
The organisations of interest in this study are those who are organised, as 
opposed to informal, lose and temporary gatherings (e.g. citizen initiatives and 
social movements). The concept of organised groups does not include only 
formal organisations understood as having specific legal forms. As Salamon and 
Anheir (1997, 33) rightly point out “[I]nstitutional reality can also be demonstrated 
in other ways where legal incorporation is either not chosen or not readily 
available – by having regular meetings, officers, rules of procedure, or some 
degree of organisational permanence.” Therefore, organisations without legal 
personality are within the scope of the study, as long as these organisations have 
an established ‘institutional reality’. Organisational formation does not always 
overlap with the moment of incorporation, and this study recognizes that some 
organisations establish their organisational structures before they acquire legal 
personality and throughout their lifetime operate in an organised 
(institutionalised) form.  
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Non-profit membership organisations as defined in this study are suitable for 
understanding the impact of accessing and maintaining different state benefits 
and while the definition excludes mutual benefit organisations, it encompasses a 
variety of non-profit, voluntary, private and organised groups with different core 
missions and membership type.  
2.3.2. Non-Profit Law  
 
Non-profit law encompasses the rules and directives that aim at constituting the 
organisational structures and controlling the behaviour of non-profit 
organisations. The legal regulation I focus on in this thesis encompasses the legal 
rules constituting available legal forms for non-profit membership organisations 
and the regulatory requirements the organisation has to comply with in order to 
maintain indirect benefits as defined in the following section. In the thesis I use 
law and regulation interchangeably, and by that I refer to statutory legislation 
enacted by legislatures and (where applicable) case law produced by courts.19 
Non-profit regulation as defined here may be spread throughout different laws 
(fiscal regulation for public benefit status, laws on associations and foundations, 
criteria for state funding may be regulated with separate law or bylaw etc.) or it 
may be contained in one primary law. Only to a limited extent the study refers to 
obligatory rules issued by state institutions or agencies that specify legal 
constraints in line with primary law. The definition of non-profit regulation adopted 
here differs from definitions used by public policy scholars who understand 
regulation as prescriptive rules (see Bolleyer 2018, 33). Moreover, this study is 
not focusing on self-regulation of non-profit organisations (Bies 2010), but only 
on mandatory regulation enacted and enforced by state institutions.  
Understanding national patterns on non-profit law is important because these 
reveal the underlying relationship between the state and civil society actors 
(Adam et al. 2015, 328) and specifically the way in which states constitute and 
regulate organisations through law. Based on Edelman and Suchman (1997, 
479) here I focus on the constitutive and the regulatory function of non-profit law. 
                                                          
19 Bolleyer (2018, 34) shows that even in common law countries non-profit organisations have 
been predominantly regulated by statutory legislation which has overwritten case law. 
Therefore, studying regulatory constraints in these jurisdictions, same as in civil law jurisdictions 
requires the analysis of statutory legislation. 
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The law understood as a constitutive environment means that “the law defines 
the basic building blocks of organisational forms” (Edelman and Suchman 1997, 
479) and by that, determines “what types of organisations come into existence” 
(Edelman and Suchman 1997, 483). Van der Ploeg states that the core aim of 
private law, and specifically non-profit law is to create rights and obligations which 
balance the interests of founders, members, donors, employees, clients and the 
broader public (2009, 3). The different legal forms available for non-profit 
membership organisations across legal regimes regulate the positions of these 
interests to each other (van der Ploeg 2009, 3). This is in line with the constitutive 
function of law that determines the building blocks of organisational structures 
and the role of actors within them (Edelman and Suchman 1997).  
On the other hand, the regulatory function of law is manifested through the active 
control of organisational behaviour (Peters and Nispen 1998). The law is a tool 
for social manufacturing: “The legal system (presumably on society’s behalf) is 
taking the initiative directly to modify organisational behaviour.” (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997, 483). The law achieves its regulatory (controlling) function 
through the allocation of benefits and constraints or costs enforced by the state 
(James 2000, 327). In the policy instruments literature, the focus is mainly on the 
regulatory function of law and its authoritative element (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 
1998; Thomann 2017, 56; see also Howlett 2011). For instance, Vedung’s 
definition of regulation accentuates this authoritative element: “[R]egulations are 
measures taken by governmental units to influence people by means of 
formulated rules and directives which mandate receivers to act in accordance 
with what is ordered in these rules and directives” (Bemelmans-Videc 1998, 10). 
Similarly, other authors define regulation as the rules and directives that impose 
binding requirements, often combined with a mechanism for monitoring and 
sanctioning regime to assure compliance (Vedung 1998, 31; Adam et al. 2015, 
328; Thomann 2017). Hence, regulation has a core substantive component which 
is directing how one should or should not behave, often accompanied by a 
coercive component which is setting the extent to which authoritative force will be 
used to assure compliance (Vedung 1998, 34).  
When non-profit membership organisations decide to access state benefits they 
become subject of legal rules and compliance requirements enforced by various 
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state agencies such as public registers for private entities, tax authorities, 
ministries etc. Depending on the stringency of legal regulation, in terms of 
accountability and reporting requirements and enforcement structures we can 
distinguish between relatively constraining and permissive non-profit regulation. 
Constraining regulation imposes extensive reporting and administrative 
requirements in relation to maintaining certain benefit, while permissive 
regulation implies either lenient reporting and administrative requirements or 
none at all. The study focuses mainly on legal regulation enacted by legislatures 
because it aims to capture how organisations adapt in response to widely applied 
and mandatory legal rules.  
2.3.2.1. Legal Forms  
 
The available legal forms for membership organisations are the first important 
step in understanding the governing structure non-profit organisations adopt and 
the decision-making power (potentially) given to members. In this thesis legal 
form is defined as the organisational structure organisations adopt from a legal 
perspective (NCVO 2018). This definition of legal form is suitable because it 
encompasses both incorporated (with legal personality) and unincorporated 
organisational structures. The choice of legal form is particularly important for 
setting the organisational (decision-making) structure of the organisation.  
Unincorporated legal forms are usually a subject to judge-made law, while 
statutory laws specify the characteristics which qualify organisations for legal 
recognition i.e. incorporated legal forms (Salamon and Flaherty 1996, 4). In some 
countries, organisations can obtain legal personality (incorporate) qua formation 
(i.e. acquisition by a private act), while in others the process entails registration 
in a publicly maintained register (acquisition of legal personality by a public 
decision) (van der Ploeg 2009, 8). In majority of countries the state is involved in 
the registration or incorporation of non-profit organisations, however there are 
few countries where establishing legal personality is a private matter of the 
founders (van der Ploeg 2009, 8). At the time of legal creation, key matters of 
internal governance must be defined including the locus of authority in the 
organisation and the decision-making procedures (Salamon and Flaherty 1996, 
13). The locus of authority being the “basic legal issue concerning the internal 
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management of non-profit organisations” should be clearly set and two main 
options are available: a governing model in which the ultimate authority rests with 
members or a model in which the ultimate authority rests with the board which is 
“self-perpetuating and is not subject to a control of a membership” (Salamon and 
Flaherty 1997, 21).  
Importantly, legal forms available for non-profit membership organisations differ 
across common law and civil law countries (van der Ploeg 2009). The distinction 
between associations and foundations was provided by the Roman civil code and 
these are the two main legal forms available in civil law countries (Simon et al. 
2016, 1140). In common law countries, non-profit membership organisations can 
operate as unincorporated associations or incorporate as limited companies or 
charitable incorporated organisations (e.g. New Zealand, UK). According to van 
der Ploeg (2009, 7) civil law countries stipulate in law detailed rules on the internal 
organisation, whilst the common law countries have fewer specific regulations on 
regarding the internal structure. In most legal contexts when an organisation is 
created as a legal person the responsibility for the organisational affairs is 
assigned to an executive body – the governing board (Renz and Smith 2010, 15-
16). This also applies to organisations whose members have the ultimate 
authority and usually elect a board which has the power to act on their behalf 
(Salamon and Flaherty 1997, 21). The law may also stipulate how the board will 
be constituted, and the organisation will specify the rules within its governing 
document (i.e. constitution, statute, articles of association etc.). Whilst in all legal 
environments boards are assigned legal and fiduciary responsibilities20, the 
requirement to grant members with voting rights to elect the board varies across 
contexts (Tschirhart 2006, 533).  
The understanding of legal form adopted here puts an emphasis on the 
organisational structure understood from a legal perspective, and it encompasses 
both unincorporated and incorporated legal forms which might differ in the legal 
requirements related to their governing structure.  
                                                          
20 Fiduciary duty or responsibilities represent a standard of care and good management which 
exists between someone who is entrusted with authority and someone who depends on the 
person exercising authority. Fiduciary duties are set in law to assure responsible exercise of 
power.  
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2.3.2.2. Indirect Benefits and Regulatory Constraints  
 
Indirect state benefits are the main way in which non-profit membership 
organisations become entangled with the state. Bullain and Toftisova (2005, 17) 
define indirect state support as the benefits which enable organisations to use 
assets for achievement of statutory goals. The literature usually refers to tax 
benefits as indirect state benefits, however, in this thesis by indirect benefits I 
refer to legal personality and tax beneficial status, both being key privileges which 
the organisations can access only from the state, and there is no alternative 
source of such privileges. State privileges, according to Bolleyer (2018, 36), can 
come in the form of rights and protections given by the state or material benefits. 
Usually, tax benefits and state funding are regarded as material benefits from the 
state (Toepler 2010; Bolleyer 2018). And legal personality is regarded as a form 
of privilege through which the state grants rights and protections for the 
organisation (Bolleyer 2018, 36). However, because this study aims to focus on 
the most common state benefits non-profit organisations access in developed 
democracies beyond direct monetary support I include tax benefits and legal 
personality together as forms of indirect state benefits.  
Accessing legal personality is the process of creation of legal personality through 
“registration in the civil law systems and incorporation in the common law 
systems” (Simon et al. 2016, 1147). Through incorporation groups gain the right 
to open a bank account, gain rights to enter into contracts, own, rent and sell 
assets. Importantly members of incorporated organisations gain limited liability. 
Incorporated organisations, in some countries due to their registration with the 
state are often eligible to apply for funding programs as opposed to 
unincorporated associations. According to Simon et al. (2016, 1147) “[r]egistering 
or incorporating an NPO is done when a greater level of formality is desired, 
which has special legal and practical benefits.” Some groups may avoid 
incorporation to minimize the costs related to maintaining legal personality, but in 
the same time cannot enjoy key rights and protections e.g. limited personal 
liability for the executive board and staff. 
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Tax beneficial status, known as charitable status21 in common law countries and 
public benefit status in civil law countries, is a form of indirect material benefit 
granted to organisations whose core purpose and activities are serving the public 
interests as defined by the state. To acknowledge their contribution to the public 
good, the state provides a range of tax benefits or exemptions (Bullain and 
Toftisova 2005). In most democracies, the tax beneficial status brings both tax 
beneficial treatment for the organisation itself and tax beneficial treatment for 
donors (corporations, individuals etc.). Tax benefits is a “forgone revenue” or 
“revenue that will not be collected” from non-profit organisations (Bullain and 
Toftisova 2005, 17). Tax benefits are fiscal exemptions and credits granted to the 
organisation, sometimes directly through registration as a legal entity and 
sometimes through a separate procedure for accessing tax beneficial status 
(Salamon and Flaherty 1996). Registration is a way to verify the eligibility to 
generous state benefits which are increasingly available for non-profits (Salamon 
and Flaherty 1996, 10). Applying to the tax authorities or a specific body (state 
agency) are the two main ways to obtain tax beneficial status (Simon et al. 2016, 
1151). Organisations which are engaged in both advocacy and service delivery 
as their core missions, depending on the public benefit legislation may qualify for 
tax beneficial status (Bullain and Toftisova 2005).  
In addition to eligibility criteria for tax beneficial status, the laws set procedures 
“for monitoring the continued appropriateness of such status for particular 
organisations” in the form of financial and non-financial reporting requirements 
(Salamon and Flaherty 1996, 19). According to Salamon and Flaherty (1996, 26) 
“[…] the purpose of such requirements is to provide a means of confirming, 
through periodic reporting and disclosure, that a non-profit organisation is in fact 
conducting activities consistent with its purposes and beneficial tax status and 
devoting its financial resources to the fulfilment of those purposes.” These rules 
are set in fiscal or charity regulation. In general, organisations with tax beneficial 
status (charity or public benefit organisations) are subject to stricter reporting 
regime – higher level of transparency and accountability demands - than other 
non-profit organisations (Bullain and Toftisova 2005, Simon et al. 2016, 1153). In 
                                                          
21 It is important to note that charity is not a legal form in itself, but a quality given to non-profit 
organisations due to their public benefit purpose (van der Ploeg 2009, 10). 
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the words of Phillips and Smith (2014, 1148): “State regulation for the third sector 
has focussed primarily on ‘charities’ (under various labels), while the broader set 
of non-profit organisations that are also exempt from income taxes but cannot 
issue tax receipts are only lightly regulated, if at all.” To secure compliance with 
these reporting requirements, the laws may establish supervisory bodies 
responsible for enforcement of investigations, penalties and ultimately removal of 
tax beneficial status in case of non-compliance (Cordery and Deguchi 2018). In 
some jurisdictions the tax authorities have an oversight and enforcement function 
(for example in the US and Canada; Phillips and Smith 1148; Breen 2013). The 
establishment of autonomous regulators - independent agencies, government or 
non-ministerial departments - to oversee the work of charities and safeguard the 
public benefit are particularly characteristic for common law countries (Cordery 
and Deguchi 2018, 1339, see also Phillips and Smith 2014). Moreover, in 
common law countries, charity law is characterised with constraints on political 
activities (Lang 2012, 103) i.e. “governments define ‘charity’ restrictively, limiting 
charities’ ability to advocate against public policy or to take other political action” 
(Cordery and Deguchi 2018, 1334). 
Organisations that maintain legal personality and tax beneficial status are subject 
to certain reporting and accountability requirements. Regulatory (i.e. legal) 
constraints are hence defined as the set of requirements, costs and obligations 
stipulated in non-profit law that the organisation must comply with in order to 
maintain the receipt of indirect state benefits. Whilst there might be constraints 
related to accessing state benefits, here the focus is on the conditions for 
maintaining benefits because the expectation is that maintenance will incentivise 
board professionalisation. According to Bolleyer (2018, 37): “Organisations might 
have to comply with reporting requirements or to refrain from certain activities 
while enjoying certain privileges.” Hence, refraining from activities due to the legal 
limitation on political activities of organisations with tax benefits (i.e. charities) 
falls within the understanding of regulatory constraints of this study.  
Depending on the type of organisational access to indirect benefits within each 
legal regime we can identify up to three configurations which differ in the 
combinations of indirect benefits they have: 1. organisations with ‘no indirect 
benefits’; 2. those that are eligible for one type of indirect benefit - legal 
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personality or tax beneficial status - and 3. organisations with ‘all indirect benefits’ 
that have both legal personality and tax beneficial status. These configurations 
differ in the type and intensity of regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting 
requirements) they are exposed to. The character and stringency of the reporting 
requirements vary across countries and can change over time within one country. 
Organisations with the same configuration of indirect benefits operating in 
different regulatory regimes may be exposed to different intensity of regulatory 
constraints. Simultaneously, within the same legal regime, I expect regulatory 
constraints to increase when organisations changes configuration from ‘no 
indirect benefits’ to ‘all indirect benefits’.  
In the next section I will define the key aspects of internal governance this study 
accounts for.  
2.3.3 Non-Profit Governance 
 
Questions of internal governance are key to our understanding of the value of 
non-profit membership organisations for members and societies (Tschirhart 
2006, 534). Drawing on a definition of governance offered by Steen-Johnsen et 
al. (2011), I define non-profit governance broadly as the way in which groups 
organise themselves internally to formulate and accomplish their goals. The 
governing model is shaped by two dimensions: formal voting rights and their use, 
i.e. do members control and elect the leadership? And board professionalisation, 
i.e. are member or external professionals represented on the board? I focus on 
formal voting rights and their use in practice on the one hand, and board 
composition (professionalisation) on the other, as two characteristics of 
governing structures of non-profit membership organisations that I expect to be 
affected by non-profit regulation related to legal forms and maintaining indirect 
benefits. These two aspects are particularly important for the development of 
democratic skills of citizens through participation in internal decision making at 
AGMs or board meetings (Warren 2001) and they shape the representational 
capacity of non-profit organisations (Guo and Musso 2007; Guo and Zhang 
2011). This means that the focus is on the role of members and the executive 
board within the organisation. In the context of the third sector literature this is a 
novel approach since the theory of internal governance has focused largely on 
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the relationship between the executive board and professional staff (Cornforth 
2003, 12; Cornforth and Macmillan 2016).  
Non-profit research on internal governance has largely focused on the functioning 
of boards, mainly due to the board’s legal and fiduciary responsibility to govern 
the organisation (Cornforth 2011, 1117; Ostrower and Stone 2007, 428; 
Andersson 2012). Stone and Ostrower (2007, 418) argue that by focusing solely 
on the board, researchers fail to grasp the role of other organisational actors, 
including staff, volunteers and beneficiaries in shaping organisational 
performance, mission and policies. Similarly, Cornforth (2011, 1117, 1122) 
suggests that we should not equate the work of the board with non-profit 
governance and such approach is ignoring the wider (regulatory) governance 
pressures on the one hand, and on the other it ignores internal actors who play a 
role in organisational governance. According to him: 
“[a] broader conceptualization of non-profit governance opens up new questions 
for research concerning the relationships between different parts of the 
governance system, such as how regulation, audit, inspection, and funding 
regimes can influence governance structures and practices at the organisational 
level, or what contribution other internal actors such as managers, staff, and 
members make to carrying out governance functions” (Cornforth 2011, 1122).  
 
One of the core questions regarding non-profit membership organisations’ 
governance is ‘how much power to give to members’ (Tschirhart 2006, 533). The 
literature on governance has noted the existence of different governing models 
depending on the members role in non-profit organisations i.e. their ability to 
control the executive and elect the members of the executive. We can distinguish 
between governing models which are characterised with absence of members’ 
powers to control and elect the executive, and governing models characterised 
by members’ voting rights and power to control the executive. The centralised 
model of governance has been empirically observed in large-scale political 
organisations (Michels 1962; Jordan and Maloney 1997). Skocpol (1999) and 
Putnam (2000) have noted the rise of professional groups where supporters have 
little engagement beyond paying fees. Jordan and Maloney (1997) have coined 
the term “protest business” for interest groups which are staff-led, 
professionalised and hierarchical, aim to maximise their efficiency and are 
maintained through ‘check-book membership’ (Maloney 2015, 102; see also 
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Bosso 2005). In this model there is little space if any for membership involvement 
in decision making, meaning that members are not enfranchised, and 
professional staff and key activists create the programmatic priorities (Halpin 
2014, 68). In contrast to this model stands the ideal typical membership 
association where members have opportunities for face-to-face meetings and 
can democratically elect and control the organisational leadership (Billis 2010; 
Halpin 2014, 60). 
 
Scholars have raised concerns that the centralised and professionalised model 
of interests’ groups is dominating the organisational landscape. However, this 
model cannot be generalised to the whole population, something that Clarence, 
Jordan and Maloney (2005, 135) in a jointly co-authored study rightfully point out: 
“the protest business model was based on a few better-known large scale beasts, 
but has been extrapolated as a generalisation for the whole campaigning sector 
in a way not originally intended or specified”(see also Jordan and Maloney 2007, 
146). In reality, governing models of groups are diverse and changing during the 
course of an organisation’s life (van Puyvelde et al. 2016, 897; Halpin 2014). In 
their study on campaigning groups in the UK, Clarence et al. (2005) find a ‘mixed 
reality’ of intra-organisational participation, with both bigger and smaller groups 
offering wide venues for members involvement. And exactly this variation of 
members’ role, particularly their power to exercise control and elect the executive 
board, is considered a central aspect of governance in this study.  
 
Another central aspect of non-profit governance of concern to this study is related 
to the composition of the board. The literature on non-profit boards formulates 
several models of board governance, out of which two make explicit assumptions 
on who the members of the board should be. The democratic perspective assigns 
a representational role to the board meaning that the board is elected from within 
the membership and its role is to represent the interests of the groups that the 
organisation serves (Cornforth 2003, 9). This perspective is consistent with the 
ideal typical membership organisation mentioned above. In contrast, the 
stewardship model assumes that the role of the board is to support the work of 
staff with its expertise and experience (Cornforth 2003, 13). Therefore, the 
members of the board should have the professional skills to meet their role of 
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organisational stewards. Appointment of members of the board through targeted 
recruitment will result in a board of professionals with needed skills and links to 
key stakeholders – who can act as organisational stewards and support the work 
of the executive office (Cornforth 2003). In essence, the democratic and the 
stewardship models clash over who the members of the board should be – 
professionals with expertise and skills or ‘lay persons’ representative of the 
constituency (Cornforth 2003, 13).  
 
In the following section I will define the concepts of formal voting rights and rule-
based participation, board professionalisation and consultative participation, 
being central aspects of interest. The study explores how formal voting rights and 
board professionalisation are shaped by the constitutive and regulatory function 
of non-profit law. The variation in consultative participation, the last aspect of 
interest, is explored across organisations with different governing models. 
 
2.3.3.1. Formal Voting Rights  
 
Formal voting rights in this study include the rights of ordinary members to attend 
the annual general meeting (AGM) and participate in decision-making through 
voting (Salamon and Flaherty 1996). The AGM is a forum where members are 
presented with the organisational accounts and can directly question the work of 
the leadership; therefore it plays an important accountability function (Cordery 
2005, 2). The formal voting rights may encompass voting for candidates for the 
executive board, vote for formal proposals for amendment of organisational rules, 
other proposals concerning organisational policy and programmatic priorities. 
The specific voting rights granted to organisational members in non-profit law 
may vary across legal regimes and for different legal forms within a legal regime. 
In this study the focus is on the right to attend the AGM and the right to elect the 
members of the executive board because these are two rights that are commonly 
stipulated in legal regulation across developed democracies. Moreover, even 
though there are other membership rights guaranteed through legal regulation 
(see Bramble 2000, 304), the rights of members to elect the leadership is the 
minimal guarantee that organisations are representative of their members and 
members have right to ‘voice’ discontent by voting down members of the board. 
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Holding of “free and open elections”, according to Cnaan (1991, 617), is “the 
hallmark of all democratic societies and organisations.” Without this the decision-
making power will be concentrated in the self-appointed leadership (Cnaan 1991, 
617). In sum, the voting rights I focus on are particularly important because they 
enable members to exercise control on the work of the executive and elect the 
organisational leadership (Guo and Musso 2007, 314). 
2.3.3.2. Rule-Based Participation  
 
Members can use or not use formal voting rights stipulated in organisational rules 
(i.e. statutes, articles of association, constitution). In this thesis, rule-based 
participation is defined at the use of formal voting rights enshrined in 
organisational statues. This means that stipulation of formal voting rights in the 
organisational statutes is a precondition for the existence of rule-based 
participation. Organisations may specify different formal voting rights in 
organisational statutes i.e. expand the rights beyond what legal regulation 
demands. And even in countries where legal regulation does not demand 
guarantees of key formal voting rights in organisational statutes, organisations 
may adopt such rights. The definition of rule-based participation captures whether 
there are actual opportunities for participation in organisations with formal voting 
rights enshrined in organisational rules and the extent to which they are used by 
members (for similar approach see Clarence et al. 2005, 142). Based on 
empirical research, we know that organisations that guarantee formal voting 
rights for members, in practice may operate with “dormant” members who are not 
actively encouraged by the leadership to participate (Lansley 1996; Locke et al 
2003) or simply refuse to use the opportunities for participation (Clarence et al. 
2005; Cnaan 1991). Bramble (2000) found that despite the presence of formal 
rights to elect the leadership in some unions, members controlled the leaders 
only to a limited extent. Exactly this discrepancy between potential and actual 
participation has been emphasized in non-profit research (Cnaan 1991; Leardini 
et al. 2016). Therefore, in this thesis I want to assess rule-based participation in 
organisations i.e. the usage of formal voting rights, as defined in organisational 
statutes, in practice.  
 
 49 
 
2.3.3.3. Board Professionalisation  
 
The second dimension of the governing models that this thesis expects to be 
affected by non-profit law is the composition of the board. Here I specifically focus 
on board professionalisation, which is defined as the external recruitment of 
professionals22 with competencies (skills, experiences and knowledge) relevant 
for organisational maintenance, including administrative and policy skills, to 
occupy unpaid positions. Before describing the characteristics of professionalised 
boards, firstly we need to recognize that professionalisation has been mainly 
defined through hiring of professionals for paid positions within organisations. 
Traditionally, there has been a distinction in the organisational literature between 
paid staff and volunteers (Hwang and Powell 2009) and professionalisation has 
been associated with paid staff (Kriesi 1996, 154). For example, Lang (2012, 75-
56) conceptualizes professionalisation as the number of employees who do 
administrative and management work. In the same vain, Klüver and Saurugger 
(2013, 187) suggest that organisations professionalise through hiring part-time or 
full-time staff specialized in carrying-out managerial and administrative tasks.23 
Despite the dominant distinction between paid staff and volunteers (Hwang and 
Powell 2009), third sector researchers have noticed that organisations can also 
professionalise through recruitment of professionals for unpaid positions in the 
executive body in response to increased environmental pressures. Hwang and 
Powell (2009, 274) themselves suggest that there is a “spread of expertise” 
coming from “volunteer executive directors and board chairs who are employed 
in professional activities in the for-profit or government sectors and “loan” their 
skills to non-profits.” Managerial professionals are particularly recruited to fill in 
leadership and board positions (Suarez 2010b; Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001). 
Therefore, to explore the potential consequences from regulatory constraints 
related to maintaining indirect benefits, I focus on board professionalisation.  
 
                                                          
22 Individuals who belong to the category of professionals “derive legitimacy and authority from 
their formal education and claims to specialized expertise” (Hwang and Powell 2009, 268). 
23 Klüver and Saurugger (2013, 187) specifically define professionalisation as the “increasing 
hiring of professionals (or specialists) whose competencies have been certified by a specific 
profession (such as lawyers or economists).” 
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What does board professionalisation look like? Organisations increasingly recruit 
‘organisational professionals’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and select 
professionals for unpaid executive positions that have managerial, administrative, 
legal and accounting skills (Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001; Groninger 2011; 
Harrow and Palmer 2003). Smith (2011, 214) argues that boards are 
professionalising by recruiting professionals such as “lawyers, accountants and 
high-tech entrepreneurs” and marginalising members without such 
competencies. Similarly, Guo (2007, 462) claims that non-profit organisations 
“overtly reflect the culture of professionalism in its board composition i.e., include 
fewer community representatives and more professional, corporate, and social 
elites to gain legitimacy in the eyes of government agencies and win contracts 
from them”. The executive board can professionalise by recruiting professionals 
within or outside of the organisation24 who poses competencies that are 
perceived as useful for organisational maintenance such as legal, managerial, 
accounting, financial, PR, charity and non-profit experience. In massive 
organisations, internal recruitment of professionals (for unpaid leadership 
positions) may undermine descriptive representation of the board because 
members taking status functions share similar traits with the elite or are 
assimilated by the elite over time (Michels 1962). Descriptive representation 
concerns the extent to which the organisational leadership mirrors the ‘political’ 
characteristics of its constituency (Pitkin 1967; Guo and Musso 2007, 314). In the 
words of Guo and Zhang (2011, 329): “Descriptive representation occurs when 
leaders of an organisation are in some respects typical of the organisational 
constituents.” In smaller membership organisations, internal recruitment of 
members with particular skills is less likely to undermine descriptive 
representation because of the proximity of the board and the members. 
Therefore, board professionalisation here is defined as the external recruitment 
of professionals and experts with competence (skills, experiences and 
knowledge) relevant for organisational maintenance. Even though members of 
the board in some organisations are eligible for reimbursement or small 
honorarium for traveling and meetings, in principle the roles in the executive 
                                                          
24 This is similar to the recruitment of professional staff for paid positions. Political parties often 
recruit employees form within the membership. Among non-profits recruitment of professional 
staff is mainly done outside of the organisations. The same recruitment paths – internal and 
external - exist when it comes to unpaid positions in the executive board.  
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organ are voluntary and unpaid. For smaller membership organisations to have 
their board professionalised, the element of external recruitment of professionals 
with skills for organisational maintenance for unpaid positions should be present. 
Executive boards of non-profits that are professionalised through external 
recruitment of board members are characterised by low descriptive 
representation (Guo 2007; Guo and Musso 2007). Bramble (2000, 303) in his 
study on unions representation distinguishes between ‘organic’ and ‘outsider’ 
leaders, organic being those leaders who have similar experiences, social and 
educational background as members that elect them, while outsider leaders do 
not arise from the members and lack similarity thereof. There are suggestions 
that a lack of descriptive representation i.e. ‘organic leaders’ which share similar 
experiences, social and educational background as the members, undermines 
the efficiency of external representation of interests (Bramble 2000; Guo 2018). 
Having professionalised boards risks that the visions of members and leadership 
over the organisational direction diverge significantly, and that externally 
recruited leaders, rather than members have the final say in shaping 
organisational priorities. In this way, professionalisation of non-profit boards 
allegedly shifts the logic of operation from expressive value-oriented mission to 
an instrumental logic of operation focused largely on organisational performance 
and survival (Frumkin 2002; Stewart 2014, 9-10). 
Professional management and leadership  
Before moving to the third dimension of interest, I want to briefly focus on the 
concept of professional management. By professional management I refer to the 
“the top salaried position[s] in non-profit organisations, variously labelled 
executive director, CEO, chief professional officer (CPO), or president” (Norris-
Tirrell et al. 2017, 147). The professional management, when present in an 
organisation, acts as an organisational entrepreneur that can shape the 
organisational direction (Moe 1980; Halpin 2014, 105). Therefore, professional 
managers act as agents of change within organisations, and this concept is useful 
for accounting for organisational change and particularly in the context of this 
study accounting for the process through which non-profit law shapes aspects of 
non-profit governance. This conceptualisation is in line with the literature that 
suggests that the rise of the managerial professionals, a subsection of the 
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occupational group of professionals who share “administrative or management 
training and similar occupational norms” had profound effect on organisational 
management (Hwang and Powell 2009, 269-270). More specifically, studies 
found that rationalisation of the organisational structure takes place after hiring a 
paid executive director (Stone 1996; Wood 1992) and that staff-driven 
organisations demonstrate “higher level of rationalization in program planning, 
financial management and performance evaluation” (Lu 2015, 301). According to 
Maloney (2015, 102) members of professional staff in organisations have been: 
“educated to degree level, have accredited professional/vocational qualifications 
in a diverse range of areas - for example, economics, finance, management, 
administration, public relations communication, human resources, marketing, 
recruitment, fundraising, law and relevant areas of the physical and natural 
sciences - and have previous employment experience with other interest groups 
or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), government institutions (regional 
and national) and corporate actors.”  
Importantly, in this study organisational leadership in addition to salaried 
managerial positions encompasses also leading unpaid positions in the executive 
board such as chairman or president of the board. This is in line with the literature 
which suggests that board members and particularly executive managers are 
often catalyst for organisational change (Baluch 2012). Also, empirical evidence 
collected for this study shows that members of the executive boards assume 
leadership roles and act as agents of change. Hence, throughout the text, 
professional managers and members of the board who assume leading roles are 
referred to as the leadership because they have a status function in the 
organisation and hold executive positions.  
In summary, according to the definition of board professionalisation adopted in 
this thesis, a board is professionalised when many of the board posts are filled in 
with professionals outside of the organisation. Bringing outside recruits on the 
board means that members of the organisations do not have a chance or have 
fewer opportunities to occupy leading positions within the organisation. Having 
many people with expertise on the board may enhance the organisational 
efficiency, but also divert the focus from members needs or advancement of core 
mission towards organisational maintenance i.e. improvement of financial 
standing and administration. Boards where many of the positions are filled in with 
members recruited within the organisation, regardless of their professional 
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profile, are not considered to be professionalised boards. The assumption is that 
members will emphasize the substantive over instrumental interests.  
2.3.3.4. Consultative Participation  
 
There are variety of ways to facilitate members’ participation beyond rule-based 
participation which is based on formal voting rights as stipulated in the governing 
document. For example, organisations may consult members over programmatic 
priorities through surveys, focus groups, advisory groups etc. (Greer et al. 2003; 
Warleigh 2001; Maloney 2015; Saidel 1998). In this study, consultative 
participation is defined as the opportunities for members input on organisational 
matters and programmatic priorities that are non-binding for the leadership. This 
form of participation does not entail final authoritative decision making via voting 
and, as already stated, goes beyond formal voting rights. Opportunities for 
consultative participation can be direct i.e. members directly provide feedback on 
online forums, via surveys, at organisational events, and indirect25 i.e. the input 
is mediated through middlemen who transmit information from the members to 
the leadership and vice-versa (Moe 1980, 45). The organisational offer of 
opportunities for consultative participation is equally important as studying 
individual-level participation and its determinants, because prompting members 
to participate in consultative fora may translate into greater participation. 
Exploring consultative participation is important especially in the context of the 
new technologies which provide organisations with cost-effective tools to receive 
members’ input. This form of members’ participation is consistent with Guo and 
Musso’s (2007) additional dimension of organisations’ representational 
capacities – participatory representation. In their words, participatory 
representation “highlights the importance of maintaining a variety of channels of 
communication and participation between an organisation and its constituents to 
ensure that the organisation is receptive to its constituents” (Guo and Musso 
2007, 315).  
                                                          
25 Direct opportunities for consultative participation may be provided via surveys, emails, online 
forums, face-to-face meetings during events, and indirect opportunities for consultative 
participation may be provided through communication with regional representatives.  
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In the previous sections I have presented the broader theoretical perspective, the 
definitions this thesis is based on, and now I will elaborate on the specific 
theoretical expectations that guided the empirical research.  
2.4. Theoretical Expectations  
 
The main contrast I am exploring in this thesis is related to the type of legal forms 
available across legal regimes and the complexity and intensity of regulation 
related to maintaining indirect benefits across configurations within each legal 
regime. The thesis is based on two fundamental observations. First, legal regimes 
differ in the types of legal forms available for membership organisations, with 
some specifically regulating formal powers for members and others not. Second, 
regardless of the non-profit tradition (common law or civil law) and the type of 
regulatory regime (constraining or permissive), within a regulatory regime we can 
distinguish between up to three configurations which differ in the combinations of 
indirect benefits they have and consequently they differ in the type and intensity 
of regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting requirements) they are exposed to. On the 
basis of these observations in the following sections I develop expectations on 
the way non-profit law shapes non-profit governance of non-profit membership 
organisations.  
2.4.1. The Impact of Legal Forms on Formal Voting Rights 
 
Legal regimes differ in the types of legal forms available for membership 
organisations, with some specifically regulating formal powers for members and 
others not. The main expectation here is that the state affects the formal voting 
rights of organisations through the available legal forms. Lansley (1996, 223) 
suggests that non-profit law shapes formal voting rights through legal 
requirements and the extent to which members are involved in decision-making. 
He suggests that (1996, 224) “legal or similar requirements may place the 
organisation in a constitutional strait-jacket which predetermines the amount of 
membership involvement which is possible.” Organisations that operate in 
regimes where there is requirement for organisations to grant formal voting rights 
for members will comply in order to access the legal form available for members. 
In countries where there is no such requirement, organisations will have a choice 
to operate with or without formal voting rights. In that sense, the law by not 
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regulating internal governance leaves it to the organisational entrepreneurs to 
decide whether to enfranchise members or not. Professional managers led by 
professional motives for efficiency and economic considerations will be “free” 
from constraints to adopt a centralized decision-making structure. Studies have 
suggested that organisational leaders who poses managerial and administrative 
competencies, try to enhance the chances of organisational survival by altering 
the organisational structure of the organisation (Maloney 2015, 99). Jordan and 
Maloney (2007, 161) argue that: “Servicing a membership can be a drain on 
organisational resources – members are more expensive than supporters or 
donors”. Organisations with voting members may face difficulties since elections 
are costly, maintaining informed membership is time-consuming, organisations 
may face difficulties in achieving quorum for meetings etc. Therefore, even 
though membership groups may initially adopt a governing structure which grants 
members the right to elect the leadership, in countries where the law does not 
explicitly require members to have voting rights, the leadership, in order to 
enhance organisational efficiency is incentivized to initiate revision of the formal 
organisational structure to limit or all together terminate such rights.  
The first expectation of this study is:  
Formal rights expectation: Non-profit membership organisations operating in 
legal regimes providing legal forms which require formal voting rights for 
members will guarantee such rights in their governing documents. Organisations 
operating in legal regimes providing legal forms which do not require formal voting 
rights for members will either not have them or limit their use in practice.  
Some authors suggest that organisations may mimic compliance (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997, 496), and that there is discrepancy between the formal rights and 
their use in practice (Lansley 1996; Locke et al. 2003). However, here we expect 
organisations operating in countries where legal forms for membership 
organisations require formal rights for members to offer actual opportunities for 
participation. This is in line with the understanding of law as a constitutive 
environment which determines the types of organisations that come in existence 
and their organisational structures (Edelman and Suchman 1997, 479). Hence, 
the second expectation of this study is:  
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Rule-based participation expectation: Organisations with formal voting rights 
stipulated in their governing document will provide opportunities for use of these 
rights in practice i.e. will have some level of rule-based participation.  
In the next section we turn to the theoretical expectation about the influence of 
regulatory constraints related to indirect benefits on board professionalisation.  
2.4.2. The Impact of Indirect Benefits on Board Professionalisation 
 
Non-profit membership organisations which enjoy indirect state benefits face 
regulatory constrains which yield certain adjustment costs for the organisation. 
The main observation is that, regardless of the non-profit tradition (common law 
or civil law) and the type of regulatory regime (constraining or permissive26), 
within a regulatory regime we can distinguish between up to three configurations 
which differ in the combinations of indirect benefits they have and consequently 
they differ in the type and intensity of regulatory constraints. Starting with the ‘all 
indirect benefits’ configuration, non-profit organisations which have both legal 
personality and tax beneficial status will be exposed to highest regulatory 
constraints. Non-profit membership organisations that have beneficial tax status 
but do not have legal personality will operate under lower regulatory constraints 
compared to the previous configuration. Compared to only having legal 
personality, maintaining tax beneficial status normally requires the organisation 
to comply with stricter requirements. Therefore, a non-profit organisation that only 
has legal personality will operate under a lower level of regulatory constraints and 
normally have obligations towards one public authority (which maintains the 
register of legal persons). Finally, an organisation that operates without any 
indirect benefits will be exposed to few reporting obligations or none. This 
analytical distinction is in line with the law understood as regulatory environment 
(Edelman and Suchman 1997), that maintains organisational control through the 
allocation of benefits and constraints (James 2000, 327). 
Maintaining indirect benefits involves becoming subject to certain reporting and 
accountability requirements (Salamon and Flaherty 1996, 11; Cordery et al. 
                                                          
26 Earlier we distinguished between relatively constraining and permissive non-profit regulatory 
regimes, depending on the stringency of the regulation in terms of accountability and reporting 
requirements and enforcement structures related to maintaining indirect state benefits. 
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2016). Such reporting may span from simple obligations, such as reporting 
changes to the registration details, to more comprehensive reporting, such as 
submission and disclosure of annual financial and narrative accounts. The latter 
obligations require specialist knowledge or skills, for example legal or accounting 
skills. Given the importance of indirect benefits for organisational maintenance 
and survival, the organisations will comply with reporting requirements stipulated 
in law. Depending on the size of the organisation (in terms of budget) and the 
complexity of accountability and reporting requirements it is exposed to, the 
organisation may require professional competencies to assure compliance 
(Breen 2013, 854).  
Edwards and Cornforth find that boards play a strong compliance role in response 
to legal responsibilities:  
“The state has an important coercive and normative influence on governance 
through its policies, legislation and guidance. Legal responsibilities emphasize 
non-profit boards’ compliance role – checking propriety and legality, safeguarding 
assets and organisational mission, and accounting for expenditure.” (Edwards 
and Cornforth 2003, 94).  
Coercive pressures imposed through regulations affect the functions and 
priorities of the board and consequently the type of people they recruit (Edwards 
and Cornforth 2003, 80). This is also compatible with resource dependence 
theory, according to which the board members are selected for their technical 
knowledge including legal competencies in acquiring and maintaining key 
organisational benefits (van Puyvelde et al. 2016, 904-905; Cornforth 2003, 8-9). 
Both Smith (2011, 214) and Guo (2018) have argued that boards are 
professionalising to be able to maintain their state benefits. Here the focus is on 
indirect benefits, because receipt of state funding is more likely to result in 
professionalisation through hiring staff, as it is often stipulated in grants and 
contracts, and not in board professionalisation.  
This thesis draws on Cornforth (2003) who argues that boards may 
professionalise in order to meet their legal responsibilities and it suggests that if 
an organisation is exposed to demanding and complex regulatory constraints it 
is more likely to professionalise by recruiting external experts to sit on its 
governing board. The boards of organisations operating under higher regulatory 
constraints will have higher responsibilities “which have legal ramifications” and 
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“call on board members to develop or hone understanding in many areas, from 
financial management to organisational communication, from fundraising to 
strategic planning” (Renz and Smith 2010, 15). 
In line with the fiduciary and legal duties, the board is ultimately responsible for 
the financial and administrative management of the organisation. By gaining 
control over organisational information, professional management may shape the 
functions of the board (Cornforth 2003, 16) and use them as tools for 
manoeuvring the changing legal and financial environment (Baluch 2012, 18). In 
fact, the professional management of organisations that are exposed to high 
regulatory constraints related to indirect benefits, may itself facilitate board 
professionalisation by providing descriptions and specifications of skills needed 
for board members and actively participating in the recruitment of professionals 
in the board (i.e. interviewing candidates) (Locke et al. 2003, 7). Burt and 
Scholarios (2011, 108) suggest that “[e]xternal imperatives for professional 
recognition have also influenced the volunteer profile, reinforced by the 
preference among professionals to deal with fellow professionals.” In 
organisations with formal voting rights, where members elect the board, there can 
be also a system of so called “guided democracy” where the elected members of 
the board are those preferred by the existing trustees or executive managers 
(Locke et al. 2003, 66). The organisational entrepreneur (a chief executive, 
chairman or someone else within the leadership) facilitates professionalisation of 
the board in response to increased regulatory pressures related to indirect 
benefits. In sum, the leadership may co-opt the nominating procedures, so the 
profiles of the candidates match their preferences. This is more likely to happen 
in organisations which are exposed to high regulatory constrains i.e. maintain 
legal personality and tax beneficial status.  
The third expectation of this study is as follows:  
Board professionalisation expectation: Non-profit membership organisations 
maintaining indirect benefits which are exposed to high reporting requirements 
and external supervision will undergo board professionalisation, whilst 
organisations which are exposed to lenient reporting requirements and little or no 
external supervision will not.  
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In sum, the core argument is that reporting and accountability requirements 
imposed through regulation will incentivise professionalisation of the board 
through the external recruitment of professionals that have managerial, 
administrative, communication, legal and accounting skills to serve in voluntary 
(unpaid) executive positions.  
In the next section I will present the last theoretical expectation of this study 
related to the variation of consultative participation across governing models.  
2.4.3. Consultative Participation across Governing Models  
 
This study acknowledges that members can increase their representational 
capacity through other channels for participation which are consultative in nature, 
and not binding for the leadership. The variation in consultative participation, the 
last aspect of interest, is explored across organisation falling under different 
governing models. This thesis argues that regulation shapes two aspects of 
governance – formal voting rights and their usage and board professionalisation. 
I differentiate between organisations with membership centred governing models 
characterised by rule-based participation and non-professionalised boards and 
leadership centred models characterised by absence of rule-based participation 
and the presence of professionalised executive boards.27 The argument is that 
non-profit regulation, depending on the legal forms available in the legal regime 
and the configuration of indirect benefits the organisation maintains will 
encourage one model of governance over the other.  
Members join non-profit membership organisations, being advocacy or service 
oriented, in return for material, solidary, purposive incentives (Clark and Wilson 
1961) as well as valuable information (Puyvelde et al. 2016, 899). Since 
membership is an important “source of legitimacy, finance, and voluntary help” 
(Lansley 1996, 226), organisations are interested in maintaining their 
membership base - sustaining their members’ loyalty and preventing their exit 
(Olson 1965; Hirschman 1970; Moe 1980). Therefore, provision of opportunities 
for members’ participation beyond the AGM is important for the leadership to 
                                                          
27 Membership centred models will have formal representation and will experience high 
descriptive representation whilst leadership centred models on the other are characterised by 
absence of formal representation and low descriptive representation. 
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understand members’ needs and interests. Here I argue that, while all 
organisations will maintain some way of communication with members, the extent 
to which organisations will offer opportunities for consultative participation will be 
shaped by the extent to which members are already involved through rule-based 
participation and the extent to which they occupy board positions. Organisation-
level opportunities for participation are shaped by the perception of the leadership 
(organisational entrepreneurs) on the extent to which membership input is 
necessary to be able to maintain the organisation (i.e. retain and increase 
membership and membership fees; signal legitimacy to policy makers; adapt 
services to members’ needs, etc.). Hence in leadership centred organisations, 
the leadership will enhance opportunities for consultative participation to be able 
to maintain the connection with organisational membership and prevent 
fluctuations, and to legitimize organisational decisions and policy stances. 
Organisations with membership centred models already maintain the connection 
with members through rule-based participation and members’ direct presence in 
the executive board, thus the leadership would not be incentivised to invest 
additional resources in enhancing membership participation. The forth 
expectation is as follows.  
Consultation expectation: Organisations that have leadership centred 
governing model will provide many opportunities for consultative participation. 
Organisations with membership centred governing models will provide fewer 
opportunities for consultative participation. 
2.5. Conclusion  
 
The chapter presented the conceptual and theoretical framework and the specific 
theoretical expectations that guided the study. I have developed four 
expectations which are addressed in four empirical chapters. Theoretically, the 
study relies on institutional theory of organisational isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983) and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Organisational response to the legal environment, understood as constitutive and 
regulatory (Edelman and Suchman 1997, 479), is a result of both coercive 
pressures and inducements. And organisational entrepreneurs (Moe 1980) 
mediate the influence of law on organisational structure by introducing their 
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interpretations of the environment and, when circumstances allow, initiating 
change in accordance with their perceptions (Halpin 2014, 105). 
The study explores the ways in which non-profit law may affect non-profit 
governance of non-profit membership organisations which are defined as self-
governing, organised, private, voluntary organisations with membership, and 
pursue aims that will benefit their members, the broader public, or both. Non-
profit law encompasses the legal rules for constituting legal forms for non-profit 
membership organisations and the regulatory constraints related to maintaining 
indirect state benefits. Legal forms are defined as the types of organisational 
structures an organisation can adopt from a legal perspective. Indirect state 
benefits are the main way in which non-profit membership organisations become 
entangled with the state and encompass legal personality and tax beneficial 
status. Legal personality means that the organisation is an incorporated body in 
law and its members have limited liability, and tax beneficial status entails 
provision of tax credits and exemptions for organisations whose purposes are in 
line with the public interest. Non-profit governance is defined as the way in which 
organisations organise internally in terms of members enfranchisement and 
executive board composition. 
The thesis proposes that by shaping these two key aspects of governance – 
formal voting rights and board professionalisation – non-profit law shapes the 
governing model of the organisation (see Figure 1). Formal voting rights are 
defined as the rights of ordinary members to attend the annual general meeting 
and elect their representatives, and rule-based participation is defined as the use 
of these formal voting rights in practice. Board professionalisation, meaning the 
recruitment of skilled volunteers with competencies (skills, experiences and 
knowledge) relevant for organisational maintenance outside of the organisational 
membership to fill in unpaid positions on the executive organ.  
The organisations’ governing model range from membership centred, where 
members engage in rule-based participation and are represented on the boards, 
to leadership centred model where members do not engage in rule-based 
participation and have boards dominated by external professionals. Non-profit 
regulation, depending on the legal forms available in the legal regime and the 
configuration of indirect benefits the organisations maintain, will encourage one 
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model of governance over the other. Translated into the language of institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), organisations operating in the same 
legal forms and exposed to the same regulatory constraints related to maintaining 
indirect benefits will tend to have high degree of organisational similarity. 
The first argument is that legal regimes differ in the types of legal forms available 
for membership organisations, with some specifically regulating formal powers of 
members and others not. Hence, the first main theoretical expectation of the 
thesis is that the regulatory requirements related to the legal forms available for 
membership organisations have consequences for the adoption of formal voting 
rights and rule-based participation (Formal rights expectation and Rule-based 
participation expectation). Specifically, the expectations are that organisations 
operating in legal regimes where there are specific legal forms for membership 
organisations which require adoption of formal voting rights for members, will 
guarantee such rights in their governing documents. And organisations operating 
in legal regimes which do not regulate (require) formal voting rights for members 
will not guarantee such rights in the governing document and will tend to limit 
them to the members of the executive board. The organisations that adopt formal 
voting rights are expected to provide opportunities for their use and experience 
some level of rule-based participation.  
The second argument is that, regardless of the non-profit tradition (common law 
or civil law) and the type of regulatory regime (constraining or permissive), within 
a regulatory regime we can distinguish between up to three configurations which 
differ in the combinations of indirect benefits they have and consequently they 
differ in the type and intensity of regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting 
requirements) they are exposed to. Based on this, the second main theoretical 
expectation labelled as the Board professionalisation expectation is that 
regulatory requirements related to maintaining indirect benefits have 
consequences for board professionalisation. Specifically, the expectation is that 
non-profit organisations maintaining indirect benefits which are exposed to high 
reporting requirements and external supervision will undergo board 
professionalisation, whilst organisations which are exposed to lenient reporting 
requirements and little or no external supervision will not. Moreover, the 
expectation is that the organisational entrepreneur (a chief executive, chairman 
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or someone else within the leadership) facilitates professionalisation of the board 
in response to increased regulatory pressures related to indirect benefits. 
The final argument of the thesis is that opportunities for consultative participation 
will vary across different governing models. The main theoretical expectation 
labelled as Consultation expectation is that organisations with leadership centred 
governing model, to compensate for the low representational capacity, will offer 
many opportunities for consultative participation, whilst organisations with 
membership centred governing model that enjoy high representational capacity 
will offer only few opportunities for consultative participation.  
There are range of other factors that may affect the governing model that 
organisations adopt. The aim of the research design, and particularly the case 
selection is to account for these factors. In the next section I will present the 
methodology of the study.  
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3. Methodology  
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I firstly present the overall methodological approach and the 
research design implemented in light of the research question. Secondly, I 
present the data used in the analysis with a particular focus on gathering the 
documentation and conducting the semi-structured interviews used in the 
organisational analysis. Thirdly, I present the stages of data analysis, the 
operationalised concepts and the alternative factors accounted for in the analysis. 
The study at hand is a comparative multiple case study design which analytically 
synthesizes a legal analysis of available legal forms and regulatory constrains 
related with indirect state benefits, and an organisational level analysis of non-
profit governance in smaller non-profit membership organisations (see 
justification below). Comparative case study research is a suitable strategy to 
understand the relationship between non-profit regulation and internal 
governance because it allows a close understanding of organisational behaviour 
and context to be built through within-case analysis and across-case comparison. 
Comparative case study research further allows the comparison of organisations 
with each other in a systematic way (Rowley 2002, 17) and helps us understand 
change in organisational forms over time (Halpin and Nownes 2011, 52).  
Even though exploratory in nature, the study was initially led by pre-defined 
research questions and formulated theoretical expectations which were used as 
‘heuristic tools’ guiding the data collection (Rowley 2002). In the beginning, I was 
looking for a ‘sign of a relationship’ between exposure to regulatory constraints 
related to indirect benefits and change in three aspects of internal governance: 
formal representation, professionalisation and membership involvement. After 
the first round of analysis of regulation and organisational data, the concepts were 
redefined and the expectations about their relationships were somewhat revised. 
These refined concepts and expectations, as presented in the previous chapter, 
guided the additional data collection efforts and the empirical analysis. This 
means that like most social science research, the study involved both deductive 
and inductive reasoning at different stages of the research processes (Trochim 
2006). That said, this research rests on the assumption that there are at least 
 65 
 
some regular and systematic empirical relationships, i.e. “regular with 
exceptions,” and that through small-n research we can capture and understand 
these relationships (Rohlfing 2012, 1).  
3.2. Case Selection  
 
The study case selection was guided by the initial theoretical expectations (Slater 
and Ziblatt 2013, 13). Gerring and Cojocaru (2016, 408) suggest that when case 
selection occurs at several levels, then “each level constitutes a distinct case 
selection event and deserves to be treated as such.” In this study, on the first 
level there is a selection of countries that represent different legal regimes (i.e. 
non-profit legal traditions) in terms of the legal forms available and the intensity 
and complexity of regulatory constraints related to maintaining indirect benefits. 
On the second level there was a selection of non-profit membership organisations 
that are exposed to different regulatory constraints related to the receipt of 
indirect benefits and operate in two most different policy fields. This means that 
the cases were selected with the goal to maximise variation on the cause of 
interest (not the outcome). Moreover, the characteristics of the cases allowed for 
some control over alternative explanations.  
In the first step, to explore the impact that available legal forms have on formal 
voting rights and rule-based participation, as one way in which non-profit 
regulation affects internal governance, two countries were selected. These are 
the UK and the Netherlands, both of which are long-standing democracies with 
very developed third sectors (Anheier et al. 2014, 24). These countries differ in 
the legal forms available for non-profit membership organisations, the UK being 
a country where there are no specific legal forms available for non-profit 
membership organisations which require the adoption of formal voting rights, 
while the Netherlands is a country where there is a specific legal form available 
for membership non-profits which grants powers to the members. Moreover, they 
also represent contrasting non-profit regimes, the UK being a common law and 
relatively constraining regime and the Netherlands being a civil law and relatively 
permissive legal regime for non-profit groups. The non-profit regulatory regime in 
the UK has been described as complex and constraining in terms of reporting 
and supervision requirements with regards to external state agencies (Bolleyer 
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2018). The state policy and regulation for charities, as organisations with special 
tax treatment, is particularly developed and characterized by strong 
accountability demands (Dunn 2016). Contrary to that, the non-profit regulatory 
regime in the Netherlands has been described as liberal and permissive 
(Brandsen et al. 2016, 12; Gilbert 2018). There is therefore an absence of state 
policy regarding the non-profit sector in the Netherlands and the sector largely 
relies on self-regulatory mechanisms (Bies 2010; Brandsen and Pape 2015, 
2275; Gilbert 2018). The analysis of the available legal forms and the reporting 
requirements for the maintenance of indirect benefits are presented in chapter 
four. 
In the second step, to assess the impact of legal forms and regulatory constraints 
related to maintaining indirect benefits, ten non-profit membership organisations 
that operate on a national level in the fields of health and the environment were 
selected, six organisations in the UK and four in the Netherlands. The selection 
of cases was based on their value on the cause of theoretical interest ‘X’ (Gerring 
and Cojocaru 2016). This means that within each country cases that exhibit 
different values of exposure to regulatory constraints related to indirect benefits, 
ranging from high regulatory constraints to low or none, were selected. This 
approach is known as a diverse case method, requiring the selection of a set of 
cases “which capture the full range of variation along the dimension(s) of interest” 
(Gerring 2009, 8).  
In the UK, of the six organisations selected, two were operating without legal 
personality (unincorporated associations), two with legal personality (companies 
limited by guarantee) and two organisations were operating with legal personality 
and tax beneficial status (charitable companies). In the Netherlands, the four 
organisations selected comprised of two with legal personality (formal 
associations) and two with legal personality and tax beneficial status (formal 
associations with ANBI status). In the Netherlands, the author could not identify 
comparable national organisations of a similar size to the other cases which 
operated without any indirect benefits, i.e. as informal associations, because 
registering legal personality is easy and only very small local clubs operate as 
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informal associations.28 However, since the main difference in the outcome is 
expected between organisations with high regulatory constraints operating with 
all indirect benefits, as opposed to organisations with exposure to lower 
regulatory constraints which have only legal personality or none of the indirect 
benefits of interest, the necessary variation to assess the theoretical expectation 
is nonetheless present. The selected organisations are presented in Table 1.  
The two policy sectors I focus on are commonly marked by different state funding 
availability with higher amounts available for health organisations than for 
environmental groups (see NCVO 2012; Burger et al. 2001, 44; Clifford et al. 
2010; Clifford et al. 2013; Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2016). This means that 
organisations operating in these two policy fields experience different levels of 
resource competition in the organisational field, which may affect the governing 
model of non-profit organisations (Baluch 2012). Moreover, the two policy fields 
are suitable for assessing the validity of expectations for different types of non-
profit membership organisations. The membership type and core mission of 
organisations have been pointed out as factors that affect members’ role in 
internal governance (Guo and Zhang 2011; Halpin 2006; Barakso and Schaffner 
2007). The selected health organisations dominantly cater to the direct interests 
of their members (professional and patient organisations), whilst the selected 
environmental organisations dominantly pursue aims that benefit the broader 
public (for the distinction see Halpin 2014). They also differ in their core mission, 
health organisations being more service oriented whilst environmental 
organisations are more advocacy oriented.  
Selected organisations are smaller membership organisations in terms of their 
membership size, operating on a national level with individual members as the 
primary membership type.29 The organisations selected for the study fit the 
definition of non-profit membership organisations, defined as self-governing, 
organised, private, voluntary organisations with membership, which pursue aims 
that will benefit their members and/or the broader public, as based on Salamon 
and Anheier’s (1997) structural operational definition. The organisations were 
                                                          
28 Some informal organisations may register with the Chamber of Commerce to receive limited 
liability, but such a list could not be obtained. 
29 This does not exclude organisations that also assign business or corporate membership.  
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founded during the 1990s30, meaning that they are younger organisations within 
the range of 20-30 years old. Commonly, case studies on organisational 
governance and adaptation have focused on “large, affluent, and heavily 
professionalised groups” (Fraussen and Halpin 2016, 6). This study focuses on 
smaller organisations in terms of membership size and financial capacities 
because these are the most common type of organisation in the population of 
non-profit membership organisations. Also, selecting organisations which were 
founded during the 90s not only assured that organisations have a similar age, 
which is an important background factor, but it also meant that data sources on 
these groups were available for earlier periods of their organisational life.  
The Case Selection Process  
The British organisations were selected from a list of associations compiled for a 
survey conducted by the Regulating Civil Society project at the University of 
Exeter31, whilst the Dutch organisations were selected from various lists of 
associations gathered for the purpose of this study. More specifically, the UK list 
is based on the last available electronic version of the Directory of British 
Associations 2009 and represents the most up to date and inclusive source on 
voluntary membership organisations in the UK. The sample includes both 
charities and non-charities, and organisations which vary in their purpose. The 
checked lists in the Netherlands included selected organisations in policy fields 
of interest from a survey list used for the Dutch Interest Group Survey 
administered during spring-summer 2016 within the framework of the 
Comparative Interest Group Survey Project32, the ANBIs association list retrieved 
data from the Dutch tax authorities, the Pyttersen's Almanac 2014, organisations 
registered with the Central Bureau on Fundraising and other lists of 
environmental and health organisations available online. 
The organisational lists were coded for the policy field, and then organisations in 
the fields of health and the environment were additionally coded for the presence 
                                                          
30 The only exception is Vitiligo.nl which was founded in 1989 but accessed legal personality in 
1990.  
31 The survey page of the ‘Regulating civil society’ project: 
http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/regulatingcivilsociety/surveys/ 
32 For more information see: https://www.cigsurvey.eu/data/ 
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of legal personality and tax beneficial status (the configuration of indirect 
benefits), membership size, membership type and group age. To assign a code 
for the type of indirect benefit the organisation had, organisations were checked 
in the public registers for legal entities and registers of organisations with tax 
beneficial status, including the: Register of the Charity Commission of England 
and Wales and the Companies House Register in the UK, the Chamber of 
Commerce and the ANBI public portal in the Netherlands. The additional 
information on membership size, type and group age were mainly retrieved from 
the organisational websites.  
More specifically, to select the organisations in the UK I have coded the list of 
environmental and health organisations in two phases. In the first phase, I coded 
organisations` access or lack of access to indirect benefits: 1. no benefits, 2. 
company limited as guarantee (legal personality only), 3. charitable company (all 
indirect benefits), 4. unincorporated charity (charitable status only) and 5. other 
(Royal Charter and charitable incorporated company - CIO). I have assigned the 
codes by checking the Charity Commission register, the Companies House 
register, the mutual benefits entities register and sometimes the website of the 
organisation for the exact registration numbers. In the second phase of the 
coding, only for organisations coded in categories 1-3 I added the year of 
foundation, the type of membership (presence of individual members) and the 
size of membership. The information was gathered from the ‘History’ and’ About 
us’ sections of organisational websites. I did not find all the necessary data for 
every organisation. Information on the year of foundation and type of membership 
are more often accessible than the size of membership. A sub-list of health and 
environmental organisations was created with the following characteristics:  
• Founded in the 90s; 
• Organisations with some political and/or public benefit activities; 
• Organisations with individual members including those that have only 
individual members or mixed membership where individuals predominate; 
• Those with national coverage and membership size big enough so all 
members cannot meet and decide through face-to-face contact.  
The short-listed organisations were checked for availability of data such as 
annual accounts and reports, statutes, newsletters for the period since foundation 
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until 2016. Organisations for which more data was accessible and were 
comparable to one another were further shortlisted. Contact information from 
potential interviewees occupying various positions in the organisation were 
obtained. One group of six shortlisted organisations was contacted at first. Those 
organisations which were not responsive to the interview invitation after two 
reminders were excluded from the study and a substitute organisation with similar 
characteristics was contacted. Hence the final six organisations in the UK 
selected matched the theoretical criteria of interest but also were suitable for 
study due to the availability of documentation and interview data.  
The health and environmental organisations in the Netherlands were selected 
later than the British cases. In the Netherlands the lists of environmental and 
health organisations were coded in three categories33: 1.organisations registered 
as associations (only legal personality); 2.organisations registered as foundations 
(non-membership organisations with legal personality) and 3.organisations 
registered as associations with ANBIs status (all indirect benefits). Only category 
1 and 3 were of interest to this study. The shortlisted associations and 
associations with ANBI status in the two policy fields were coded with the same 
criteria described above. The shortlisted Dutch organisations were comparable 
to the British organisations already included in the study. The four Dutch 
organisations for which interviewees accepted the invitation for participation were 
the ones included in the study.  
The ten organisations which made the final cut were organisations which first and 
foremost satisfied the theoretical criteria and had different type of indirect 
benefits, were similar to each other in terms of age, membership size, coverage 
and type, and for which both documentation and interview data were accessible. 
Hence, the final list of organisations included in this study was affected by matters 
of access which will be discussed in more detail in the data collection section. At 
this point it is important to mention that from the contacted organisations in the 
UK, the chief executive of one organisation in the field of health explicitly refused 
to have the organisation involved in any way in the research. In the Netherlands, 
the potential interviewees identified in the case of one environmental organisation 
                                                          
33 In the Netherlands organisations without any indirect benefits were not identified. 
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refused participation, even though the management was sympathetic to the 
research. In the end, the organisation was not included in the research. 
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Table 1: Selected Non-profit Membership Organisations in the UK and the Netherlands  
Organisation Country and 
policy field 
Intensity of 
regulatory 
constraints  
a. foundation 
b. access to legal personality 
c. gaining tax benefits 
Type of members Membership 
size (current) 
Songbird Survival 
 
UK 
environment 
All indirect 
benefits 
a. 1996 
b. 2000 
c. 2001 
Citizens interested in protection of 
songbirds 
1700 
National Activity 
Providers Association  
UK 
health  
All indirect 
benefits 
a. 1997 
b. 1997 
c. 1998 
Professionals who provide 
activities in care homes 
3000 
Surfers Against 
Sewage  
UK 
environment 
All indirect 
benefits 
a. 1990 
b. 1994 
c. 2012 
Citizens interested in protection of 
marine life and the coastline 
10 000 
Young FoE 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
environment 
All indirect 
benefits 
a. 1990 
b. 1991 
c. 2012 
Youth (16-28 years old) 600 
Vitiligo Netherlands  
 
Netherlands 
health  
All indirect 
benefits 
a. 1989 
b. 1990 
c. 2014 
Patients with vitiligo and their 
families 
1450 
Patient Information 
Forum  
UK 
health 
Legal 
personality  
a. 1997 
b. 2008 
Professionals working with health 
information provision 
550 
Dutch Association for 
Dragonfly Studies  
Netherlands 
environment 
Legal 
personality 
a. 1997 
b. 1997 
Citizens interested in dragonflies 
monitoring and conservation 
450 
The National 
Association of 
Psychosocial 
Workers  
Netherlands 
health 
Legal 
personality 
a. 1995 
b. 1999 
Professional psycho-social 
workers 
250 
NHS Alliance UK 
health 
No indirect 
benefits 
a. 1997 
 
Health professionals (GPs, 
nurses, etc.) 
400 
Hardy Orchid Society  UK 
environment 
No indirect 
benefits 
a. 1993 
 
Citizens interested in research 
and conservation of orchids 
800 
 73 
 
3.3. Qualitative Case Study Research: Strategy of Data Collection and 
Analysis 
 
Qualitative comparative case study research is a suitable research strategy to 
address the research questions because of the exploratory nature of the 
research. Qualitative data is suitable because of the wealth of information which 
allows changes to be traced over time, the mapping and contextualisation of 
outcomes, and helps provide an account of outcomes which deviate from the 
expectations (Rowley 2002, 16; Baluch 2012, 57). Qualitative case study 
research commonly uses multiple sources of evidence (Rowley 2002, 23; Yin 
2018). Hence, the organisational case studies in this research are based on 
material comprised of diverse sources including publicly available reports and 
accounts, organisational newsletters and semi-structured interviews with past 
and current organisational actors. This approach of drawing on a combination of 
primary and secondary sources has been applied in other organisational studies 
of non-profit organisations which focus on various aspects of organisational form 
and evolution (see for example Baluch 2012, Halpin 2014, Guo and Zhang 2011, 
Halpin and Daugbjerg 2013; the qualitive part of the research from Hwang and 
Powell 2009). Therefore, this was identified as the most suitable research 
strategy for addressing the research question. 
In the following section, I will present the data body and the data collection 
process whilst also discussing matters of access.  
3.3.1. Legal Data: Primary and Secondary Sources 
 
The legal data comprised of statutory regulation (laws and bylaws), official 
guidelines and application documents issued by enforcement institutions in 
England and the Netherlands. A list of relevant regulations per country and a list 
of cited expert interviews are included in Appendix A. To better understand the 
legal regimes and specific regulatory requirements, I relied on secondary 
literature written by legal scholars as well as guidelines by state agencies or legal 
firms produced for practitioners. With few exceptions, all of the relevant 
documents were accessible online. In November 2015, the Charity Commission, 
upon my request in accordance with the UK’s Freedom of Information Act, 
provided me with a copy of older guidelines on the political activities of charities. 
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The Chamber of Commerce in the Netherlands answered clarification questions 
(August-September 2016) regarding the reporting requirements of associations. 
Additionally, I have interviewed two experts on charity regulation in the UK and 
one expert on non-profit law in the Netherlands. Via email, I further contacted 
three academics with expertise on ANBI status and non-profit regulation in the 
Netherlands, and two experts on companies’ law and the law on unincorporated 
associations in the UK. The goal of the interviews and email consultations was to 
clarify and verify my understanding of specific aspects of non-profit law in the two 
countries.  
3.3.2. Organisational Data 
 
The organisational data is mainly comprised of documents and interviews. A short 
overview of types of documents used, number of interviews and additional 
contact via email per organisation is presented in Table 2. In Appendix B, a 
detailed list of cited documents and interviews is enclosed for each organisation. 
In the following section I will describe the data collection efforts.  
Concerning the use of document sources specifically, document analysis is 
suitable for qualitative case study research, particularly when employed in 
combination with other qualitative research methods (Bowen 2009, 28-29). 
Documents are particularly useful for understanding the early life of the 
organisations under study, especially since interview data can be a limited source 
of data for this period (Bowen 2009, 31). Bowen nicely summarises the benefits 
of using documents: “[…] documents provide background and context, additional 
questions to be asked, supplementary data, a means of tracking change and 
development, and verification of findings from other data sources. Moreover, 
documents may be the most effective means of gathering data when events can 
no longer be observed or when informants have forgotten the details” (Bowen 
2009, 31). Documents such as annual accounts and reports provide specific 
substantive content (e.g. budgetary spending, size of membership and staff, etc.) 
(Ritchie 2003, 35) and often are easily accessible in the public domain (Bowen 
2009, 31). This makes them a good starting point for establishing baseline 
information, drawing initial case study narratives and in preparation for the 
interviewing phase (Baluch 2012, 78). The drawback of using documents is that 
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they have been produced for a purpose other than that of the research which 
means that they often lack sufficient detail (Bowen 2009, 32) and, as with other 
sources of data, carry certain biases (Hammersley 2008). For example, 
organisational newsletters are often a reflection of the stances of organisational 
leadership and depending on the editorial policy of the organisation they may 
reveal little on the members’ perspective on organisational matters. Also, 
organisational accounts and reports – financial and non-financial - reported to 
public authorities or published on organisational website may be drafted in a way 
that highlight organisational achievements, whilst they reveal little information on 
difficulties organisations face. To overcome such limitations, I have obtained 
various types of documents, which were validated and complemented with 
interview data.  
For the purpose of the organisational analysis, various types of available 
documents from public sources including public registers of organisations and 
organisational websites were collected. This included governing documents (i.e. 
internal rules, statutes, articles of incorporation), annual accounts and reports, 
descriptions of organisational history, newsletters, articles and reports on 
organisational events posted on organisation websites. In the UK, documents 
were retrieved from the Charity Commission and the Companies House registers 
for organisations with legal personality and charitable status. The Dutch Chamber 
of Commerce and the ANBI register offer very limited information on membership 
organisations due to the permissive regulatory constraints. Documents were, 
therefore, retrieved mainly from group websites and/or interviewees. Specifically, 
in the case of six organisations, newsletters and old statutes were obtained from 
interviewees who were informed of how the documents will be used in the 
research and that confidentiality was guaranteed. In addition, newsletters and 
annual accounts were accessed in the British Library in London and the National 
Library of the Netherlands in The Hague. The available newsletters were 
reviewed by the author on the premises of the libraries and the relevant 
information was selected and scanned for the purpose of further analysis. The 
selected pages included calls for AGMs and AGM reports, meetings of the 
executive, financial information, information on membership size and profiles of 
members of the executive board, project announcements and calls directed to 
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members. Newsletters and magazines, despite the potential leadership bias, 
represent a rich source of information on the internal life of organisations and 
were extensively used in the organisational analysis. 
3.3.3. Semi-structured Interviews  
 
While documents provide important baseline information for the organisational 
paths and particular aspects of organisational behaviour, often such data is 
limited or incomplete (Beyers et al. 2014, 175). Because of this and the need to 
make sense of information retrieved from documents and to understand internal 
processes that were not recorded in official documents, interviews are an 
important complementary data source. They are also useful for accessing other 
interviewees and obtaining additional documentation (Beyers et al. 2014, 177).  
In this research, 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted in the period from 
March 2017 until July 2018. The UK interviews were mainly conducted during 
spring-summer of 2017, while the Dutch interviews were mainly conducted during 
Autumn 2017. A few additional interviews in the case of the UK were conducted 
during 2018. The period when the interview data was collected falls within the 
period for which ethical approval was given for this research.34 A copy of the 
Ethical Approval is provided in Appendix C.  
The semi-structured interview style falls somewhere between the closed 
questionnaire with pre-defined questions and answers and the ethnographic 
interview which occurs as a conversation without pre-defined structure (Leech 
2002, 665). The semi-structured interview helps in obtaining comparability of data 
across organisations, whilst at the same time providing a space for the 
interviewee’s specific insight concerning the internal development of their 
organisation (Edwards and Holland 2013). Interviews in this thesis were used as 
both primary data for understanding organisational processes which were not 
officially recorded as well as a complementary data strategy to triangulate the 
findings from the document analysis. The latter was particularly important 
because interviews may not be a reliable source of information about events that 
                                                          
34 I was granted a Certificate of Ethical Approval by the SSIS College Ethics Committee for the 
period from 30th June 2016 to 20th September 2018. 
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happened years before the interview was conducted (Beyers et al. 2014, 178). 
Due to difficulties with memory recall, documents are used to cross-check 
information from interviews.  
Research on non-profit organisations often relies on behavioural data from 
executive managers or trustees and has, therefore, an explicit executive bias (see 
Hwang and Powell 2009, 239). This research, in line with suggestions from the 
non-profit literature (see Guo and Zhang 2011, 343), made an attempt to 
interview multiple informants including people which occupy positions in the 
leadership, e.g. paid staff or unpaid members of the executive board, and ‘rank 
and file’ members. This was deemed important for getting a more accurate 
understanding of internal governance. As presented in Table 2, in eight of the ten 
organisations more than one informant was interviewed. However, in six cases, 
the research failed to recruit informants who are current members because 
organisations are not allowed to provide third parties with contact information on 
members, and such contacts could not be identified through the websites or 
newsletters of those organisations. To address this limitation, care was taken for 
at least one of the interviewees to have familiarity with matters of membership 
involvement and to have started off their engagement as an ordinary member. 
This means that in all cases we have an informant who occupied a position 
outside of the leadership, at least for some period of their engagement in the 
organisation. In most of the organisations, the gaps in the data were addressed 
through follow up correspondence with interviewees and other organisational 
actors who did not participate in face-to face interviews.  
Accessing interviewees and the interview situation 
 
Allan Cigler in his review of interest group research from 1991 has noted that the 
systematic study of interest groups and associations has been difficult because 
these organisations are private or semi-private entities and can be particularly 
sensitive about their reputation and visibility (1991, 100). He suggests that 
scholars have been discouraged to conduct in-depth case studies due to the 
difficulties related to gaining organisational access (Cigler 1991, 112). The 
experience with identifying and recruiting interviewees from smaller national non-
profit membership organisations in UK and the Netherlands re-affirms this claim. 
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Even more, recruiting interviewees from smaller non-profits poses a particular 
challenge because such organisations often operate with limited human 
resources. They are mainly run on a day-to-day basis by a small paid team with 
limited time for research participation, or in some cases are run entirely by 
volunteers who have other daily jobs that prevent them from dedicating additional 
time to research participation.  
Table 2: Overview of Documentation, Number of Interviews and Additional 
Contact 
Organisation Type of documents  Number of 
interviews 
E-mail 
correspondence* 
National Activity 
Providers Association 
Governing documents  
Annual accounts and 
reports  
Newsletters  
N = 2 N = 2 
Surfers Against 
Sewage 
Governing documents  
Annual accounts and 
reports  
Newsletters  
N = 5 N = 1 
Patient Information 
Forum  
Governing documents  
Annual accounts and 
reports  
 
N = 6 N = 0 
Songbird Survival Governing document  
Annual accounts and 
reports  
Newsletters  
N = 2 N = 1 
NHS Alliance  Governing documents  
AGM reports  
Website articles  
N = 4 N = 1 
Hardy Orchid Society  Governing document  
Newsletters  
Website reports  
N = 1 N = 0 
Vitiligo Netherlands Governing documents  
Newsletters  
N = 2 N = 2 
Young Friends of the 
Earth Netherlands  
Governing documents  
Newsletters  
N = 4 N = 1 
National Association 
of Psychosocial 
Workers  
Governing documents 
  
N = 1 N = 3 
The Dutch 
Association for 
Dragonfly Studies 
Governing document  
Magazine  
N = 3 N = 2 
Note: Queries sent over e-mail that involved the answering of interview questions or 
follow-up questions are counted under e-mail correspondence.  
The first and crucial step in obtaining interview data was identifying a list of 
potential informants for each organisation. Email contacts and names of past and 
present organisational actors were collected from organisational websites, 
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LinkedIn and newsletters. In cases where I could identify names and could not 
find email addresses, I conducted additional searches online to identify contact 
information. In a few cases, some of the interviewees were identified and 
recruited though snowball sampling, a strategy in which respondents are asked 
to suggest other potential research participants, as can be helpful in cases when 
this is difficult because they are few in number (Atkinson and Flint 2004). This 
was used to connect mainly with actors who have been part of leadership 
structures in the past. 
The second step was sending an interview invitation via email which familiarised 
the potential interviewees with my research topic and the broader ERC-funded 
project ‘Regulating Civil Society’ within which my doctoral research was 
conducted. The goal was to create a professional impression by conveying the 
research topic and clarifying to potential interviewees why their participation is 
crucial for the project’s success (Beyers et al. 2014). Interviewees were given the 
option to choose between face-to-face interviews or phone/Skype interviews. Up 
to three reminders were sent for the interview invitation. The email template used 
for interview invitations is enclosed in the Appendix D.  
All the interviews were conducted in English, which means that the Dutch 
informants were not interviewed in their native language. The interviews were not 
in-depth, probing for interviewees’ personal experiences and perceptions, but 
rather about tapping into factual information regarding organisational events and 
practices. As such, conducting the interviews in English was acceptable because 
the research did not engage in interpretation of meanings that interviewees attach 
to their involvement in the organisation. Out of the 30 interviews, 7 were 
conducted in person, and the remaining 23 interviews were conducted via 
phone/Skype. Written consent was granted by interviewees and they were 
guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality of their data (the consent form used is 
presented in the Appendix D). For face-to-face interviews a hard copy of the 
consent form was provided, and for phone/Skype interviews it was sent via email. 
Additionally, interviewees were asked at the beginning of each interview for 
recording approval and were offered to see a copy of their interview transcript 
afterwards. All the interviews were recorded except for one in which notes were 
still taken by hand. Interviews lasted between 25 minutes and one hour. 
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3.3.4. Interview Topic Guide  
 
The topic guide used in the interviews had pre-defined questions, yet it also 
allowed for flexibility and the changing of question order depending on the 
conversation. The first topic guide used in the UK was broader in its thematic 
scope and, in addition to the questions related to maintaining indirect benefits, 
internal governance and membership involvement, included questions on political 
activities over time and about state funding maintenance. Following the first round 
of fieldwork in the UK and a descriptive analysis of gathered data the scope of 
the research was narrowed down, and the topic guide was revised. The revised 
topic guide was used for the interviews in the Netherlands and the additional 
interviews conducted in the UK. The topic guide used is included in Appendix E.  
The topic guide was designed in a way that could be adapted depending on 
whether interviewees were part of the leadership or membership. Moreover, the 
topic guide was divided into sections that could be easily omitted if the 
organisation did not have legal personality and/or tax beneficial status, meaning 
it could be used for organisations falling under different configurations of indirect 
benefits. As a warm-up question and to be able to locate the timeframe for which 
the interviewee could answer questions, the interview initially asked about the 
history of organisational involvement of the interviewee. Then, questions were 
asked regarding the governance and membership participation in decision-
making in the early years after formation, the maintenance of legal personality 
and tax beneficial status and the possible changes in terms of formal governing 
rules, membership involvement and recruitment of skills that followed in the 
period after accessing such benefits (if applicable). All the interviewees, no matter 
their organisational role, timeframe of engagement or the configuration of indirect 
benefits of the organisation, were asked questions about membership 
participation in decision-making, i.e. attendance at AGMs, election of board 
members and opportunities to influence programmatic priorities. Also, all the 
interviewees were asked questions about the type of staff and board members 
involved over time. In the end, the topic guide asked about the major 
organisational reforms (milestones) of organisational development according to 
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the interviewee and provided a chance for the interviewee to add any relevant 
information which had been omitted in the conversation.  
In the words of Beth Leech (2002, 665):  
“In an interview, what you already know is as important as what you want to know. 
What you want to know determines which questions you will ask. What you 
already know will determine how you ask them.”  
Hence, while trying to be faithful to the topic guide, the interviews differed in the 
organisation-specific questions and, depending on the availability of data before 
the interview, some focused more on obtaining organisation-specific information. 
In terms of the sensitivity of the questions, when asked about funding matters or 
state funding requirements respondents would be slightly reluctant to give 
elaborate answers. However, this did not affect the quality of data since these 
questions were not the primary concern of the research. Fortunately, in most 
cases annual accounts were a sufficient source for understanding the funding 
structure of organisations. In the first few interviews, interviewees had difficulty 
understanding what ‘access to legal personality’ means, hence in later interviews, 
the question referred to registration with relevant authority (e.g. Companies 
House). 
3.4. Data Analysis and Criteria for Evaluation  
 
The analysis comprised of several steps is summarised in Figure 2. The first step 
was an analysis of non-profit regulation in the two countries and the comparison 
of the results. The second step included a reconstruction of the organisational 
trajectories of the ten organisations. A case study folder was formed for each 
organisation and descriptive documents summarizing key information over time 
for each organisation were produced. The case study descriptions were created 
by following a template composed of five parts: basic organisational information, 
professionalisation, membership involvement, political activities and financial 
information. It is important to note that the data from the Dutch documents was 
selected and translated by a Dutch speaking research assistant who followed the 
same template. I have then jointly analysed the extracted data from the 
documents and the interview data in English to create the organisational case 
studies. The third step included cross-organisational comparisons that served as 
a basis for modification of the concepts and expectations of the study. This was 
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followed by another round of data collection to close the information gaps. Rowley 
accurately described the process of analysis for case study evidence: 
 “Analysing case study evidence is not easy. Typically, a case study database 
will include a multitude of different evidence from different sources. Data analysis 
of this rich resource is based on examining, categorising and tabulating evidence 
to assess whether the evidence supports or otherwise the initial propositions of 
the study. […] The researcher trawls through the evidence seeking corroboration 
or otherwise of the initial propositions, and then records relevant evidence and 
makes a judgement on whether the positions have been substantiated.” (Rowley 
2002, 24).  
In a similar fashion, data was grouped in documents for each operational concept 
and the evidence was judged against the revised expectations.35 In the end, the 
new data were integrated into the analysis and a written account was produced. 
To assure the validity and credibility of the analysis, evidence from diverse 
sources was cross-checked and complemented, as well as evidence across one 
type of data source (i.e. data across at least two documents or across two 
interviews). This approach towards data collection and analysis is known as 
triangulation and it is commonly defined as the use of evidence from multiple and 
“different sources to corroborate the same fact or finding” (Rowley 2002, 23). 
Triangulation is key for mitigating the different biases associated with each type 
of data (Hammersley 2008; Bowen 2009; Yin 2018). Triangulation, as employed 
here, in addition to comparing different types of data (i.e. documents and 
interviews), also encompasses comparing data collected with one method of data 
collection i.e. comparison of multiple interviewees (Hammersley 2008, 2). Whilst 
most of the evidence presented in the analysis has been triangulated, there are 
some instances where data was particularly difficult to obtain and only one source 
of information was available for inclusion in the analysis. All the data sources 
used are transparently indicated throughout the analysis.  
The final empirical analysis is based on an interpretation of all available and 
relevant evidence vis-à-vis the expectations, hence I want to recognize that the 
analysis of additional sources might have led to a different interpretation of 
results. Also, I cannot rule out that other researchers may come to different 
conclusions if they implement a different approach towards the measurement and 
analysis of the same data. Since this is an exploratory study of the potential ways 
                                                          
35 The coding of data during all the phases was conducted by hand. 
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in which non-profit regulation correlates with aspects of internal governance, the 
focus is on understanding the role of law as a factor, and not proving a causal 
relationship. Nevertheless, the analysis takes into consideration rival 
interpretations on the causes of organisational change and accounts for them 
throughout the analysis (Rowley 2002, 24). Hence, I believe that the findings of 
the research ‘enjoy’ some level of external transferability (Slater and Ziblatt 2013, 
14), and can be further assessed with new cases or by a large-N study design.  
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Figure 2: Sequence of Data Analysis (adapted from Yin 2018, 58 and Baluch 2012, 83) 
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3.5. Operationalisation of Concepts  
 
In this section I present the operational definitions of the central concepts of the 
study. The operationalised concepts help to establish the link between the 
theoretical expectations and the empirical data. 
Non-profit law encompasses the legal rules for constituting legal forms for non-
profit membership organisations and the regulatory constraints related to 
maintaining indirect state benefits. The first premise is that legal regimes differ in 
the types of legal forms available for membership organisations, with some 
specifically regulating formal powers for members and others not. The second 
premise is that, regardless of the non-profit tradition (common law or civil law) 
and the type of regulatory regime (constraining or permissive), within a regulatory 
regime we can distinguish between up to three configurations which differ in the 
combinations of indirect benefits they offer. Consequently, they further differ in 
the type and intensity of regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting requirements) 
organisations are exposed to. 
To assess the differences in non-profit law in the two countries, firstly I have 
compared the different legal forms available, defined as the types of 
organisational structures an organisation can adopt from a legal perspective. The 
focus was on legal forms for membership organisations. To establish the 
differences, I have mapped the presence or absence of explicit mandatory 
requirements for members’ participation at the annual general meeting and 
election of the members of the board for each of the legal forms available 
(nominal measure). The focus is on the rights to elect the executive because the 
law does not explicitly specify voting rights for programmatic priorities in the two 
countries.  
Regulatory constraints are defined as the set of legal requirements, costs and 
obligations the organisation has to comply with in order to maintain receipt of 
indirect state benefits. Depending on the type of indirect benefits organisations 
access, within each regulatory regime we can identify up to three configurations 
which differ in the combinations of indirect benefits and the type and intensity of 
regulatory constraints they are exposed to. To map out and compare the concrete 
regulatory constraints related to indirect benefits and their enforcement in the two 
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countries, I use and adapt analytical criteria (see Table 3) developed by Bolleyer 
(2018).36 These analytical criteria travel well across legal systems (civil vs. 
common law countries) and are based on an organisation-centred approach 
towards regulation. These criteria have been stressed as relevant in other studies 
(see the NGO Regulatory Index by Bloodgood et al. 2013). The analytical tool in 
Table 3 is applied to mapping both reporting requirements related to maintaining 
legal personality and tax beneficial status, with the difference of one additional 
criterion on political constraints (i.e. engagement in partisan activities or pursuing 
political purposes) applied only to maintaining tax beneficial status. This 
additional code on political constraints is present in Bloodgood et al.’s (2013, 717) 
index of NGO regulation and I include it in the analytical tool because it is an 
important type of constraint which might potentially affect organisational 
governance.  
Table 3: Analytical Tool for Mapping Requirements for Maintaining Indirect 
Benefits 
Requirements for maintaining legal personality and beneficial tax status: 
1) Updates of any information 
2) Updates are put online or otherwise made publicly available 
3) Regular reports on non-financial matters 
4) Periodicity of non-financial reports 
5) Non-financial reports are put online or otherwise made publicly available 
6) Regular reports on financial matters 
7) Periodicity of financial reports 
8) Submissions have to be audited by external auditor 
9) Financial information is put online or otherwise made publicly available 
10) Constraints on engagement in partisan activities or pursuing political 
purposes (code only applicable to maintaining tax beneficial status) 
 
                                                          
36 The criteria are used for comparative assessment of regulation concerning different types of 
voluntary organisations in advanced democracies. 
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The coding scheme is applied to data consisting of statutory legislation (laws and 
bylaws), court rulings, official guidelines and application documents issued by 
enforcement institutions in the UK and the Netherlands since 1980.37 
The thesis is exploring the impact of non-profit law on the following aspects of 
governance: formal voting rights and the related rule-based participation, and 
board professionalisation. Formal voting rights are defined as the rights of 
ordinary members to attend the annual general meeting and elect their 
representatives, and rule-based participation is defined as the use of these formal 
voting rights in practice. Two nominal measures were devised. The first measure 
mapped the absence or presence of rights for the wider membership to attend 
AGMs and elect the members of the board as stipulated in the governing 
documents of the organisations. The units of analysis were the sentences in the 
governing documents. A similar dummy measure which records the presence or 
absence of the mechanism of board elections has been implemented by other 
authors (see Guo and Zhang 2011, 331; Leardini et al. 2016). The analysis was 
complemented by information from interviews and newsletters. Rule-based 
participation is measured as the presence or absence of members’ opportunities 
for: participation at AGMs, election of the executive and voting on programmatic 
priorities in practice. The newsletters were coded to identify advertisements or 
invitations for members to attend AGMs, elect the members of the board and vote 
on programmatic priorities. Interview questions similarly asked if members were 
invited to participate in these activities.  
Board professionalisation is defined as the recruitment of skilled volunteers with 
competencies (skills, experiences and knowledge) relevant for organisational 
maintenance outside of the organisational membership to fill unpaid positions 
within the executive organ. The concept of board professionalisation has two 
elements, the first being external recruitment and the second being recruitment 
of professionals with managerial, financial and accounting and/or legal and policy 
skills. If the data shows that organisations satisfy both elements, then it is 
considered that the organisation underwent board professionalisation. 
                                                          
37 The organisations in the analysis are founded in the late 80s and early 90s to be able to 
understand how regulation affects them over time and the legal analysis is tracing legal 
changes from 1980 onwards.  
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Organisations coded with a 0 did not recruit board members externally with 
particular skills relevant to organisational maintenance in mind. Organisations 
were coded with a 1 if the organisation – after being exposed to regulatory 
constraints – sought board members outside of the organisation with particular 
competencies relevant to organisational maintenance, including managerial and 
policy skills. The measure encompasses managerial and policy skills because 
these are difficult to disentangle empirically, and sometimes board members are 
recruited because of both. As Bramble (2000) notes, it is difficult to empirically 
track the professional profiles of organisational officials. This is especially true for 
tracking professional profiles of board members over time due to data limitations. 
Therefore, here I have relied on a mix of information from newsletters, websites 
and interview data. Interviews asked about how members of the executive board 
were recruited – outside or within the organisation – and about the kind of 
competencies commonly represented on the board. Specifically, respondents 
were asked if the organisation looks for members with specific competencies 
relevant for organisational maintenance in mind, and whether their recruitment 
practice has changed over time.  
The last concept of interest in the study is consultative participation which is 
defined as the opportunities for members’ input on organisational matters and 
programmatic priorities beyond the annual general meeting. This input is non-
binding for the leadership. The operational concept has two categories, low 
consultative participation when members have few sporadic direct and indirect 
opportunities for input, and high participation where members have many 
frequent direct and indirect opportunities to give input. I have coded data for both 
direct opportunities for feedback, including surveys, online forums, mailing lists, 
events (i.e. training, conferences and other meetings), and indirect opportunities 
for feedback, including advisory boards, policy committees and networks of 
regional representatives. I agree with Saidel (1998) that advisory groups are a 
way to involve most active and prominent members and compensate for the lack 
of rule-based participation among the wider membership. The same applies for 
other “middleman” structures recruited by the organisational entrepreneur (Moe 
1980, 45), and this is why I have counted these mechanisms as opportunities for 
consultative participation. Interview data, documents and website information 
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were coded for the different opportunities for consultative participation offered by 
the organisations.  
3.6. Alternative Factors  
 
Although interested in exploring the potential impact of one factor, I recognize 
that different factors can impact the outcome (equifinality) and there can be 
multiple causes interacting (configurational causality) to produce an outcome 
(Rohlfing 2012, 7). The research design aims to ‘control’ for organisational 
density by focusing on different policy fields and for the effect of age by selecting 
groups founded in the same decade. In addition, the empirical analysis will pay 
attention to other alternative factors to be able to discern the influence of non-
profit law on the relevant aspects of internal governance. Those alternative 
factors are: types of funding source (dependence on state funding related to 
service delivery vs. dependence on funding from members), participation in self-
regulatory mechanisms for good governance, changes in membership size, 
membership type and core mission.  
The types of funding source or the dominance of one type of source over the 
other can affect members’ rights and involvement, as well as board 
professionalisation. Specifically, reliance on members for funding (i.e. 
membership dues, sponsorships, payments for services) enhances the role of 
members, and we might expect that organisations that rely on members will 
provide formal voting rights and have members represented on the board. In 
contrast, dependence on external sources of funding, and particularly reliance on 
state funding has been related to the diminished role of members and increased 
reliance on professionals. In fact, board professionalisation has been linked to 
the increased dependence on state funding (Smith 2011, 214; Smith and Lipsky 
1993; Guo 2018). Hence, the analysis accounts for the types of funding source 
the organisations rely on during their lifetime and in periods of change.  
The literature has pointed at the increased introduction of self-regulatory 
certification systems for good governance across democracies (Phillips and 
Smith 2014, 1150; Phillips 2013, 883). Organisations that participate in self-
regulatory initiatives that demand compliance with good governance standards 
may feel pressures to undergo centralisation of the organisational structure and 
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board professionalisation. To account for this, I pay attention to whether 
organisations have been part of such a scheme during their career.  
The effect of membership size on member involvement has often been 
highlighted in the literature (Michels 1962; see also Saunders 2009; van Puyvelde 
et al. 2016, 900). Namely, scholars believe that national organisations with 
massive memberships will structure themselves hierarchically and 
bureaucratically and would not be able to engage meaningfully with the rank and 
file membership. Organisations with large memberships are expected to 
experience troubles with organising meetings, decision-making efficiency and 
increased internal conflict (van Puyvelde et al. 2016, 901). In contrast, small and 
medium sized groups are more likely to offer opportunities for membership 
involvement (Clarence et al. 2005, 142; Saunders 2009). Even though the 
selected organisations, based on membership size count in the past few years, 
qualify as small national organisations, some of them have experienced rapid 
changes in membership size during their lifetime. Thus, in the analysis we 
account for such changes that may potentially affect the organisational structure 
and role of members. 
Another important factor that may affect the organisational structure and the role 
of members is the nature of the represented interests (type of members). The 
proposition comes from the interest group literature and is based on the 
distinction between public interest groups that are characterised by a mismatch 
between their membership and their constituency, and sectional groups where 
there is no such mismatch (Halpin 2006; Halpin 2010; Binderkrantz 2009). 
Specifically, scholars propose that these two interest group types will 
substantially differ in their internal democracy. Members of organisations that 
represent broader interests have low costs and barriers for exit from the group 
and opportunities for democratic participation will be of little value for them, hence 
the expectation is that they will centralise decision-making processes (Barakso 
and Schaffner 2007, 187; Binderkrantz 2009, 661). On the other hand, members 
of sectional groups join because of some direct interest and, hence, have 
stronger motives to influence the group agenda (Binderkrantz 2009, 661). This 
will be translated into more opportunities for participation. The empirical evidence 
is inconclusive, with some authors finding that sectional groups (i.e. professional 
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associations) have higher levels of internal democracy, whilst patient groups are 
“laggards” when it comes to internal democracy (Binderkrantz 2009, 670). The 
selected organisations vary in the type of membership (i.e. nature of represented 
interests) and this will be considered as a possible factor that shapes the 
governing model.  
Finally, the organisational mission has been singled out as a factor that shapes 
organisational structure (Minkoff and Powell 2006; Halpin 2014) and 
representational capacities (Guo and Zhang 2011). It has been suggested that 
groups driven by the logic of influence (Schmitter and Streeck 1999) are expected 
to increase the role of professionals and diminish the role of members within the 
organisation (Jordan 2012, 97). Therefore, to be able to ‘control’ for the influence 
of mission, the study selected organisations with varying levels of ‘politicalness’.  
3.7. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have presented the general methodological approach adopted. I 
have also presented the two levels of case selection and the reasoning behind it. 
I then detailed the legal and organisational data collected and produced for the 
study, followed by a presentation of the stages of data analysis and the 
overarching data analysis approach. Lastly, I present the operational definitions 
of the central concepts and the alternative factors accounted for in the analysis.  
In summary, the study implements a qualitative comparative case study approach 
suitable to address the exploratory nature of the research. Analytically, the study 
synthesizes a legal analysis of available legal forms and regulatory constrains 
related with indirect state benefits, and an organisational level analysis of non-
profit governance in smaller non-profit membership organisations in the UK and 
the Netherlands. The two countries represent contrasting non-profit regimes, the 
UK being a common law and relatively constraining regime and the Netherlands 
being a civil law and relatively permissive legal regime for non-profit groups. As 
a result, they differ in the legal forms available for non-profit membership 
organisations. Furthermore, ten non-profit membership organisations were 
selected that operate on a national level in the fields of health and the 
environment, six being based in the UK and four in the Netherlands. The 
organisations operate in the available legal forms for membership organisations 
 92 
 
and represent different configurations of indirect benefits given their exposure to 
different intensities of regulatory constraints, ranging from high constraints to low 
or none. In that sense, they represent diverse cases (Gerring 2009). 
In terms of data, the study relies on multiple sources of evidence including 
publicly available reports and accounts, organisational newsletters, and 30 semi-
structured interviews with past and current organisational actors. The legal data 
comprised of statutory regulation (laws and bylaws), official guidelines and 
application documents issued by enforcement institutions in England and the 
Netherlands, secondary sources written by legal scholars and consultations with 
seven legal experts.  
The data analysis was conducted in three main stages, including an analysis of 
non-profit law in the two countries, within case study analysis of the ten 
organisations and, finally, a cross organisational analysis. The legal and 
organisational data were coded according to six measures, and data was 
triangulated to overcome the biases related to different sources of data. This 
evidence was assessed against the theoretical expectations. The analysis further 
accounts for alternative factors such as types of funding source, participation in 
self-regulatory mechanisms for good governance, changes in membership size, 
membership type and core mission. In the following chapters I will begin to 
present these analyses in greater depth. As such, attention will now be turned to 
providing an account of non-profit law in both the UK and the Netherlands. 
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4. Non-Profit Regulation on Legal Forms and Tax Beneficial Status in the 
UK and the Netherlands 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The non-profit regulation I focus on in this thesis stipulates the available legal 
forms for non-profits with members and the legal requirements and obligations 
organisations have to comply with in order to maintain legal personality and 
beneficial tax status as forms of indirect state benefits. The main argument is that 
regulation affects the internal governance in two ways, through the available legal 
forms within the non-profit regime and through maintaining these indirect state 
benefits. The thesis wants to highlight that the choice of legal form shapes the 
adoption of formal decision-making structure depending on whether this is 
regulated or not by law. The assumption is that it is more likely that formal voting 
rights will be allocated to members in organisations which operate in countries 
where the law specifically mandates adoption of members powers to oversee the 
work of the board at the annual general meeting and elect the members of the 
board. Maintaining indirect benefits requires compliance with specific reporting 
and accountability requirements, and organisations exposed to higher regulatory 
constraints are more likely to undergo board professionalisation. Previously we 
presented up to three configurations which represent combinations of indirect 
benefits which differ in the intensity of regulatory constraints they are exposed to. 
These three configurations range from organisations with ‘all indirect benefits’ 
which are exposed to highest regulatory constraints to organisations without any 
indirect benefits which are exposed to few regulatory constraints or none.  
This chapter presents the analysis of laws which regulate legal forms available 
for non-profits with members and the maintenance of indirect benefits in the UK 
and the Netherlands. Firstly, the analysis describes the differences in the offer of 
legal forms for membership organisations in the two countries with focus on the 
differences in requirements for members right to participate at an annual general 
meeting and appoint members of the board. The focus is on the rights to elect 
the executive because the law does not explicitly specify voting rights for 
programmatic priorities in the two countries. For the purpose of cross-country 
comparison, I have coded the presence of explicit mandatory requirements for 
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adoption of members’ rights to elect the board in the regulation on legal forms 
and tax beneficial status since 1980 until today.  
Secondly, differences in intensity and character of requirements for maintaining 
legal personality and tax beneficial status (reporting and monitoring) are 
presented. As previously outlined (see section on operationalisation), I use 
analytical criteria based on Bolleyer (2018) and adapted for this study, to map out 
and compare reporting requirements and their enforcement across countries. 
These analytical criteria are used for comparative assessment of regulation 
concerning different types of voluntary organisations in advanced democracies, 
travel well across legal systems (civil vs. common law countries) and are based 
on an organisation-centred approach towards regulation. The coding scheme is 
applied to data consisting of statutory legislation (laws and bylaws), court rulings, 
official guidelines and application documents issued by enforcement institutions 
in the UK and the Netherlands since 1980.38 
The analysis shows that in the UK adopting formal voting rights for the wider 
membership i.e. right to participate at an annual general meeting and elect the 
board in organisations operating in any legal form available is optional, while in 
the Netherlands the legal forms available for membership organisations grant 
special powers to the members to control and elect the board and attend the 
annual general meeting. Reporting requirements and statutory supervision are 
higher and more constraining for organisations which have ‘all indirect benefits’ 
in the UK and the Netherlands, while organisations operating with only legal 
personality or ‘no indirect benefits’ are exposed to lower regulatory constraints.  
In the next sections, I will present first the general legal set-up for non-profit 
membership organisations in the UK and the Netherlands. Secondly, I will focus 
on the governing structures of available legal forms and the presence or absence 
of regulatory requirement for formal voting rights of members. Thirdly, I will 
analyse the regulatory constraints related to maintaining legal personality and tax 
                                                          
38 The organisations in the analysis are founded in the late 80s and early 90s so to be able to 
understand how regulation affects them, the legal analysis traces legal changes from 1980 
onwards.     
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beneficial status in the two countries. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a 
summary of findings and the country-specific expectations.  
4.2. Common Law Non-Profit Tradition: Legal Forms and Charity Status in 
the UK 
 
The UK has a highly developed statutory regulation and policy regarding the 
wider voluntary sector and particularly for organisations with tax beneficial status 
– charities. UK is representative of the common law non-profit tradition, and while 
the concept of the ‘charity’ is central, legal forms in common law non-profit 
tradition are usually more general and not exclusively developed for 
organisations with non-profit purposes (van der Ploeg 2009, 6-7; Cordery et al. 
2016, 293). There are no specific legal forms for membership organisations, but 
the legal forms available can be used by both organisations with members and 
without. Here I focus only on regulation enacted in England and Wales because 
most of the organisations in the population are governed by this regulatory regime 
and Scotland and Northern Ireland39 have a similar regulation concerning 
charities. In Table 4 a summary of the three configurations of indirect benefits in 
focus are presented along with a list of relevant statutory regulation and 
registration bodies.  
Non-profit membership organisations which fall within the configuration of ‘no 
indirect benefits’ in the UK operate as unincorporated associations. 
Unincorporated associations do not have a legal personality and are “essentially 
an informal association of members who share a common purpose that is not 
profit making” (Synge 2017, 363; Kendall and Knapp 1993, 261). This legal form 
is not regulated by statutory law but by common law, mainly including contract 
law and trust and property law (Steward QC 14.09.2018). Members of the 
unincorporated association are “bound to each other by mutual contracts on the 
terms of the rules of the association” (Steward QC et al. 2011, 4). The 
unincorporated association cannot enter into contracts, instead contracts are 
made by the individual members (Steward QC et al. 2011, 5). Also, the property 
of an unincorporated association must be held by an individual on behalf of the 
                                                          
39 The regulation for companies limited by guarantee applies to the overall jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom, however the countries have different legislation and regulators for charities. 
The focus is on charity regulation enacted in England and Wales. 
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organisation (Thomas 1997, 313). While they do not have the benefits of legal 
personality, they also do not face the liabilities that incorporated organisations 
face – they cannot be sued or sue in its own name, nor they can be guilty of 
criminal offence (Steward QC et al. 2011, 5; Thomas 1997, 313). Unincorporated 
associations do not report to the Companies House and have lower management 
costs (Steward QC et al. 2011, 7).40 Unincorporated associations in the UK can 
qualify as charities by registering with the Charity Commission (Piper et al. 2012, 
69).  
Table 4: Summary of Laws and Registration Bodies for the Three 
Configurations in the UK 
Configuration 
of indirect 
benefits  
UK form  Key statutory 
regulation  
Registration 
body  
without indirect 
benefits  
Unincorporated 
associations 
Regulated by non-
statutory law  
No registration 
body 
with legal 
personality  
Company limited 
by guarantee  
Companies Act 1985 
Companies Act 1989 
Companies Act 2006 
Companies 
House  
Her Majesty's 
Revenue and 
Customs 
with legal 
personality and 
tax beneficial 
status  
Charitable 
company  
Companies Act 1985 
Companies Act 1989 
Companies Act 2006 
Charities Act 1960 
(repealed)  
Charities Act 1985 
(repealed) 
Charities Act 1992 
Charities Act 1993 
Charities Act 2006  
Charities Act 2011  
Charities (Protection and 
Social Investment) Act 
2016  
Companies 
House  
Charity 
Commission 
Her Majesty's 
Revenue and 
Customs 
 
 
Company limited by guarantee is a company where members give small 
investment to guarantee the assets of the company upon dissolution and it is a 
form used for non-profit activities. Companies limited by guarantee were 
regulated by the Companies Act 1985 and 1989, which were replaced by the 
Companies Act 2006 (Piper et al. 2012, 67). In terms of benefits, organisations 
                                                          
40 The exception being when they engage in trading activities, in which case they should submit 
company tax return similar to companies limited by guarantee (UK Government 30.06.2016). 
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which register as companies limited by guarantees in the UK gain corporate 
personality and limited liability (Kendall and Knapp 1993; Gray 2000, 80). This 
means that the company limited by guarantee can own, inherit, purchase and sell 
property in its own name, take loans, open bank account, enter into contracts, 
sue and be sued by others etc. In order to gain legal personality, organisations 
are obliged to register with the Companies House, a government agency which 
operates as a register for all companies (Synge 2017, 267).41 Since 2013, non-
profit membership organisations can also register as Charitable Incorporated 
Company (CIO) with the Charity Commission and gain legal personality and 
charity status with the one-stop registration procedure (Cordery et al. 2016, 298). 
The share of CIOs is very small in comparison to organisations incorporated as 
companies limited by guarantee, hence I only focus on regulation concerning the 
latter.42 
Since the 19th century there has been a strong statutory framework regulating 
charities in England and Wales (Dunn 2016, 22). In fact, “[c]harities are the most 
heavily regulated form of organisation within the social economy, primarily 
because they are the only form to receive direct fiscal subsidy through the tax 
system and to ensure their veracity for those wishing to make private donations.” 
(Smith and Teasdale 2012, 161). Non-profit membership organisations interested 
in gaining tax beneficial status are required to register as charities with the Charity 
Commission and the tax authorities (HMRC).43 ‘Charity’ is not a legal form but 
“quality given to trusts, unincorporated associations and non-profit corporations 
because their aim is charitable” (van der Ploeg 2009, 10).  
Charitable company is a ‘company limited by guarantee’ which has charitable 
status and has to comply with both company and charity law, which means they 
                                                          
41 Organisations can incorporate also through Royal Charter or they can incorporate as CIOs 
under the Charities Act 2006. Non-profit organisations could operate as industrial and provident 
societies, which were renamed as co-operative or community benefit societies in 2014 with a 
new law regulating these forms. Industrial and provident societies are rare, and they were 
mainly set up to pursue interests of local communities such as local clubs, allotment societies, 
historical societies, housing associations etc. (Company Law Solutions Ltd 2018). 
42 And even though the new legal form cuts the burden of double reporting, in terms of 
governing structure, the CIO, same as the charitable company can chose between “two-level 
structure of members electing trustees or a single level where the only members are the 
trustees” (Cordery et al. 2016, 294). This means that membership organisations in the UK have 
the freedom to choose to grant or not formal voting rights to their members. 
43 They are required to register with the tax office to be able to use Gift Aid, “a tax effective 
giving scheme” (Hadzi-Miceva Evans 2015, 26). 
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are subject to double accounting and reporting obligations (Cordery et al. 2016, 
292). In return, charitable companies enjoy significant tax exemptions including 
exemptions from tax on income from donations, corporate gains tax, trading 
income, corporate tax, inheritance tax when people leave legacies to charities, 
income from buying and renting property for charitable purposes etc. (Cassey 
2013, Piper and Reed 2016, Budding 2013, 30). Moreover, since the late 1980s 
benefits for charitable donors have been expanded significantly through Payroll 
giving and Gift Aid. The Gift Aid scheme benefits both (higher paying) donors and 
the charity. Charities can claim repayment of basic rate tax on donations received 
from individuals (Cassey 2013). This means that charitable status brings more 
direct funding from private donors and attracts further funding (Budding 2013, 28; 
Synge 2017, 377).  
In England and Wales, charitable status is regulated with the Charities Act 2006 
and Charities Act 2011, where thirteen charitable purposes are clearly defined. 
The criteria for charitable status are: organisational mission to fall under the 
charitable purposes and the organisation to fulfil the public benefit test (Charity 
Commission for England and Wales 2013; Budding 2013, 28). The Charity 
Commission checks whether the purposes of an organisation are charitable, 
including the interpretation of purposes which have not been considered 
charitable so far (Luxton 2013, 13). Before 2006, what is charitable was decided 
by the registration practice of the Charity Commission since there were very few 
court cases (Meakin 2009, 27), and the Charities Act 1993 did not give a statutory 
definition of charitable purposes (s46).44 The four heads of charitable purposes 
in common law (Pemsel classification, 1891) which were guiding the classification 
of what is charitable were ‘replaced’ with the Charity Act 2006`s statutory list of 
thirteen charitable purposes. Even though it specified the charitable purposes, 
the Charities Act 2006 did not change their meaning.45 However, with the 
                                                          
44 The Charities Act 1993 created the new functions of the Charity Commission (Malik 2008, 48, 
Bies 2010). This act “called for increased reporting and granted greater power and resources to 
the public regulation arm, the Charities Commission” (Bies 2010, 1073). 
45 The first three heads of the Pemsel classification (1891), ‘relief of poverty, advancement of 
education and advancement of religion’ were ‘copied’ in the Charity Act 2006 (Luxton 2009, 8). 
The fourth head (being beneficial to the community) was the basis for recognizing new charity 
purposes by the courts or the Charity Commission (Luxton 2009, 4). All the charitable purposes 
which were recognized through interpretation of the fourth head became part of the charitable 
purposes list in the Charities Act 2006. 
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Charities Act 2006 the presumption of public benefit was removed46 (s 3(2)) and 
this remained unchanged in the Charities Act 2011 (s 4(2)), which means that 
charities which register should demonstrate the public benefit of their charitable 
purpose. Maintaining charitable status requires most of the activities of the 
organisation to be directed towards the achievement of the charitable purpose. 
In terms of legal forms in the UK, non-profit membership organisations operate 
as unincorporated associations and companies limited by guarantee. We can 
identify the following configurations of indirect benefits: without legal personality 
(unincorporated associations), with legal personality (companies limited by 
guarantee) and with both legal personality and charitable status (charitable 
company).47 When an organisation is moving from an unincorporated association 
to a company limited by guarantee or charitable company, the organisation will 
become exposed to higher regulatory constraints.  
4.3. Civil Law Non-Profit Tradition: Legal Forms and Tax Beneficial Status 
in the Netherlands  
 
The Netherlands is representative of the civil law non-profit tradition where “the 
phenomenon of legal personality is more important” and specific legal forms for 
non-profits are available (van der Ploeg 2009, 7). Similar to other civil law 
countries, the legal forms available for non-profit organisations are informal 
association, formal association and foundation48 (Overes 2017, 466). Book 2 of 
the Dutch Civil Code [Burgerlijk Wetboek 1976] provides the legal framework for 
different legal forms in the Netherlands (Russell 2018). The law on legal forms is 
regarded as flexible and they are easy to establish (Koele 2017; Knijnenburg 
2014). The foundation cannot have a membership i.e. it is legally prohibited and 
“[i]n doctrine this prohibition is mostly interpreted to mean that a situation should 
                                                          
46 The ‘public benefit requirement’ was presumed for the three old heads of the Pemsel 
qualification (relief of poverty, advancement of education and advancement of religion). 
47 There are also unincorporated associations registered as charities, however since there is no 
equivalent form to this one in the Netherlands, they are not in the focus of this study. 
48 Foundation is a legal person without members which has to fulfill its statutory objectives through 
allocation of assets and profit (Overes 2017, 466; Russell 2018). There are very few rules on the 
internal structure of foundations in the Book 2 of the Civil Code (Overes 2017, 470), and the only 
mandatory requirement is to have a management board (Burger et al. 2001, 26). Groups that 
want to avoid internal democratic structure where members appoint the board usually chose to 
incorporate as foundations (van der Ploeg 09.10.2017), and this is the most used form by non-
profits with public benefit status (Koele 2017).  
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not exist in which a body acquires a position similar to that of the general meeting 
in the association” (Burger et al. 2001, 26). Non-profit membership organisations 
can take the legal forms of informal associations without notarial deed and formal 
associations with notarial deed (Civil Code, Book 2, Title 2.2 Associations). Both 
formal and informal associations have to be established by at least two persons 
(Overes 2017, 467).  
Formal association (in Dutch ‘vereniging’) is formed by a notarial deed which 
contains the statutes, it has full legal capacity and must register with the Chamber 
of Commerce (in Dutch: Kamer van Koophandel) to gain limited liability (Article 
2:29). In the Netherlands “there is no government involvement in the 
establishment of associations and foundations, and government has no 
supervisory competences with regard to the activities of the [organisations]” 
(Overes 2017, 474). While external supervision of foundations is more extensive, 
external supervision for associations is very limited in civil law (Overes 2017, 
475). The association as a legal form is present across civil law non-profit regimes 
and it is “perhaps the most important legal form for organizing interests” in 
democratic countries (Freise and Hallmann 2014, 4). Associations across 
democratic countries have a membership assembly that elects and gives 
authority to the executive board (Freise and Hallmann 2014, 4).  
Informal associations gain legal capacity at the moment of their establishment; 
however, they have restricted capacity i.e. board members have personal liability, 
the entity cannot inherit, cannot acquire real estate etc. (Overes 2017, 467). 
Informal associations have the possibility to register with the Chamber of 
Commerce to limit the liability of the members towards third parties (Civil Code 
Article 2:30; Overes 2017, 467). According to Brasz (1995, 25), associations are 
mainly established by a notarial deed because associations without notarial deed 
are “limited in its functioning” and “[o]nly small associations like a club can do so”. 
Registering as a formal association is an easy process, thus many groups decide 
to incorporate (van der Ploeg 09.10.2017). Moreover, having legal personality is 
often a precondition for receiving subsidies, which is an additional incentive for 
groups to register. Only formal associations can gain tax beneficial status, so 
there is no equivalent configuration where the organisation has tax beneficial 
status without being legal personality like in the UK. The three configurations 
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identified in the Netherlands are presented in Table 5, together with the statutory 
regulation and relevant registration bodies.  
Table 5: Summary of Statutory Regulation and Registration Bodies for the 
Three Configurations in the Netherlands  
Configuration 
of indirect 
benefits 
Forms in the 
Netherlands  
Key statutory 
regulation 
Registration 
body 
without indirect 
benefits  
Associations 
without notarial 
deed – informal 
associations  
Civil Code, Book 2, Title 
2.2 Associations 
Can choose to 
register with the 
Chamber of 
Commerce  
with legal 
personality  
Associations with 
notarial deed – 
formal associations  
Civil Code, Book 2, Title 
2.2 Associations 
Must register 
with the 
Chamber of 
Commerce but 
there is no 
supervisory 
body  
with legal 
personality and 
tax beneficial 
status  
Formal 
associations with 
ANBI status  
Personal Income Tax Act 
2011 
General Tax Law 2012 
Chamber of 
Commerce  
Tax 
Administration 
office 
 
Formal associations are exempted from income tax as long as they do not 
engage in business activities (Russell 2018). Groups gain special tax benefits by 
applying for the status of "institution for general or public benefit" (Dutch: 
algemeen nut beogende instelling, ANBI; the abbreviation will be further used in 
the text). There is no special legal form for organisations with public benefit 
purpose (Overes 2017, 479). Incorporating as a formal association or foundation 
is a precondition for gaining ANBI status (Russell 2018), unlike in the UK where 
unincorporated associations can become charities. To be recognized as an ANBI, 
the organisation applies to the Tax Administration (Article 5b General Tax Law 
2012; Budding 2013, 10). The ANBI status is defined in the tax legislation 
(General Tax Law 2012) and there were considerable changes regarding the 
access to tax benefits in the past decade, and specifically in 2006, 2008, 2010 
and 2012 (Hemels 2012, 1). Since 2008, associations which want to obtain ANBI 
status have to register with tax authorities and meet certain requirements (Article 
41a-c Decree Minister of Finance 1 February; Hemels 11.09.2015). Before 2008, 
registration with the Dutch Tax authorities was not necessary to qualify as an 
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ANBI (Hemels 11.09.2015). Before changes in the General Tax Law 2012, the 
definition of tax beneficial status was included in the Personal Income Tax Act 
2011.  
The ANBI status brings various benefits for both the organisations and their 
donors i.e. periodic and ordinary gifts from individuals and companies are tax 
deductible under certain conditions (Overes 2017, 480; Russell 2018). The 
government encourages donations to ANBIs through tax exemptions on personal 
and corporate income tax, gift tax and inheritance tax (Hemels 2012, Hemels 
2015, Overes 2017, 480). Under certain conditions ANBIs can get return of 50% 
of the tax on energy (Russell 2018). Also, having an ANBI status is an “informal 
requirement for fundraising” since organisations subjected to the reporting 
requirements of the tax office are perceived as more transparent (Budding 2013, 
10).  
In the Netherlands, according to the General Tax Law (2012), organisations are 
required to direct 90% of their expenditures to public benefit activities in order to 
be granted ANBI status (Hemels 2012, 2; FATF/OECD and IMF 2011, 263). Until 
2012, the Dutch Tax Authorities evaluated on a case-by-case basis whether 
organisations are pursuing public benefit activities since there was no definition 
of public benefit activities in the law (Hemels 2012, 2). According to a court ruling 
(Supreme Court, BNB, 1994/280), before 2012 “if an organisation serve[d] both 
its members and the public at large, as a rule at least 50% of the activities should 
be for the public benefit in order to qualify as a public benefit organisation” (Burger 
et al. 2001, 24). The article 5b of the General Tax Act (2012) for the first time 
provides an exhaustive list of public benefit activities (full list is provided in 
Appendix A). This means that no other type of public benefit activities can be 
recognized than those included on this list.  
In summary, in the Netherlands there are legal forms available specifically for 
membership non-profit organisations – informal and formal associations. The 
informal associations have limited legal capacity (gaining legal personality is a 
private act), whilst formal associations have full legal capacity. In practice, small 
local clubs operate as informal associations and due to the easy procedure for 
incorporation, non-profit membership organisations almost exclusively chose to 
operate as formal associations (Brasz 1995; van der Ploeg 09.10.2017). Hence, 
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in the Netherlands, in terms of configurations of indirect benefits we can 
distinguish between those with legal personality (formal associations) and those 
with legal personality and tax beneficial status (formal associations with ANBI 
status). When an organisation operating as a formal association obtains ANBI 
status, it becomes subject to higher regulatory constraints.  
4.4. Powers of Members in Available Legal Forms  
 
This thesis argued that the type of legal regime and the legal forms available 
therein affect the adoption of formal voting rights of members, and subsequently 
the use of these rights in practice. In this section, I will present the governing 
structure required for the available legal forms for non-profit membership 
organisations in the two countries, with focus on the presence or absence of 
explicit requirement for formal powers of members to attend the annual general 
meeting, and the power to control and elect the members of the executive body. 
Moreover, within the country sections we briefly discuss whether charity law in 
the UK and tax law in the Netherlands stipulate any rules on formal governing 
structure.  
4.4.1. Legal Status of Members in the UK  
 
The unincorporated association is a form which is not regulated by statutory law, 
and there is no defined internal governance structure prescribed for them (Synge 
2017, 368; Steward QC 14.09.2018). Unincorporated organisations have 
flexibility and freedom to set their own internal structure (Steward QC 
14.09.2018). The internal rules or the ‘constitution’ of the unincorporated 
association usually contains rules for establishment of management committee, 
define members rights and obligations and specify the governing control 
(Steward QC 2011, 17). There is no strict format for meetings and members can 
chose the format they prefer (Steward QC 2011, 8). The elected committee has 
fiduciary duties towards the association’s members (Steward QC 2011, 113).  
The company law regulates various matters of internal governance of companies 
limited by guarantee including meetings, voting, resolutions, appointment and 
removal of directors of the board (Synge 2017, 368). Yet, in comparison to the 
civil law tradition, regulation on legal personality in the UK does not regulate 
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internal structure in details and this is seen as a matter of choice for the founders 
(van der Ploeg 2009, 7). In order to incorporate as company limited by guarantee, 
organisations need to submit memorandum of association and articles of 
association as a governing document where the formal governing structure is 
defined (Companies Act 2006, part 2, 9 Registration documents). Under the 1985 
law, companies were required to have minimum two members and at least one 
director, while under the 2006 Companies Act they must have one or more 
members and at least one director of the governing board (also known as the 
management board, management committee etc.). To amend the articles of the 
association, the organisation has to pass a special resolution at a general 
meeting supported by at least 75% of the companies’ members (Thomson 
Reuters 2018). 
Companies limited by guarantee are governed by a board of directors 
accountable to the members, however, “the directors are not necessarily voted in 
by the membership” (Smith and Teasdale 2012, 165).49 In terms of governing 
structure, companies limited by guarantee can chose between two-tier structure 
where members can elect the directors and a single tire structure where the 
directors will be considered members of the company (i.e. the two roles are 
performed by the same people) (Governance Hub and Co-operatives, undated, 
15). UK company law places the locus of authority with the board of directors and 
there is no requirement in the UK to include members on the board or include 
members in the process of appointing directors. There are model articles in the 
UK that allow for appointment by ordinary resolution or decision of directors. A 
company’s own articles may also prescribe a different way of appointment of the 
directors. If there is no provision in the company’s articles of association as to 
appointment, then by default the power of appointment rests in the members.  
All companies were required to hold an annual general meeting under the 1985 
Companies act and in case of non-compliance the company and its directors 
were liable to a fine (Meetings 366, Annual general meeting, Article 4). Under the 
1989 Act it has been possible for companies to opt out of holding AGMs by 
passing an elective resolution (Company Law Club Undated). The Companies 
                                                          
49 In fact, in the UK under both company and charity legal framework, organisations do not have 
to adopt a democratic decision-making structure (Smith and Teasdale 2012, 161). 
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Act 2006 introduced a change (Part 13 sec281 - sec361 in effect since October 
2007) and currently private companies are not required to hold general meetings 
including annual general meetings (Governance Hub and Co-operatives, 
undated, 15). In practice, if companies were incorporated before 2006, their 
articles will require them to hold an AGM, and this would remain intact unless the 
companies amended their articles post 2006. Also, it is more likely in a company 
limited by guarantee rather than shares that its articles would require an AGM. In 
sum, company limited by guarantee is a flexible form that enables but does not 
legally require members to appoint the directors, and therefore in practice most 
organisations can opt out from democratic decision-making structure where wider 
membership attends at the annual general meeting and elects the members of 
the executive (Smith and Teasdale 2012, 165).  
Charities are governed by appointed trustees, and even though they can adopt a 
governing document where members have right to elect trustees, they can 
operate without voting membership (Smith and Teasdale 2012, 161). 
Organisations are not required to hold annual general meetings by charity law 
and they have the freedom to specify who can attend and vote at the meetings 
(Charity Commission 2012). This means that legally speaking the law on charities 
does not stipulate any requirements for the governing structure in terms of 
members’ powers. Some authors have noted that in common law countries 
characterised with charity-specific law, there is no concept of membership and 
their rights, and that there is a tension between pursuing a purpose for the public 
benefit (wider public) and the interests of members (Lansley 1996, 225). The 
distinction is rather between the trustees, who are members of governing bodies 
and the ‘beneficiaries’ which are users of charity (Locke et al. 2003). Despite 
these suggestions the Charity Commission has issued guidance (not mandatory 
in nature) for good governance practices of membership charities and there are 
calls for involving ‘beneficiaries’ in internal governance. 
We can conclude that the UK represents a country where non-profit membership 
organisations operating in any of the legal forms available are not required by law 
to grant wider members with the right to attend the annual general meeting and 
formal voting rights to elect the board. They have the freedom to limit the 
decision-making rights to the members of the executive. 
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4.4.2. Legal Status of Members in the Netherlands  
 
In the Netherlands, a formal association is established by a notarial deed drawn 
up by a Dutch public notary in Dutch language (Civil Code, Book 2, Legal persons 
Article 2:27). The notarial deed contains the articles of incorporation which define 
the method for convening the general meeting and appointment and dismissal of 
associations' directors (Book 2, Legal persons Article 2:27 Par 4.). The notary is 
responsible for producing a deed that would be in accordance with the law (Book 
2, Legal persons Article 2:27 Par. 5). Both formal and informal association should 
be established by at least two persons (Article 2:26 Par. 2 Civil Code). The 
internal structure of the association is regulated by the Civil Code (Title 2 Book 
2) and most of these rules are mandatory (Overes 2017, 469). Associations have 
two internal bodies – the general meeting of members and the board of directors 
(Articles 2:40 and 2:44 Civil Code). The board of directors is managing and 
representing the organisation while the general meeting of members has a 
mandatory competence to appoint and dismiss the members of the board 
(Overes 2017, 469; Russell 2018). The management board has competencies to 
make independent decisions for the advancement of associations’ objects and 
existence of such body is mandatory (Burger et al. 2001, 26).  
The members have rights to vote at the annual general meeting (van Veen 1997, 
236). According to Burger et al. (2001, 26, see also van Veen 1997, 236) the 
most important rules in terms of internal governance of associations are those 
that provide the general meeting of members with mandatory powers:  
“The law provides for the right to receive an annual report from the management 
board, to appoint and dismiss the members of the management board, to amend 
the articles, to wind up the association and to take decisions in all cases in which 
the law nor the articles give competence to other bodies of the association.” 
In other words, the legal form of the association enables “democratic control of 
the management by the plenary meeting” (Brasz 1995, 23). The appointment of 
the board of directors is made by the general meeting of members, however there 
can be another procedure specified in the articles of association, “provided that 
each member is able to participate, either directly or indirectly, in the voting on 
the appointment of the Directors.” (Book 2, Article 2:37, Par. 2). There is a 
possibility for some of the members of the board, but not more than half to be 
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appointed by others than the members of the association (Book 2, Article 2:37, 
Par. 3). Moreover, the association may have a general meeting attended by 
delegates previously elected by and from the members (Book 2, Article 2:39). 
Each member must have the opportunity to participate in the election of delegates 
(Book 2, Article 2:39, Par. 1). This means that members have democratic rights 
and must be involved in the decision-making processes of associations (Brasz 
1995, Russell 2018). The governing document can be amended only by a 
decision of the general meeting of members, once members receive a notice that 
such amendment will be proposed at the meeting (Article 2:42, Par.1).  
To be recognised as an ANBI, the formal association submits a governing 
document to the tax authorities to show that it is a non-profit, and that it serves 
the public interest (Overes 2017, 479). There are no specific requirements 
regarding the governing structure of organisations acquiring ANBI status, except 
those related to constraints on the renumeration of managers, as well as the one 
stating that the members of the board that determine the organisation’s policy 
cannot treat assets as personal assets (FATF/OECD and IMF 2011, 236). 
In sum, the Netherlands represents a country where a specific legal form 
designed for membership non-profits is available. This means that organisations 
operating as associations grant members the right to control the executive body, 
attend the annual meeting of members, and directly or indirectly elect the 
executive organ. Organisations operating in countries like the Netherlands, where 
the regulation specifically mandates adoption of democratic structure are more 
likely to achieve formal representation of members i.e. elect their representatives 
in the executive organ. Also, the meeting of members has the right to amend the 
governing document. There are no legally mandatory rights for members to 
decide on programmatic priorities, but members can decide on all other matters 
for which other bodies have no competencies as per the governing document.  
 
4.4.3. Comparative Assessment of Legal Forms for Non-Profit Membership 
Organisations in the UK and the Netherlands 
 
The UK and the Netherlands are representative of different traditions of non-profit 
law and differently regulate the internal governance of legal persons. In the UK, 
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company law does not require the wider membership to elect the board (it’s 
optional), hence companies do not have to hold an annual general meeting and 
board directors can be defined as the members of the organisation. On the other 
hand, the Dutch Civic Code provides mandatory rules for the control of the 
meeting of members over the executive body as well as members rights to 
appoint the board (directly or indirectly through delegates). Unincorporated 
associations in the UK, same as companies limited by guarantee have the 
freedom to adopt any governing structure, and theoretically they can limit the 
formal voting rights to the members of the board.  
Table 6: Members Powers in Legal Forms Available for Non-Profit Membership 
Organisations 
 Legal forms  Mandatory powers for 
members 
UK • Company limited by 
guarantee 
• Unincorporated associations 
                  No 
Netherlands • Association (Vereniging) Yes 
 
In the UK, charity law places governance responsibility in the executive board 
(the trustees) which might encourage adoption of centralised decision-making. 
Legally speaking, it enables the leadership to decide whether they want to 
operate with voting or non-voting membership. In the Netherlands, tax law 
regulating ANBI status does not stipulate requirements related to their governing 
structure. In light of the legal regulation presented above, the expectation is that 
non-profit membership organisations operating like companies limited by 
guarantee (with or without charity status) and unincorporated associations are 
more likely to exclude ordinary members from election of the board. The 
organisations operating as formal associations in the Netherlands are more likely 
to have formal voting rights for the wider membership.  
 
4.5. Maintaining Legal Personality and Tax Beneficial Status 
 
In each of the two regulatory regimes analysed there are up to three 
configurations of indirect benefits which differ in the type and intensity of 
regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting requirements) they are exposed to. In this 
chapter we have already identified the configurations of indirect benefits in the 
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two countries. Building on that, in this section, I will firstly present an overview of 
regulatory constraints in the UK for the different configurations, as stipulated in 
charities and companies’ law since 1980 and captured by the analytical tool 
introduced earlier. Secondly, I will present the regulatory constraints related to 
maintaining indirect benefits for different configurations in the Netherlands.  
4.5.1. Reporting Requirements and Supervision of Non-Profits in the UK 
 
In the UK organisations are exposed to overall higher reporting requirements and 
strict external supervision (particularly charitable companies). In terms of 
maintaining indirect benefits, companies limited by guarantee are less 
constrained than charitable companies, which, as mentioned earlier, are highly 
regulated and subject to both company and charity law (Piper et al. 2018). 
Unincorporated associations (no indirect benefits) are the least constrained 
configuration.  
Companies limited by guarantees (configuration with one type of indirect benefit 
e.g. legal personality) in the UK have to comply with the nine requirements coded 
and this has remained the same since 1980. They need to provide updates on 
organisational changes and if any of the company details change (e.g. address 
or directors) the company has to report this to the Companies House and in some 
cases to the tax office (UK Government 19.04.2016).  Moreover, organisations in 
the UK have to make regular reports on non-financial matters to the Companies 
House. More precisely, they need to submit annual return which provides 
information about the company and its activities (Companies House GP2 June 
2016). The annual return is published by the Companies House. Finally, 
companies limited by guarantee are required to submit regular financial matters 
(annual accounts) on annual level, which are also made publicly available through 
the Companies House Register. The directors’ report and accounts are submitted 
to the Companies House within nine months after the accounting period (Synge 
2017, 374). 
In terms of financial reporting, in the UK, the organisation has to file financial 
accounts to both the Companies House and the Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
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Customs (UK Government 30.06.2016).50 Requirements for keeping records and 
accounting are complex and organisations are recommended to hire an 
accountant (UK Government 30.06.2016). The annual fillings depend on the size 
of the company (Budding 2013). Small company, in terms of budget size, can 
choose to disclose less information than medium and large companies, and the 
rules for small companies accounting regime are set in Parts 15 and 16 of the 
Companies Act 2006 (Companies House 2018). Small company accounts 
generally include a full balance sheet, profit and loss account, a signed directors 
report and notes to the account to the Companies House (Companies House 
2018). Small companies can qualify for audit exemption (Companies House, GP3 
June 2016 v5). Micro companies prepare a balance sheet with reduced 
information. Micro companies may be exempted from filing directors’ report, a 
profit and loss account and auditor report, however they are yet required to 
prepare them by law (Companies House 2018). Companies must prepare and 
submit the same set of accounts to the Companies House and to their members 
(Companies House 2018). Before 2016, companies had to prepare full accounts 
for its members and send abbreviated (shorter) version for the public record 
(Companies House 2018). 
When it comes to supervision, companies limited by guarantee are overseen by 
the Companies House and HCMR (Piper et al. 2018). The Secretary of state has 
investigative powers which were set by the Companies Act 1985 (part XIV) and 
is authorised to order an investigation of a company, inspection of documentation, 
and access to premises on the groups of suspecting illegal activities (Synge 2017, 
374). Companies officers can be prosecuted for failing to submit a company’s 
annual documents on time (Companies House 2018). Moreover, there is a civil 
penalty for late filing of accounts (Companies House 2018). 
Moving to charity regulation, the government has established constraining and 
complex accountability and oversight requirements for charities since the 1990s 
to be able to prepare organisations for increased engagement in social service 
provision (Cornforth 2003, 4-5). Furthermore, this accountability regime was set 
to prevent abuse of the extensive tax benefits for organisations and donors by 
                                                          
50 Company tax returns must be completed every year and if directors receive salary, they have 
to file self-assessment tax return. 
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subjecting organisations to external scrutiny (Cornforth 2003, 4-5). Since 
charities serve the public interest, the state wants to assure and protect the public 
interest through enhanced accountability requirements. Legally speaking, the 
burden of compliance falls on the trustees or individuals responsible for the 
general management (Locke et al. 2003). Trustees are responsible for the “the 
‘proper administration’ of the charity: they have a duty to ensure that money and 
other assets (endowments, donations, grants or income from fees and trading, 
etc.) are applied in the interests of the beneficiaries as set out in the charity’s 
objects.” (Locke et al. 2003, 60). Moreover, Harrow and Palmer (2003, 102) 
suggest that the financial role of charitable boards is inclusive of the following 
tasks: “[Trustees] must ensure that there are proper policies and procedures in 
place governing their financial responsibilities, notably their exercise of budgetary 
control in relation to expenditure, financial and physical assets, human resources 
costs, and income generation”. This means that boards of trustees need to be 
operated by persons with sufficient knowledge of charity law, financial and 
governance matters to be able to meet these responsibilities. To prevent misuse 
of tax beneficial status, since 2010, the tax authorities apply the ‘fit and proper 
persons’ test on persons involved in the management of the charity (National 
Audit Office 2013, 32; UK Government 27.06.2016; HMRC 03.05.2016). The tax 
authority can deny access to tax beneficial status in case the responsible persons 
do not pass the ‘fit and proper persons’ test.  
For charitable companies (configuration with all indirect benefits), that are subject 
to both company and charity law, reporting to the Charity Commission is 
mandatory and extensive (see Bolleyer 2018, 257-258). In terms of maintaining 
tax beneficial status, organisations have to comply with all ten coded 
requirements. They have to submit regular updates on information including 
financial and non-financial reports on annual level. The reporting requirements 
vary for different charity types and income bands. Non-financial reporting to the 
Charity Commission has expanded since the 90s (Hyndman and McMahon 2010, 
459). All charities registered with the Charity Commission are required to submit 
trustees annual report (Morgan and Fletcher 2013, 806-807). The Charities Act 
2006 led to a new requirement for public benefit reporting in the trustees’ annual 
report, which applied to charities with income over £25 000 from 2008 onwards 
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(Breen 2013, 866). Public benefit reporting is key for charity accountability. 
Charities must submit annual return to the Charity Commission via an online 
system. All registered charities whose yearly income exceeds £10,000 must 
submit annual return. 
In terms of financial reporting, charities were required to present charity accounts 
for the first time by the 1992 Charities Act and the 1993 Charities Act (Hyndman 
and McMahon 2010, 458; Morgan 2008, 9; Morgan and Fletcher 2013, 7). 
However, it was not until the implementation of the first mandatory 1995 SORP 
(based on the 1993 Charities Act) that charities had to comply with detailed 
requirements for accounting (Morgan 1999, 98-99). The 1995 regulations were 
mandatory for charities with income over £250,000 (Harrow and Palmer 2003, 
100). The 2000 SORP introduced a new requirement for trustees to provide risk 
management statement which further strengthened the financial role of boards. 
According to Harrow and Palmer (2003, 100) the developments of accounting 
regulation for charities is a clear manifestation of “governmental intervention in 
strengthening the boards’ role as financial controller”. Importantly, the accounting 
requirements differ depending on the income category the organisation falls in 
and whether the charity is a company or not (Charity Commission 2016). 
The differentiated reporting and accounting system were implemented since the 
Charities Act 1993 which set reduced requirements for smaller charities and this 
trend continued with subsequent charity legislation (Bolleyer 2018, 256). 
Charities Act 2006 and Companies Act 2006 synchronised the reporting 
requirements for smaller charitable companies, which in practice meant less 
administrative burden (Charity Commission 2013). Also, it simplified the rules for 
when a professional audit is required (Charity Commission 2013). In the past 
charitable companies were subject to a more complicated accounting and 
reporting requirements because of the “specific thresholds set out under 
company law which were quite different to those applying to non-company 
charities.” (Charity Commission 2013, 1). Despite these changes, charitable 
companies irrespective of size have to prepare accounts on accrual basis, which 
are more demanding type of accounts (Charity Commission 2016). The Charities 
(Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 simplified reporting for charities in the 
income band from £25,000 and £250,000 (Charity Commission 2013, 20-21). 
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Currently all registered charities whose gross yearly income exceeds £25,000 
need to fill in annual return, trustees’ annual report and accounts (Charity 
Commission 2016). There are detailed legal requirements on what kind of 
information the trustees’ annual report should contain, which are set in The 
Charities (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 (for details see Charity 
Commission 2016). Charities which are subject to statutory audit have to provide 
additional information, and larger charities which prepare accounts on accrual 
basis should satisfy specific requirements stipulated in the charities SORP 
(Charity Commission 2016). In 2015, external scrutiny of charities with income up 
to 1 million was simplified i.e. independent examination applied instead of 
professional audit (Charity Commission 2015; Garbett 2017). For charities whose 
gross income exceeds £250 000 the independent examiner has to qualify by 
being a member of approved professional organisation specified in the Charities 
Act (Garbett 2017).  
It is important to stress that charities are the most constrained non-profit 
organisations in terms of their political activities in the UK (Dunn 2008, 54). 
Constraints on political campaigning and partisan activities have been a 
continuous characteristic of charity legislation in the UK. Charities are allowed to 
engage in clearly defined political activities which are non-partisan to the extent 
that these contribute to the advancement of their charitable purpose as defined 
in their governing document (Dunn 2008). The Charity Commission has been 
issuing guidance on political activities of charities since 1995 (the first guidance), 
where it interprets the charity law in regard to political activities (Dunn 2008, 59; 
an overview of guidelines/publications which concern political activity of charities 
is provided in Appendix A). According to the Charity Commission’s guidance on 
campaigning and political activity by charities (CC9 2008, 12): “For any charity, 
political activity can only be a means of supporting or contributing to the 
achievement of its charitable purposes. It cannot be a charitable purpose in its 
own right, or the only means by which the charity pursues its objects.” Since 2008 
the rules under which organisations can engage in political activities are clearer 
because of the guidance on political activities of charities issued by the Charity 
Commission (Lang 2012). The charity trustees have the responsibility to assure 
that political activities are performed in an independent and balanced manner, 
 114 
 
and solely for achievement of its charitable purpose. In practice, the real 
challenge for charities is to comply with both law on charities and law on elections 
which constraints charity campaigning. For the purpose of campaigning, charities 
might have to register with the Electoral Commission as a non-party campaigner 
and stay in line with the reporting requirements concerning joint campaigning, 
respecting campaign spending limits and reporting on donations (Charities and 
Campaigning 2014, 4). This puts additional burden and responsibilities in the 
hands of charity trustees.  
In terms of supervision, charities are accountable to and overseen by the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales, which “has extensive investigatory and 
enforcement powers” (Dunn 2016, 22). The Commission is maintaining a register 
of charities (Dunn 2016, 22). The supervisory and investigative powers of the 
Charity Commission had increased since the 1992 Charities Act (Piper et al. 
2018). The 1992 and 1993 Act extended the interventionist powers of the 
commissioners, so they could conduct inquiries and request documentation, 
amend charity purposes and constitutions, direct the application of the charity’s 
property, suspend a trustee or employee in case of mismanagement, appoint 
additional trustee and manager and they could disqualify persons that are 
convicted of offence involving dishonesty and bankrupts among other powers 
(Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2010; Breen et al. 2009, 11; Morgan 1999, 110). 
As mentioned above, the charity acts required charities to report information to 
the commissioners (Palmer 1995, 273-274). The Commissioners’ decisions were 
binding and subject to review by the courts (O’Halloran et al. 2008, 152). The 
2006 Charity Act further expanded the investigative powers of the Commission – 
it authorised the Commission to direct trustees and employees to take certain 
actions (e.g. on the use of property), to cancel the membership of trustees or 
employees in an organisation and to enter premises of charities to seize 
documents (O’Halloran 2008 et al., 152; Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2010; 
Bolleyer 2018). Finally, the latest Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 
2016 introduced new sanctioning powers of the Charity Commission. The Act 
“extended powers for directing the use of charity property and the removal of a 
trustee disqualified from office without opening an inquiry” and “create[d] a new 
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list of offences that automatically disqualify a person from being a charity trustee” 
(Bolleyer 2018, 259). 
Non-profit membership organisations with all indirect benefits - maintaining legal 
personality and tax beneficial status - have been exposed to high reporting 
requirements and external supervision by the Charity Commission since early 
1990s. The reporting requirements for companies limited by guarantee have 
remained the same in terms of intensity since the 90s. In terms of maintaining 
indirect benefits, the charitable companies (‘all indirect benefits’ configuration) 
are more constrained than the companies limited by guarantee (configuration 
with one indirect benefit), which are more constrained than unincorporated 
associations that, as mentioned earlier, are not subject to statutory regulation and 
reporting (Steward QC et al. 2011).  
4.5.2. Reporting Requirements and Supervision in the Netherlands 
 
In terms of maintaining indirect benefits, formal associations in the Netherlands 
are exposed to permissive reporting requirements and there is an absence of 
external supervision for this legal form. The results from the coding of 
requirements show that in comparison to the company limited by guarantee (legal 
form available) in the UK, associations in the Netherlands have to comply with 
lower number of reporting requirements - three out of nine. 
In order to maintain its registration, incorporated associations in the Netherlands 
are legally required to inform the Chamber of Commerce about any changes in 
the details provided in the registration form within one week (Dutch Chamber of 
Commerce, 2015) and this information is publicly available. Importantly, 
associations in the Netherlands are not obliged to submit regular annual reports 
on non-financial matters. 
In terms of financial reporting, smaller associations are not required to deposit 
their annual financial reports to the Chamber of Commerce and this requirement 
applies to big associations with registered companies with turnover of EUR 
6.000.000, 00 during the last 2 years. The financial reports must be audited only 
in specific cases, and financial information is published only for big associations 
with sizeable commercial enterprise (Overes 2017, 472). Consequently, financial 
information from associations are not disclosed publicly by the Chamber of 
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Commerce except for large associations with companies (Budding 2013). Similar 
to the UK, large associations in the Netherlands are only required to have their 
financial statements audited by a registered accountant or an accountant-
administration consultant (Book 2 Civil Code, Article 2:393).  
The Dutch law is very limited when it comes to external supervision of 
associations and their activities (Burger et al. 2001, 27; Overes 2017, 475). The 
general assembly of members has a central supervisory role over the managing 
board (van Veen 1997, 236; van der Ploeg 2009, 14), and, as previously 
suggested, can dismiss board directors (Burger et al. 2001, 27). The directors 
have a responsibility for proper performance of tasks towards the association 
(Article 2:9, Par.1). According to the Dutch Civil Code (Article 2:48), the board of 
an association is primarily accountable to the general meeting (and not to an 
external statutory body) which approves the balance sheet and income and 
expenditure statement within six months after the end of the financial year (van 
Veen 1997, 236; Overes 2017, 472). While the board presents the annual 
account internally, it is not obliged to make this account public (Brasz 1995, 24). 
The General meeting receives the annual report describing the events of the past 
years and on the policy work of the board (Civil Code Article 2:48, para 1). In case 
the board fails to report within the required period, each member of the 
associations may file a legal claim in court against the board of directors (Civil 
Code Article 2:48, para 1; Burger et al. 2001, 27). When the association does not 
have a supervisory board and the annual accounts are not checked by an 
external accountant, the annual general meeting appoints at least two ordinary 
members (committee) to examine the documents and report its findings to the 
general meeting (Civil Code 2:48, para 2). This committee has the right to carry 
on an investigation and inspect the association’s documentation, books and 
records (Civil Code 2:48, para 2).51  
                                                          
51 Non-profits that receive government funding report their annual accounts and report to the 
state agency issuing the funding and this is a way to compensate for the absence of external 
monitoring (Burger et al. 2001, 28). Also, organisations might be part of self-regulating initiatives 
such as the Central Bureau of Fundraising, and voluntarily adhere to greater public scrutiny 
(Burger et al. 2001, 28). Importantly, state funding bodies often ask for the adoption of 
participatory structure where participants have a say in matters of direct concern to them, as a 
condition for accessing state subsidies (van Veen 1997, 237).  
 117 
 
Moving on to maintaining tax beneficial status, ANBIs in the Netherlands currently 
have to comply with eight out of ten coded requirements. However, before 2014, 
ANBIs had to comply with five out of ten requirements. Since 2014, there is an 
increase in transparency requirements and ANBIs are required to publish 
information on their website including basic organisational data (i.e. name, tax 
number, contact details), up-to-date policy plan, information on directors, financial 
statement, report of past activities and payment policy for directors and other staff 
(Russell 2018). They are required to report the website containing the required 
information to the Dutch tax authorities, which means that effectively they report 
to the public on financial and non-financial matters annually since 2014. The 
published financial information should contain the balance sheet, the profit and 
loss statement and an additional explanation (Dutch Tax Administration 
01.01.2014).52 The ANBI status will be refused or withdrawn if a charity fails to 
publish the required information on the internet.53 Organisations have to submit 
regular updates on organisational information such as changes in the address, 
renumeration costs, the objectives of the association etc.54 The administration 
has to keep records on the exact renumerations per director, expenses, income 
and assets of the public benefit organisation (Russell 2018). To maintain ANBI 
status, organisations are not required to have externally audited reports and there 
are no constraints on political purpose. In fact, in the Netherlands, there are no 
constraints on political activities (Gilbert 2018, 8-9), and there is “no specific 
legislative framework governing the public policy or political activities” of non-
profit organisations (Gilbert 2018, 9). 
In terms of supervision, the Dutch Tax Authorities “execute continuous 
supervision on recognised charitable organisations with regards to the applicable 
criteria” (Russell 2018). The administrative and fundraising expenditure must be 
proportionate to the expenditure related to fulfilling the core purpose (Overes 
2017, 479). In case an ANBI fails to meet the reporting requirements described 
                                                          
52 Tax and Customs Administration ‘Publishing the financial statement’ accessed at: 
https://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontenten/belastingdienst/business/other_s
ubjects/public_benefit_organisations/publishing-anbi-information-on-a-
website/publishing_the_financial_statement on 28.09.2018 
53 Anbi.nl ‘Publication obligation’ accessed at https://anbi.nl/publicatieverplichting/ on 28.09.2018 
54 Artikel 1a Uitvoeringsregeling Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen 1994 accessed at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/jci1.3:c:BWBR0006736&hoofdstuk=1a&artikel=1a&z=2018-07-
01&g=2018-07-01 on 02.10.2018 
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above, the tax authority can decide to withdraw the status (Overes 2017, 480; 
Russell 2018). 
In summary, non-profit membership organisations maintaining legal personality 
in the Netherlands are exposed to lenient reporting requirements (three out of 
nine coded) and there is an absence of external supervision. ANBIs have to 
comply with more reporting requirements, and even though there is supervision 
in place, it is weaker than the supervision to which charities in the UK are 
exposed. The reporting requirements increased since 2014, and before that, the 
reporting regime was relatively permissive.  
4.5.3. Comparative Analysis of Reporting Requirements and Supervision 
in the UK and Netherlands  
 
In conclusion, non-profit membership organisations in the UK are -overall- 
exposed to a higher number of reporting requirements for maintaining legal 
personality and tax benefits than organisations in the Netherlands (see Table 7 
for a summary of scores). Non-profit membership organisations maintaining legal 
personality and particularly tax beneficial status in the UK since the 1980s have 
been exposed to higher reporting requirements and external supervision than 
organisations falling within the same configurations in the Netherlands. While the 
requirements for financial reporting of smaller charities relaxed in the UK over 
time, and requirements for Dutch ANBIs increased since 2014, overall UK 
charities are more constrained than ANBIs. While ANBIs in the Netherlands in 
the past few years have been exposed to higher reporting requirements, there 
are no additional constraints on political activities (Gilbert 2018, 8-9) and 
supervision of ANBIs is less strict. The constraints on political activities of 
charities invite for cautious and measured managerial approach. 
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Table 7: Summary of Reporting Requirements Related to Maintaining Indirect 
Benefits in the UK and the Netherlands 
 
Based on the legal analysis we can conclude that charitable companies in the UK 
are the most constrained configuration, followed by ANBIs in the Netherlands, 
which in turn are followed by companies limited by guarantee. Formal 
associations are on the least constraining side, followed by informal associations 
and unincorporated associations being the least constrained configurations. 
Figure 3 presents the configurations in the two countries on a continuum from 
most constrained to least constrained. For analytical purposes we treat 
organisations without legal personality in the UK, and with legal personality in the 
UK and the Netherlands as being exposed to low regulatory constraints, while 
organisations with “all indirect benefits” in the UK and the Netherlands as being 
exposed to high regulatory constraints (see dividing line on Figure 3). The figure 
reflects the legal situation since 2014 until now. In terms of relative positions, 
before 2014, formal associations with ANBI status were on the left side of the 
dotted line i.e. were exposed to low regulatory constraints. 
Figure 3: Configurations of Indirect Benefits in the UK and the Netherlands 
 
Note: The figure visualises relative difference in terms of regulatory constraints 
between configurations and does not reflect numerical distance 
Country  Legal personality without 
beneficial tax status 
 
Legal personality and tax 
beneficial status  
UK (England and 
Wales) 
 
Company limited by 
guarantee 
(9 coded requirements) 
 
Charitable company 
(19 coded requirements) 
 
 Netherlands 
Formal Association 
(3 coded requirements) 
Formal association with 
ANBI status  
(11 coded requirements) 
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The main theoretical expectation examined in the following chapters is that 
organisations which are exposed to higher regulatory constraints and external 
supervision are more likely to undergo board professionalisation than 
organisations which are exposed to lenient reporting requirements and little or no 
external supervision. In line with this, we can expect that charitable companies 
and ANBIs are more likely to undergo board professionalisation than 
organisations operating only with legal personality or no indirect benefits. 
However, the analysis takes into consideration the qualitative differences of the 
regulatory constraints to which ANBIs and charitable companies are exposed. 
While ANBIs in the Netherlands have been exposed to higher reporting 
requirements since 2014, supervision of ANBIs is less strict and there are no 
additional constraints on political activities such as those faced by charitable 
companies. 
4.6. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have presented the analysis of regulatory constrains in the UK 
and the Netherlands. The chapter first presented the legal non-profit frameworks 
in the two countries with the focus on the available legal forms for membership 
organisations and tax beneficial status. Then the chapter presents the differences 
in legal requirements for members to attend the annual general meeting and elect 
the members of the board. Finally, the chapter presents the analysis of the 
regulatory constraints i.e. the difference in intensity and character of 
requirements related to maintaining different indirect benefits in the two countries.  
The first theoretical expectation of this thesis is that the type of legal regime and 
the legal forms available therein, affect the adoption of formal voting rights of 
members, and subsequently the use of these rights in practice. The regulatory 
analysis shows that in the UK adopting formal voting rights for the wider 
membership i.e. right to participate at an annual general meeting and elect the 
board in organisations operating in any legal form available is optional, while in 
the Netherlands the legal forms available for membership organisations grant 
special powers to the members to control and elect the board and attend the 
annual general meeting. Thus, the expectations for the organisational analysis 
are that non-profit membership organisations operating like companies limited by 
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guarantee (with or without charity status) and unincorporated associations in the 
UK are more likely to exclude ordinary members from election of the board, whilst 
organisations operating as formal associations in the Netherlands are more likely 
to have formal voting rights for the wider membership.  
The second theoretical expectation of this thesis is based on the observation that 
in each regulatory regime there are up to three configurations of indirect benefits 
which differ in the type and intensity of regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting 
requirements). And that exposure to high regulatory constraints may lead to 
professionalisation of the board through external recruitment of professionals with 
skills for organisational maintenance. While the regulatory analysis shows that 
the British configurations are overall more constrained than their Dutch 
equivalents, it also confirms that reporting requirements and statutory supervision 
are higher and more constraining for organisations which have ‘all indirect 
benefits’ within the two countries, and organisations with only legal personality 
and ‘no indirect benefits’ are exposed to lower regulatory constraints. Based on 
the regulatory analysis, the expectations for the organisational analysis are that 
charitable companies and ANBIs are more likely to undergo board 
professionalisation than organisations operating only with legal personality or no 
indirect benefits. 
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5. The Impact of Non-Profit Regulation on Formal Voting Rights of 
Members  
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The first expectation of this thesis is that the type of legal regime and the legal 
forms available therein, affect the adoption of formal voting rights of members in 
the governing documents. Formal voting rights encompass the rights of ordinary 
members to attend the annual general meeting and participate in decision-
making through voting (Salamon and Flaherty 1996). The Formal rights 
expectation is that organisations operating in regimes where there are specific 
legal forms for membership organisations will have formal voting rights 
guaranteed in the governing document, whilst organisations operating in legal 
regimes providing legal forms which do not require formal voting rights for 
members will either not have them or limit their use in practice. In this chapter we 
will focus on the adoption and change of formal voting rights of non-profit 
membership organisations which operate in two different regulatory regimes for 
non-profits, UK being a common law, and the Netherlands being a civil law 
system. The use of formal voting rights in practice, as guaranteed in 
organisational rules, will be addressed in the next chapter.  
Here the focus is on the implications of legal forms enshrined in company law 
and common law (i.e. the law of unincorporated associations) in the UK, and in 
line with the Civic Code in the Netherlands. The legal analysis showed that in 
both countries tax beneficial status - regulated by charity law in the UK and tax 
law in the Netherlands - is not directly relevant for the formal voting rights of 
members. Moreover, the legal analysis found that in the UK, company law does 
not require adoption of democratic structure (it is optional). Organisations 
operating as unincorporated associations are not subject to statutory law and 
required to have formal rules, but when they have, the members are free to agree 
to any rules, without constraints (Steward QC et al. 2011; Steward QC 
14.09.2018). In contrast to the UK, in the Netherlands, the Civic Code provides 
mandatory powers to the annual members meeting to oversee the work of the 
executive and requires the inclusion (directly or indirectly through delegates) of 
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members in the appointment of members of the board. The law does not stipulate 
in what other areas members should be given voting rights in the Netherlands.  
 
Based on the legal assessment, in the UK, we expect to find greater variety of 
formal governing structures with a tendency for centralised forms i.e. 
organisations without formal voting rights for members among membership 
organisations, whether they have legal personality or not. While company law 
prescribes some rules for internal governance, it leaves organisations with legal 
personality (companies limited by guarantee) to decide whether to have voting or 
non-voting members. Similarly, organisations without legal personality in the UK 
(unincorporated organisations) have flexibility and freedom to set their own 
internal structure and there is no defined internal governing structure for this form 
(Synge 2017; Steward QC 14.09.2018). In contrast, Dutch organisations with 
legal personality (formal associations and informal associations) are expected to 
grant formal voting rights for members, because within these legal forms 
members hold important organisational powers and there is more elaborate 
regulation for them in the Civil Code (van Veen 1997, 231).  
 
The specific expectations assessed in this chapter are as follows: Organisations 
operating in the UK where legal forms do not require (i.e. regulate) voting rights 
for the wider membership are less likely to have such rights for members in their 
governing documents, meaning they will not involve ordinary members at the 
annual general meeting and in the election of the executive. Formal voting rights 
for members are more likely to be given by membership organisations which 
operate in the Netherlands where the law specifically mandates adoption of 
control powers of members over the executive i.e. right to attend at the annual 
general meeting and elect the executive board. To assess the expectations, ten 
organisations were selected, four organisations with legal personality and two 
without legal personality in the UK, and four organisations with legal personality 
in the Netherlands. As explained before, in the Netherlands organisations 
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operating as informal associations (with limited legal personality)55 are small local 
clubs that do not fit the population of interests.  
Table 8: Summary of Expectations on the Link Between Legal Form and Formal 
Voting Rights 
 
First, I present the analysis of the four organisations with legal personality and 
the two organisations without legal personality in the UK, and then I present the 
analysis of the four Dutch organisations with legal personality. The chapter 
concludes with comparative analysis of the patterns found and a discussion of 
the findings and its implications.  
5.2. Organisations with Legal Personality in the UK 
 
Based on the legal analysis in the previous chapter, organisations with legal 
personality in the UK are less likely to achieve formal representation because 
                                                          
55 In the Netherlands, informal associations are formed without a notarial deed and have restricted 
legal personality (Overes 2017, 467), so there is no equivalent form to the unincorporated 
association in the UK.  
56 Here I refer to the general or wider class of members who joined the organisation and accepted 
its statutes, and not the members of the organisations that form the leadership.  
Country  Organisation Legal form  Theoretical 
expectations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK  
Songbird Survival  Company limited by 
guarantee  
 
Organisations are 
less likely to 
guarantee formal 
voting rights for 
members56  
National Activity 
Providers 
Association 
Company limited by 
guarantee 
Surfers Against 
Sewage  
Company limited by 
guarantee 
Patient Information 
Forum  
Company limited by 
guarantee 
NHS Alliance  Unincorporated association  
Hardy Orchid 
Society  
Unincorporated association  
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
Vitiligo Netherlands Formal association  
 
 
Organisations are 
more likely to 
guarantee formal 
voting rights for 
members 
Young Friends of 
the Earth 
Netherlands  
Formal association 
 
National 
Association of 
Psychosocial 
Workers  
Formal association 
The Dutch 
Association for 
Dragonfly Studies 
Formal association 
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company law does not explicitly require the board to be elected by the wider 
membership.  
The findings below show that three (NAPA, SAS and PIF) out of the four 
organisations analysed with legal status in the UK grant formal voting rights upon 
incorporation to the wider membership and later in life limit the voting rights to 
members of the board (executive organ). The only exception is SBS, an 
organisation with formal rules that provide for democratic rights for the wider 
membership during its lifetime.  
National Activity Providers Association 
 
The National Activity Providers Association (NAPA), a charitable company 
working in the health and care sector, incorporated under the Companies Act 
1985 and 1989 as company limited by guarantee in 1997. They primarily pursue 
the interest of their members. NAPA accessed legal personality promptly after 
formation when they were a small group of members – founders. They did not 
adopt a centralised decision-making structure upon incorporation. They drafted 
their governing document by using a model constitution for charitable companies 
designed by the Charity Commission (Certificate for Incorporation, 18th 
December 1997).57 According to the first governing document, the organisation 
convenes an annual general meeting (Article 3). Quorum for any meeting is 
reached if ten members eligible to vote are present or one tenth of the total 
number of such members, whichever is greater (Certificate of Incorporation, 
Articles of Association, 1997, Article 7). Two members with voting rights or 
member(s) representative of one tenth of the membership at a minimum have the 
right to demand a vote upon a resolution (Article 13). Every paid member 
(individual and organisation) has one vote at a general meeting (Article 20 and 
21) and in the statute there was no specification of the membership categories of 
the organisation.58 
                                                          
57 The model constitution suggests several alternative clauses, that the organisation choses from 
depending on how they want to structure the work of the organisation. Organisations are advised 
to consult a solicitor if they want to include additional clauses (Certificate for Incorporation, 18th 
December 1997, 1).  
58 The document suggests the membership classifications may be specified in bylaws (Articles of 
Association December 1997, Article 61 (1), Companies House). The bylaws should be consistent 
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The articles refer to appointment and reappointment of trustees. The business of 
the charity should be managed by the trustees (Article 27), and their number 
should not be less than three while there is no specification of a maximum (Article 
25). At every annual general meeting 1/3 of the longest serving trustees will retire 
by rotation (Article 29 and 30). A trustee is appointed or reappointed by 
recommendation from trustees or upon proposal of a voting member joined by a 
letter by the proposed candidate expressing willingness to become a trustee 
(Article 31:2). If there is no provision in the company’s articles of association as 
to appointment, then by default the power of appointment rests in the members. 
This meant that NAPA had formal rights for wider members to elect the trustees.  
In 2001 the organisation had 360 members59 and total annual income of £79,646. 
By 2003, their membership doubled and reached over 600,60 and their annual 
income increased to £188,658. In the period between 2001 and 2004 the 
organisation received funding from various private foundations and public 
sources. This led to the employment of professional staff. In 2001 the 
organisation obtained funding from the Growing with Age Project from the 
National Lottery Community Fund for which a National Project Manager was 
appointed in January 2002.61 The organisation also received grant funding 
through the Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Health Authority and direct 
funding for administrator post by grant-aid from the Carnegie UK Trust.62 In the 
same year NAPA received grants from Lloyds TSB Foundation to cover the costs 
of employing a Chief Executive Officer, while Help the Aged contributed towards 
the cost of administration.63 NAPA also reported that the Esmee Fairbairn 
Foundation has agreed to fund the services of a project worker in 2002.64 With 
this funding, part time staff reached 4 in 2003, however, NAPA did not have full 
time administrative staff due to, as they report in the newsletter, lack of funding 
supporting the core work of the organisation.65 The administrative work of the 
                                                          
with the memorandum and articles of association and can be altered or repealed at a general 
meeting (Article 61 (2)). 
59 NAPA Spring 2001 Volume 4 Issue 3, 2 
60 NAPA Summer/Autumn 2003 Volume 7 Issue 1, 1 
61 Annual Report and Accounts, 31 December 2001, 3 
62 Annual Report and Accounts, 31 December 2001, 3 
63 Annual Report and Accounts 2002, 3 
64 Annual Report and Accounts 2002, 8 
65 NAPA Spring 2003, Volume 6, Issue 3, 2 
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organisation, including membership administration and newsletter editing was 
still conducted by volunteers66 and trustees in their voluntary capacity.67 Finally, 
in 2004, NAPA received a grant from the Big Lottery Fund and three-year grant 
from the Department of Health (state funding), which enabled hiring of permanent 
staff posts.68 
In 2002, the organisation elected a new chairman, who was employee at the 
Royal National Institute for the Blind, a leading UK charity in the care sector.69 In 
light of the increased membership, budget and staff, in 2004, NAPA’s chair 
announced that they wanted to lower the number of people who are required to 
attend an AGM for it to be able to function.70 NAPA consulted the Charity 
Commission whether ten people attending as opposed to 10% of members can 
be the new threshold for AGM attendance.71 The article was changed at an 
annual general meeting and the necessary quorum to convene an AGM was 
decreased:  
“Ten persons entitled to vote upon the business to be transacted, each being a 
member or a duly authorised representative of a member organisation, shall 
constitute a quorum. If, for any reason, quorum cannot be achieved, the AGM 
shall be deferred by no less than one month, when it shall meet again. If, on this 
occasion, a quorum is not possible, the AGM will be deemed valid and can go 
ahead." (Special resolution, June 2004).  
This means that they narrowed down the number of members that can attend the 
AGM for it to be able to convene. However, this does not mean limiting the rights 
of members to attend and vote and members formally still had voting rights. 
Members continued to enjoy formal voting rights until 2014.  
It is important to note that since 2005, NAPA had a strategic director and a 
communication director.72 The Strategic Director post was focused on 
                                                          
66 NAPA Spring 2003, Volume 6, Issue 3, 2 
67 Annual Report and Accounts 2003 
68 Our History section accessed at http://www.napa-activities.com/about-us on 11.04.2017; NAPA 
Spring 2005 Volume 9 Issue 1, 1-3; Annual Report and Accounts 2004 
69 NAPA Spring 2002 Volume 5 Issue 3, 1 
70 NAPA 2004, Volume 7 Issue 3, 2; Earlier, in 2000, NAPA made small changes in the quorum. 
They adopted Special resolution that the article 7 from the Articles of Association 1997 was 
deleted and replaced with an article specifying that quorum is achieved at any meeting if four 
members entitled to vote, or one tenth of the total number of members, whichever is greater 
attended the meeting (Special resolution, June 2000). 
71 NAPA 2004, Volume 7 Issue 3, 2 
72 NAPA Spring 2005 Volume 9 Issue 1, 1 
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cooperation and influence on external stakeholders (i.e. care providers, 
inspectorate, policy makers and other charities), while the communication 
director post was responsible for communication with members, media and 
provision of educational services.73 In effect, the strategic director was the first 
paid CEO of the organisation who worked four days a week. Since 2007 the CEO 
became the spokesperson on behalf of the organisation informing members on 
organisational news,74 which signalled shift in leadership. In newsletters up until 
2007, the opening remarks were reserved for the chairman (voluntary position).  
In 2014, the charity’s paid management examined the issue of membership and 
voting rights and concluded that the constitution has not provided for decision 
making rights of ordinary members and that the trustees are the only members 
of the charitable company.75 Until then trustees, were voted by the members at 
the annual general meeting (NAPA 30.05.2017). This conclusion resulted in a 
resolution being adopted by the trustees, for a formal amendment of the 
Memorandum of Understanding which defined serving trustees as members with 
voting rights and all the other members i.e. care homes, individuals and 
organisations that choose to uphold the values of NAPA were defined as 
‘subscribing members’ with no voting rights.76 The AGM currently involves only 
the trustees, since NAPA was “advised that Trustees were the only true 
‘members’ in a legal sense”.77 
There was a confusion about what the constitution enabled members to do 
according to one of the interviewees: 
“And it really was not until [NAPA] made a major review of all the policy and 
procedures in 2014 that [NAPA] realised that wasn’t an appropriate process, that 
technically those people were subscribers, not members and that the constitution 
have not given them any kind of format previously to have a voting rights largely 
because of that geography and although, [NAPA] had a perception that [NAPA] 
were holding and annual general meeting, technically it was not correct which is 
why [NAPA] then reviewed the memorandum of understanding and the trustees 
decided to change that in 2014, so the voting rights sat with them as members 
and everybody else was an associate or a subscriber if you like, who received 
services, but did not have the right to decide and vote on services.” (NAPA 
30.05.2017).  
                                                          
73 NAPA Spring 2005 Volume 9 Issue 1, 1 
74 For example, see: NAPA Autumn 2007 Newsletter Volume 2, Issue 2 
75 NAPA 30.05.2017; E-mail correspondence 15.09.2018 
76 Minutes of Trustees Meeting 14 March 2014, Companies House 
77 NAPA E-mail correspondence 13.09.2018 
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The same interviewee describes this change as part of a bigger process of 
professionalisation:  
“[…] I think one part of the professionalisation that took long time to achieve is 
recognizing the issue of members right and voting rights.” (NAPA 30.05.2017). 
The revision of formal voting rights was proposed by a chief executive and 
supported by the trustees, so as of 2014 wider membership does not have formal 
voting rights i.e. cannot attend the annual general meeting, elect the members of 
the board, propose motions and vote on issues.  
In terms of funding, the organisation in the period from 2005-2009 did not have 
funding from public sources78 and all the grant support received was from private 
sources79. They had some state funding as partners to a project led by Age UK 
in 2010-2015 and in 2013 they received a grant from the Department of Health to 
fund a Training and Development Officer in the organisation.80 However, state 
funding was not the main source of finance at the time when the formal change 
took place, because after the economic recession, they aimed at generating their 
income independent of grant-funding bodies and private donors.81 In 2009 NAPA 
reported that their main source of funding are their members and that they 
generate 45% of their income in-house.82 During the 2000s they have increased 
their funding through provision of training. In 2003, they launched their first fully 
accredited training course designed specifically for activity providers,83 and in 
2015 they launched the Level 3 Certificate in Activity Provision in Social Care.84  
In 2013 NAPA experienced drop in the income from training activities as a 
consequence of the economic crisis and had to undertake staff cuts and move 
the office from central London to Amersham.85 In addition to individual members, 
                                                          
78 This includes national lottery funding and state funding  
79 Annual Report and Accounts 2009 
80 Financial report 2013, 19 
81 NAPA Living Life, Winter 2009, 2; This was also confirmed by an interviewee who suggested 
that it was NAPA’s strategic decision not to depend on grant funding from external bodies because 
it diverted the organisation from its core mission (NAPA 30.05.2017).  
82 NAPA Living Life, Winter 2009, 2 
83 Annual Report and Accounts 2003 
84 Financial report 2015 
85 Director`s report, Financial report 2013; While the membership size for 2013 and 2014 is not 
known, the membership size in 2012 was 3000 and in 2015 it was 2,980. The annual income 
dropped from £363,000 in 2013 to £265,275 in 2014. The 2014 financial report gives only the 
abbreviated accounts, which means that they worked with smaller annual income and the 
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in 2006 NAPA opened up the membership to corporate members (e.g. care 
homes),86 and these organisational members were particularly hit by austerity 
cuts and in some cases could not afford to pay membership or training fees 
(NAPA 06.06.2017).87 In the Financial Report from 2013, they reported cuts in 
staff numbers and two posts were made part-time. This means that the change 
in formal voting rights happened in the context of reduced financial and human 
resources in 2014.  
In summary, NAPA had formal voting rights for members until 2014. The 
organisation upon incorporation adopted a governing structure with formal voting 
rights for members. The attendance quorum for AGMs decreased in 2004, which 
coincided with the organisation’s access to state funding, increased staff and 
membership size. However, the organisation kept formal voting rights for 
members until 2014, when the chief executive reviewed members voting rights 
and the organisation changed the formal rules, so the trustees became formally 
members of the charity. NAPA, which operated in legal environment where legal 
forms do not require (i.e. regulate) voting rights for the wider membership, upon 
incorporation adopted formal voting rights for members, however, later in its 
lifetime limited these rights to the board members (trustees).  
Surfers Against Sewage  
 
SAS was founded in 1990 and accessed legal personality in 1994 under the 
Company Act 1985. Before accessing legal status, they did not have a written 
governing document, but they had clearly defined aims and principles of the 
organisation (SAS 26.05.2017). The membership of the organisation is 
predominantly composed of individuals, and they pursue the interests of both 
members and non-members – beach users, surfers, and citizens interested in 
                                                          
document was prepared in accordance with the Financial Reporting Standard for Smaller 
Entities effective April 2008. 
86 NAPA Summer 2006 Volume 10 Issue 2, 3; NAPA signed up care homes and care-homes 
groups as members to be able to avoid fluctuation of individual members who often left the care 
sector (NAPA 30.05.2017).  
87 Therefore, the organisation is looking at diversifying the membership to include members of 
families of people in care-homes and providers of care in private housing (NAPA 06.06.2017). 
In 2016 the organisation has both individual and corporate members: mixed membership of 
care homes, housing with care and day care settings, with a variety of membership strands, for 
qualified and new activity staff, service users and their families (Financial report 2016, 6). 
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protection of marine life and the coastline. In 2007 the first corporate member 
was signed up.88 In the early days the organisation was led by a group of founding 
members without much formal governing rules:  
“In the early days every monthly directors’ meeting was pretty much a party. 
SAS was pretty anarchic!” (Pipeline news summer/ autumn 2010 issue 81, 28). 
The size of staff grew rapidly in the first years, paralleling the increase of 
membership and funding. In 1991 they had a membership of around 1000 
members and two employees.89 A chief executive (originally called General 
Secretary) was employed since 1990 (SAS 26.05.2017). By the time they 
accessed legal status in 1994, SAS already had a team of 8-9 employees (SAS 
26.05.2017).90 They did not have state funding in the period before and after 
incorporation, and their funding came mainly through membership fees, small 
sponsorships and merchandise income (Wheaton 2007, 269). In the mid-90s 
their budget was composed dominantly from membership fees and the sale of 
merchandise (SAS 26.05.2017). According to Wheaton (2007), the membership 
size in 1993 was 7,300 members and in 1994 reached 12,500, while Gibbs (1994) 
cited in Hassan (2003, 224) claimed that their membership reached 16,000 by 
1994.  
They were advised by an accountant to incorporate as company limited by 
guarantee in order to protect the founding members who were engaged in 
campaigning activities critical of the government and companies (SAS 
26.05.2017). They also needed legal personality to be able to engage in trading 
activities (SAS 26.05.2017), since sales of merchandise was one of their main 
sources of income. Even though incorporation was a formality that did not affect 
the day-to-day running of the organisation, it led to the adoption of a formal 
governing structure (SAS 26.05.2017). The organisation adopted two tier 
                                                          
88 Pipeline news issue 70 October 2007, 21; Interestingly, the bylaws accompanying the first 
governing document in 1994 membership was opened for both corporate and unincorporated 
organisations which paid the annual subscription (Article 1.1.).  
89 Pipeline news 1991, Number 3, 7 
90 Since their incorporation in 1994, they had to report to the Companies House, however, for the 
period 1995 -2011 only the abbreviated accounts were retrieved from the Companies House 
which do not provide the total expenditure and total income, staff spending or staff numbers. 
Some of the information on staff and membership size gathered for this period comes from 
newsletters and secondary sources. The periods around 1994 and 2012 are important for 
understanding the formal voting rights for members, and for these years there are sufficient 
sources for triangulation.  
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organisational structure with different membership categories – an “A” and “B” 
category (Articles of Association 1994, Article 3b). The Bylaws accompanying the 
first governing document in 1994, stipulated that the “A” members shall not be 
less than 7 (Article 3.1.) and they were “entitled to receive notice of and attend 
and vote at any General Meeting” (Article 3.2). In article 8a it is stipulated that “A 
"B" Member of the Company shall not by reason of his or her membership be 
entitled to receive notice of or attend or vote at any General Meeting of the 
Company.”91 The B-members shall meet once a year only for the election and/or 
removal of A-members (Bylaws 1994, Article 4.2). The quorum for the B-
members meeting is at least 25 members or other, if the Directors decide 
otherwise (Bylaws 1994, Article 4.4). The B-members can propose nominations 
or removals in advance of the meeting, and they will decide with a simple majority 
(Bylaws 1994, Article 4.5). They created the two categories of membership to 
prevent significant changes related to the mission of the organisation: 
“A-members were the original founding members. And those A-members, if 
someone wanted to change the constitution or do anything like that, and that was 
there to block. So that was put in place, in case someone suddenly decide, so 
say, of all members, the B-members were the 18 000, and what we realised is 
that we need to have some protection about it. At our AGM, if 3000 members 
turned out from Brighton, and said that we are sacking you and we are going to 
move the whole thing to Brighton, they could not. So, any change in constitution, 
or the aim and objectives or any big change, had to be agreed by these A-
members.” (SAS 26.05.2017).  
The annual general meeting was then only attended by the A-members and they 
elected the Directors of the company. The Directors of the organisation did not 
retire by rotation and an appointment was made upon the recommendation of the 
Directors or a voting member that provided a notice for appointment of a person 
together with a confirmation by that person (Article 9c and 9d). This means that 
upon accessing legal personality, SAS adopted a representative structure where 
the wider members had a chance to elect delegates who then attended and voted 
at an AGM.  
Formal voting rights for the paying members were retained until 2012, when the 
organisation accessed charitable status and changed its governing document, 
following a leadership change in 2008 and further increase of specialised staff. In 
                                                          
91 Articles of Association 1994 and Bylaws 1994 (Article 4.1), Companies House 
 
 133 
 
2008, a new chief executive, who had a background in the environmental non-
profit sector was employed (Siegle 2010).92 The organisation at that period was 
facing threat of closure (SAS 16.06.2017a). Under the new management SAS 
staff grew from three members in 200893 to nine members of staff in 2011 and 
2012, the year when they accessed charity status.94 The budget of the 
organisation reached £514 046 in 2012.95 In that period they had diverse funding 
coming from private grant making foundations and trusts, donations, government 
agencies, membership fees and corporate sponsorship.96 In terms of state 
funding, the Environmental Agency supported two of SAS’s initiatives with total 
of £34,610, which was 6.7% of the total income,97 meaning they were not 
dependent on state funding.98  
In 2012, SAS changed the governing document in accordance with the 
Companies Act 2006. The charitable status does not have requirements related 
to formal voting rights of members, as pointed out earlier. Nevertheless, 
registration with the Charity Commission was an opportunity to amend the 
governing document. The two categories of members defined in the 1994 articles 
were removed, and in the new Articles of Association (2012), members are 
defined as “those individuals whose names are recorded as company members 
in the Charity's statutory registers as at the date of adoption of these Articles, and 
other individuals admitted to membership of the Charity in accordance with the 
Articles” (Article 7). The formal members are the Trustees of the charity (Article 
20). The article 20.1 on the appointment of trustees stipulated that “The number 
of Trustees must always be the same as the number of Members”.99 This means 
that in line with company law, the trustees (members of the board) are members 
with formal voting rights who can attend the annual general meeting. According 
                                                          
92 Pipe Line news issue 74 winter 2008, 3; The position of the Chief Executive was newly created, 
however SAS in practice had someone in charge of general management since the early 1990s.  
93 The Exeter Lectures: Hugo Tagholm, Chief Executive, SAS, May 2016 
94 Accounts and report 2012 
95 Accounts and report 2012 
96 Accounts and report 2012, Companies House 
97 Accounts and report 2012, 45 
98 The 2013, 2014 and 2015 Accounts and reports, SAS reported financial support by the 
Environment Agency. In 2015, the Environmental Agency supported the following project: 
http://www.cleanercoastalcatchments.org.uk/frequently-asked-questions/ 
99 Articles of Association passed on 11.12.2011 
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to the latest Articles of Association (11.12.2011), the Board of trustees may call 
the General meetings or at least 90% of the members entitled to vote (Article 11). 
The quorum for the meetings was set on four members (Article 12), and voting 
can be done in person or via proxy (Article 15-17). The trustees are managing 
the charity in a voluntary capacity, enjoy extensive decision-making rights and are 
responsible for the financial management and accountability of the charitable 
company in accordance with Charity Act 1993.100 Members defined in this way 
have the right to pass written resolutions if signed by sufficient number of 
members (Article 18). The broader membership reported by the charity does not 
have the right to attend the annual general meeting and elect the members of the 
board. According to one of the interviewees who was involved with SAS during 
that period, the change of the governing structure was due to the fact that it was 
not feasible to have direct voting rights for all the paying members: 
“If you were to convene an annual general meeting […] you normally need about 
two thirds of your membership. Now if SAS was having to convene a proper AGM 
for that to happen then we’d be talking about thousands of people if they had 
voting rights.” (SAS 16.06.2017).  
In summary, SAS did not have formal governing document until 1994, when upon 
incorporation adopted a representative governing structure. In 2012, the trustees 
(members of the executive board) were defined as the only organisational 
members with formal voting rights. Accessing legal personality in 1994 happened 
in the context of increased funding, membership and staff size, so the leadership 
decided to adopt a two-tier membership system, to be able to protect their 
position within the organisation. In 2012, the professional leadership decided to 
adopt a centralised governing structure which does not grant paying members 
with formal voting rights. This happened at a time when the organisation did not 
have significant state funding, but funding from diverse funding sources and faced 
multiple pressures for accountability (Koppell 2005). In line with the expectations, 
SAS, operating in a legal system where legal forms do not require (i.e. regulate) 
voting rights for the wider membership, upon the initiative of the professional 
management, changed the governing structure of the organisation so the 
members of the executive can have exclusive formal voting rights.  
                                                          
100 Article 39-40, Articles of Association passed on 11.12.2011; Accounts and Reports 2013 and 
2014, Companies House 
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Patient Information Forum  
 
PIF was founded in 1997 and accessed legal status in 2008 in accordance with 
Companies Acts 1985 and 2006. The organisation was founded by a small group 
of patient information managers and professionals led by the need to share 
information and facilitate learning in the midst of changing health policy and 
increased importance of health information.101 The membership is composed by 
mixture of individuals and organisations including companies, small charities, 
researchers and freelance professionals involved in health information 
production. PIF primarily pursues the interests of its members. According to 
interview data, before incorporation the organisation did not have a governing 
document and it was governed by a board of non-executive directors (PIF 
02.05.2017). However, a newsletter from 2002 (quarterly publication) shows that 
PIF invited members to the AGM, which was held together with the annual 
conference, indicating the existence of an internal democratic practice. 
In the period around 2005 the organisation moved towards a smaller 
management group and employed first paid staff.102 This is the period when the 
organisation also accessed state grant from the Department of Health (PIF 
02.05.2017). They applied for legal personality in 2008 to be able to give more 
credibility to the organisation (PIF 02.05.2017). The structure adopted in the 
governing document at the time of incorporation was democratic. The statute 
granted every member one vote at the Annual General Meeting (Articles of 
Association 2008). Interestingly the quorum for the annual general meeting was 
set very low and “two persons entitled to vote upon the business to be transacted, 
each being a Member or a proxy for a Member or a duly authorised representative 
of a corporation” constituted a quorum (Articles of association, 2008). Moreover, 
the articles of association stipulate that the company can hold an annual general 
meeting with one person in case that is the sole member of the company (Articles 
of Association 2008, Article 6, i and ii). The Directors of the Company are elected 
                                                          
101 History of The Patient Information Forum accessed at: https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-
us/our-history/ on 31.08.2018 
102 History of The Patient Information Forum accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-
us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018 
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by members at the general meeting. There is no maximum number of members 
of the board, while the minimum is one (Articles of Association 2008, Article 18).  
In 2009, after incorporation PIF employed three members of staff, including an 
executive manager (PIF 31.05.2017). Moreover, in 2009, the organisation formed 
a Strategy Group responsible for the organisational development and Advisory 
group composed of members to assure representation of their interests and 
needs.103 At an Extraordinary meeting held in December 2010, new articles of 
association were adopted, and the document stated that as of 1st of January 2011 
the directors of PIF will invite the regional and country coordinators, and members 
of the Advisory and Strategy groups to join the company as members (Special 
Resolution 2011). In the articles there is no further specification of membership 
categories therefore, based on the document, it is difficult to conclude whether 
the organisation limited voting rights only to those persons who served as 
regional and country volunteers and sitting on the Advisory and Strategy groups. 
According to an interviewee who was involved in a leadership role in PIF, the 
wider membership did not attend the AGM, but the advisory group (PIF 
02.05.2017). This is further supported by an interviewee who acted as a regional 
coordinator in the period after the changes and reported participation at AGMs, 
which were held during the annual conferences (PIF 31.05.2017).  
The 2010 Articles of Association are the last formal governing document 
deposited at the Companies House.104 This document extensively regulated the 
rights and obligations of company’s directors (Part 3). In the section on Methods 
of appointing directors, it is stated that the director is appointed by an ordinary 
resolution (simple majority) or by a decision of the directors (Articles of 
Association 2010, Article 21). The quorum for holding a meeting remained two 
persons entitled to vote upon the business of the company (Article 35.1).  
In 2012 the organisation was awarded a state grant of £175,000 by the 
Department of Health105 for period of three years to develop new approaches to 
                                                          
103 Accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018 
104 The Patient Information Forum Limited accessed at: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06562222/filing-history?page=2 on 03.09.2018; 
PIF 02.05.2017 
105 Innovation, Excellence and Strategic Development Fund 
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consumer health information (PIF 04.06.2018).106 According to one interviewee 
the three year grant provided more support for the core work of the organisations 
and increased offer for the members, while it placed the organisation on a “more 
professional footing” (PIF 04.06.2018). With the grant money they employed a 
services manager for the period 2013-2015.107 In this context of increased 
responsibilities related to state funding, the leadership actively reviewed the 
governing structure of the organisation and debated over the legal form in which 
they should operate: 
“[…] It was probably about 2012 I would say and we looked at lots of different 
forms of governance and we also at the same time looked at different structures 
for the organisation, so we looked whether we should become a registered 
charity, or community interest company and we looked at whether we felt we 
would be better funded if we chose one of those options, we looked at whether 
we should have a membership at all, we looked at whether we should make the 
membership free and try to get income from other sources. Cause if you make 
the membership free presumably you get a greater membership and that is more 
appealing for organisations who want to come on board with more money. So we 
looked at lots of different options and we got advise from other organisations, we 
got advise from the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, we kind of did 
as much as research that we could and then we ended up sticking with the 
membership and kind of similar structure but we decided not to get a charitable 
status cause we did not feel it would give us any particular benefit to doing so 
and it was going to be time-consuming […].” (PIF 04.06.2018). 
Furthermore, in 2013, PIF asked an external Task and Finish Group to review the 
governance of the organisation.108 The Task and Finish Group recommended 
setting a procedure for election of an executive board as a central governing 
body.109 The membership voting rights were looked at again during this process 
and it was decided that the wider membership will not be given voting rights (PIF 
04.06.2018). The Advisory board absorbed the regional coordinators network in 
2014,110 and since 2015 the AGM was not opened for the members of the 
Advisory group anymore (PIF 02.05.2017). The organisation holds separate 
                                                          
106 PiF to build case for consumer info (11 April 2012) accessed at: 
https://www.digitalhealth.net/2012/04/pif-to-build-case-for-consumer-info/ on 01.05.2017 
107 Membership Services Manager Role description and person specification July 2014; In 2014, 
the organisation operated without a central office and the board directors and the staff were 
communicating via Skype, phone, email and met physically once a month. 
108 Accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018; PIF 
04.06.2018 
109 Accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018; PIF 
04.06.2018 
110 Our History, accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018 
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meetings for the executive board and the Advisory group (PIF 21.05.2018). The 
decisions of the executive board are binding.  
The managerial staff concluded that members in the Articles of Association are 
the directors of the company limited by guarantee and not the wider membership. 
The governing document from 2010 enabled such interpretation. This is 
confirmed by an interviewee who was involved with PIF at the time, and proposed 
that there was a terminology confusion and that the members referred to in the 
Articles of Association were the organisational members – the directors of the 
executive board and not the wider members (PIF 02.05.2017).  
In summary, the case of PIF shows how company law in practice enables diverse 
interpretation of membership. There is limited evidence that until 2008 PIF had 
democratic structure, and this structure was formalised when they accessed legal 
personality. The organisation formally granted members with rights to attend the 
AGM and have formal voting rights. The quorum for convening an AGM was set 
low at not less than two members and that remained unchanged. In 2010, a year 
after the first operational director (professional manager) was hired, the 
organisation adopted a new governing document announcing that the members 
of the previously formed Strategy and Advisory groups and the regional and 
country coordinators will be invited to become members of the company. Even 
though this was the last formal governing document adopted, the organisation in 
2015 de facto limited decision making to the members of the executive board. 
The change was facilitated by the leadership. In line with the expectations, PIF, 
which operated in legal environment where formal voting rights do not have to be 
granted to wider membership, upon the initiative of the professional 
management, de facto limited the formal voting rights to the members of the 
executive board.  
Songbird Survival  
 
SBS operates as a charitable company, and it is the only UK incorporated 
organisation under study where the wider membership has formal voting rights. 
SBS was founded in 1996 and accessed legal personality in 2000 in accordance 
with the Companies Act 1985 and 1989. The organisation has not accessed state 
funding during its lifetime and mainly relied on funds from membership fees and 
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private donations.111 The organisation primarily pursues interests of citizens 
interested in the protection of songbirds.  
SBS did not have a governing document until it accessed legal personality in 
2000 (SBS 26.03.2017). The governing document adopted in 2000 remains the 
same until today. When accessing legal personality in 2000 the organisation 
adopted a democratic governing structure. According to the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, all members are entitled to attend the AGM and have one 
vote which may be given in person or by proxy.112 Moreover, the document 
specified that the members elect the Trustees, appoint Patrons or honorary 
members such as Vice-presidents and decide upon any policy matter arising 
(Article 2.8.). More specifically:  
“At an AGM the members […] discuss and determine any issues of policy or deal 
with any other business put before them” (Article 2.8.7). 
The quorum for the AGM is set on at least 10 or 10% of the members, whichever 
is greater (Article 2.2. Article of Association). The Council (executive organ) is 
composed of Vice-Chairman and elected members (Article 3.2). The directors are 
elected by the members during AGM,113 the members of the board for at least 
one year, and the Vice-chairman for the period of three years. Members of the 
charity may remove members of the Council by ordinary resolution (Article 3.10). 
One-third of the directors must retire at each general meeting.114 The candidates 
for the executive board are proposed by at least two members of the charity 
(Article 3.4). The total number may vary from seven to twenty-one individuals 
(Article 3.4) – all of whom should be members of SBS. The Council is accountable 
to the members for its work.  
After accessing legal personality SBS did not have employed staff, and the 
trustees led the financial and administrative matters, publicity and events and 
membership responsibilities on a voluntary basis.115 In 2005, a new Policy 
Director was employed and part time staff to man the office.116 The part time 
                                                          
111 SBS 26.03.2017; SBS 06.07.2018; Membership Leaflet 2015 
112 Certificate of Incorporation 2000, Companies House 
113 Report of the directors (continued), Year to 30th September 2004, 3 
114 Report of the directors (continued), Year to 30th September 2004, 3 
115 Accounts and Reports 2004, Companies House 
116 After incorporation and gaining charity status, the organisation was led by one of the 
founders on a voluntary basis, Keith Pulman in the role of Chief Executive of the charity until 
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policy director was “trying to implement trustees’ direction” by working one day a 
week (SBS 06.07.2018). In 2006, SBS merged with a Scottish charity Save our 
Songbirds117 because the aims of the organisations were identical. After this 
event, the membership size climbed at 1200 members and in 2007 the budget 
increased to £83253 from £55535 in 2006. In the period from 2005-2012 the 
organisation was effectively led by dedicated volunteers (the trustees) and 
supported by part-time staff (SBS 06.07.2018). The first executive director was 
employed in 2012.118 The establishment of the post of the full-time director was 
financially supported by a substantial private donation from a long-term donor of 
SBS.119  
SBS for a long time was led by a voluntary board consisting of founding members 
and people who were brought on the board by existing members, and the main 
funding for the research projects and staff came through the connections and 
private funds of members (SBS 26.03.2017). The organisation has never 
received state funding.120 This remained the same after the employment of the 
chief executive, and members continued to be a significant source of financing. 
This is confirmed by an interviewee, who when asked why SBS kept formal voting 
rights for members when legally they could limit them to the trustees, said the 
following: 
“Because we are a membership organisation. Our funding comes from members, 
through sales of goods and pieces, charitable trust donations tend to be 
instigated by our members who may well be members of grant-making institutions 
or who have heard of us by word of mouth.” (SBS 06.07.2018).  
This suggests that keeping formal voting rights for the wider membership is of 
financial interest to the organisation. Therefore, unlike the other cases where 
professional management has initiated change of the governing document, in 
SBS, we do not find this. 
                                                          
2004. In 2004 the headquarters of the charity were moved from Bristol to East Anglia. In 2005, 
SBS established its first office in Diss, which was related to the growing membership, according 
to the History section on the web site. 
117 Account and reports, 2007, Companies House, 2; SBS 26.03.2017 
118 History of SongBird Survival accessed at: https://www.songbird-survival.org.uk/history on 
31.08.2018 
119 Newsletter Autumn / Winter 2012 Edition, 1; Newsletter Spring / Summer 2013 Edition, 1 
120 SBS 06.07.2018; SBS 26.03.2017 
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In summary, SBS against the expectations retained formal voting rights for its 
membership during its lifetime. The fact that the organisation was led for most of 
its lifetime by the voluntary board mainly consisting of members, and members 
were significant source of funding, facilitated formal voting rights for them.  
5.3. Organisations without Legal Personality in the UK 
 
As explained in the legal chapter, the unincorporated association is a form which 
is not regulated by statutory law and there is no defined internal governing 
structure (Synge 2017, 368). The unincorporated association is a legal form that 
allows flexibility and privacy of operation (Warburton 1986). The governing 
structure is set in their rules, known as the ‘constitution’ and members of the 
unincorporated association are bound to each other by the terms of their mutual 
contract as laid down in the rules of the association (Steward QC et al. 2011, 4; 
Thomas 1997, 322). The expectation is that organisations which are not subject 
to statutory law, similarly as those which are subject to company law, are more 
likely to have members without voting rights. The analysis of the formal rules of 
the two unincorporated associations in the UK – The Hardy Orchid Society (HOS) 
and NHS Alliance shows that both organisations provide formal voting rights to 
their members.  
Hardy Orchid Society  
 
HOS was founded in 1993 and they are governed by a document adopted in 
2005.121 The organisation was started by a group of citizens during a meeting at 
the Newbury Horticultural Show.122 HOS is a national organisation with individual 
direct members and pursues goals that primarily benefit members. The main 
sources of funding of HOS are membership fees. HOS has not had employed 
staff during its entire period of existence. According to the governing document 
all members can participate in the Annual General Meeting (Constitution 2005). 
Members have extensive decision-making rights according to the constitution. 
The annual general meeting elects the Officers (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, 
                                                          
121 In 2002 newsletter there is a mention of changing formal rules, which means there might 
have been an earlier governing document, which I could not access.  
122 Chairman report 2007, accessed at: 
http://www.hardyorchidsociety.org.uk/HOS%201012/HOSweb5/AGMchair07.htm on 14.09.2018 
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Secretary, Membership Secretary and Treasurer) which form the Committee 
(Constitution 2005). During the AGM, members receive the Chairman’s Report of 
the Society’s activities during the year, they adopt a statement of the Society’s 
accounts for the preceding financial year, nominate an auditor and consider and 
approve rules proposed by the Committee (Constitution 2005). The Committee 
controls the Society’s finances and administration and can appoint members on 
specific posts and define their duties (i.e. Meeting Secretary, Show Secretary, 
Journal Editor).  
HOS does not own property and does not have employed staff. When asked why 
HOS did not access legal personality, an interviewee responded:  
“Because […] we don’t have nature reserves, we don’t have anything to maintain, 
you know it’s like if you were RSPB for example, you’ve probably got 200 nature 
reserves and you’ve got staff that you pay, I mean we pay nobody, we have no 
salaries to pay, we have no real estate to look after, we have no offices, all we 
have is people, ordinary people, who are sharing an interest.” (HOS 06.10.2017).  
This means that the activities of the organisation did not require additional 
material, financial and human resources. Connected to that, the organisation is 
managed by its members who have retained formal voting rights as part of the 
formal structure. This in combination with the small organisational budget 
composed of membership fees and sales to members, accounts for the 
democratic decision-making structure of the organisation.  
The NHS Alliance 
 
The NHS Alliance, unlike HOS, is an influential national advocacy organisation 
that has been operating as an unincorporated association since 1997. The NHS 
Alliance dates back to early 90s when it was formed by a group of general 
practitioners called the National Association of Commissioning General 
Practitioners that were concerned with primary care.123 NHS Alliance had a mixed 
membership composed of both organisations and individuals (NHS Alliance 
23.06.2017) and primarily pursued the interests of its members. They were a 
representative professional organisation which had over 90% of Primary Care 
Trusts, a number of Health Authorities, and lots of primary care individuals as 
members which encompassed doctors, nurses, pharmacists, non-executive 
                                                          
123 Speech, 10.12.2015; NHS Alliance 23.06.2017 
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directors and managers of health bodies (NHS Alliance 23.06.2017). The 
composition of membership broadened in 2013 to include “GP practices, primary 
care providers and individual clinicians, managers and patients”.124  
They adopted the constitution from the National Association of Commissioning 
GPs and amended it to permit working with the private sector, to be able to 
diversify their funding sources (NHS Alliance 23.06.2017). In terms of funding 
streams, during their lifetime, the income from members was around a third of the 
total income, the other sources of funding came from private sponsorships and 
state agencies such as the NHS and the Department of Health (NHS Alliance 
23.06.2017). NHS Alliance had employed staff and received state funding from 
both grants and contracts during its existence (NHS Alliance 24.05.2017; NHS 
Alliance 31.05.2017).  
At the beginning they had a member of staff who was employed in the National 
Association of Commissioning GPs who transferred to NHS Alliance (NHS 
Alliance 23.06.2017). A chief executive was employed on a part time basis in 
1997 and by 2000 the organisation had nearly 10 paid staff members, several of 
which were contracted on a full-time basis (NHS Alliance 24.05.2017; NHS 
Alliance 23.06.2017). The chairman and the Chief Executive received honorarium 
for their work, while the other members of the National Executive (equivalent to 
executive board) were engaged on a voluntary basis (NHS Alliance 24.05.2017). 
All the people who acted as chief executive came from within the membership of 
the NHS Alliance.  
The members of the national executive established a subsidiary company limited 
by shares called Primary Care Alliance in 1998125 to be able to engage in trading 
activities (i.e. Conferences) and receive external funding, while the directors were 
protected with limited liability.126 According to an interviewee:  
“One of the things we did do by the way, in order to satisfy some other 
requirements that we had about liabilities and VAT registration, was to establish 
a Private Limited Company as a wholly owned subsidiary, if you like, of the NHS 
                                                          
124 Chairman’s New Year Message 2013 January 2, 2013, Dr Michael Dixon 
125 The Primary Care Alliance Limited accessed at: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03652706/filing-history?page=1 on 03.09.2018 
126 Email correspondence NHS Alliance 06.09.2017 
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Alliance which became its trading arm. And that was an incorporated body with 
formal directors etc.” (NHS Alliance 23.06.2017).  
NHS Alliance is a shareholder and three of the non-executive directors of NHS 
Alliance are directors of the Primary Care Alliance.127 The annual accounts 
submitted to the Companies House are abbreviated, therefore we cannot get a 
full picture of their financial situation over the years.128 According to an 
interviewee who was engaged in the organisation from the beginning, the reason 
why the NHS Alliance did not incorporate as company limited by guarantee and 
did not access charitable status is that it wanted to be an organisation led by its 
members (NHS Alliance 23.06.2017). Both charity status and incorporation 
impose certain corporate structure that they wanted to avoid together with the 
costs for maintaining that structure (NHS Alliance 23.06.2017).  
On the basis of the constitution of NHS Alliance from 2005, we can conclude that 
the organisation provided its members with formal voting rights. The members 
could attend the annual general meeting, where they elect the twelve members 
of the National Executive (Constitution 2005). The quorum for the National 
General Meeting is 20 voting members or 10% of voting members to be present, 
whichever is smaller (Article 7). The National Executive is responsible for 
implementing the policies of the association and they produce a report to be 
presented at the annual general meeting about their activities (Constitution 2005). 
Moreover, the treasurer is responsible for ensuring that the annual accounts and 
statement is presented to the members at the AGM (Constitution 2005).  
There were several membership categories corresponding to different payment 
levels. The Primary Care organisations including professional executive 
committees (PECs), practices and individual members had the right to be notified 
about national meetings, right to propose motions and vote if present at national 
general meetings.129  
                                                          
127 Email correspondence NHS Alliance 06.09.2017 
128 See annual accounts submitted to the Companies House 2000 -2018 accessed at: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03652706/filing-history?page=1 on 03.09.2018; 
Also one of the interviewees suggested that the two entities accounted individually, and that 
NHS Alliance accounts were not in the public domain (NHS Alliance Email correspondence 
27.06.2017).  
129 Report by the Executive Committee 2005/6 
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NHS Alliance slightly changed the constitution in 2016130, however, none of the 
formal voting rights of members were changed. The members continue to elect 
the members of the executive as previously: 
“There shall be a National Executive comprising of twelve members elected at 
the Annual General Meeting. The National Executive elected members shall be 
able to co-opt additional members to the EC. Co-opted members will not be able 
to vote at EC meetings.” (New NHS Alliance Constitution 13 July 2016) 
Moreover, as previously, members could propose motions and decisions were 
made by a simple majority of the eligible voting members present at the meeting 
(Article 5).  
The NHS Alliance grants formal voting rights to members. The organisation was 
an influential advocacy group representing professional interests of members, 
and to pursue its mission it accessed diverse funding sources, including state 
funding and had employed staff and part-time chief executive. To be able to do 
that they registered a trading arm of the unincorporated association. Throughout 
their existence, the Chief Executive was a contracted employee (NHS Alliance 
24.05.2017) who came from within the membership and worked closely with the 
chairman and the elected executive.  
In conclusion, HOS and NHS Alliance, even though having different aims and 
operating with different funding streams,131 membership types and human 
resources (NHS Alliance having professional management since 1997, while 
HOS did not have staff during their lifetime), have decided to maintain themselves 
as unincorporated associations to minimise costs related to external 
accountability. Their governing structures as laid down in their constitutions 
stipulate formal voting rights for members, which suggests that the leadership of 
the two organisations wanted to maintain a democratic governing structure.  
5.4. Organisations with Legal Personality in the Netherlands  
 
As presented in the legal analysis, in the Netherlands the Civic Code provides 
mandatory rules for attending an annual general meeting and the inclusion 
                                                          
130 They changed the name of the organisation to the New NHS Alliance and also broadened 
the membership to include citizens and patients. The governing structure remained the same.  
131 HOS is highly dependent on membership fees, NHS Alliance is not dependent on membership 
fees. Moreover, the NHS Alliance, after change of leadership in 2016, abolished the membership 
fees altogether.  
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(directly or indirectly through delegates) of members in the election of members 
of the board. The theoretical expectation is that organisations operating in 
countries like the Netherlands, where the regulation specifically mandates 
adoption of democratic structure upon accessing legal personality, are more likely 
to guarantee formal voting rights for members. In accordance with the 
expectations, the four organisations analysed here, upon incorporation, have 
adopted democratic structures with formal voting rights for members, and have 
preserved that structure during their lifetime. 
Vitiligo Netherlands (Vitiligo.nl) was founded in 1990132 and was incorporated the 
same year by notarial deed under the name National Association of Vitiligo 
Patients (LVVP). Vitiligo.nl pursues the interests of its members, patients with 
vitiligo and their families. The organisation initially served as a self-help group 
where patients share information and experiences with the disease, however 
following a leadership change in 2009 they adopted an advocacy-oriented 
mission.133 The main source of funding for the organisation in the beginning were 
the membership fees, however, later on, the organisation accessed state subsidy 
from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport.134 Despite having annual access 
to state subsidy Vitiligo.nl relied only on volunteers and did not employ any staff 
during its existence.135 
The original statutes of the organisation adopted when accessing legal 
personality did not undergo changes in terms of members’ rights.136 In 2017 the 
organisation changed its name to Vitiligo.nl to be more recognizable, and the 
statute was amended for that reason.137 The only article that changed was the 
term of members of the board from 8 years to unlimited in 2011.138 This followed 
                                                          
132 One interviewee suggested that the organisation was formed in 1989.  
133 Newsletter 2011, Newsletter May 2010 page 3, Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017 
134 State subsidy was reported in the newsletters i.e. Newsletter November 2006; Newsletter 
August 2008, Newsletter August 2009, 4; Newsletter August 2010; Newsletter August 2011, 2, 
Financial Statement 2016; The subsidy was allocated by the PGO Foundation, which falls under 
the Service for Subsidies to Institutions (DUS-I). This foundation executes the subsidy scheme 
on behalf of the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport. 
135 Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017; Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017 
136 E-mail correspondence on 10.24 and 10.26.2017 
137 I had access to the 2017 statute which according to interviewee Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017 was 
the same in content like the first statute when it comes to governing structure.  
138 E-mail correspondence on 10.24 and 10.26.2017 
 
 147 
 
the change of leadership and board professionalisation (see Chapter seven), and 
can be interpreted as a formal attempt to centralise the decision-making. 
In accordance with the requirements in the Civic Code, Vitiligo.nl set a democratic 
structure for the association, where members attend the annual general meeting 
and can elect the members of the board (Statute 2017, Article 9). All members 
older than 16 years have the right to attend and vote at the AGM.139 The general 
meeting can create and amend regulations and can implement changes in the 
statutes.140 Ordinary members (paying members), extraordinary members 
(exempt from paying) and honorary members (recognised for outstanding 
services and exempt from paying) are all considered equal members (Statutes 
2017). The AGM can determine the number of the members of the board and can 
suspend or terminate the post of members of the board (Statutes 2017). The 
general meeting can also dissolve the executive board.141  
In line with expectations, Vitiligo.nl, being a formal association, has granted 
formal voting rights to the members. Formally speaking, the organisation did not 
change the formal voting rights of members, even though it received state subsidy 
over the years and after 2009 changed its mission towards advocacy. However, 
within the limits of the law, they extended the term of the members of the board 
to unlimited in 2011, and this can be considered an attempt to centralise the 
power in the board, despite the rights of wider members to oversee its work. 
Young Friends of the Earth Netherlands (in Dutch: Jongeren Milieu Actief – JMA), 
is an environmental organisation founded in 1990. JMA accessed legal 
personality in 1991. The membership is composed from youth 16-28 years old 
and the organisation primarily pursues the interests of non-members. During the 
90s the organisation was politically active and organised various advocacy 
campaigns alone and in collaboration with bigger environmental non-profits.142 
JMA hired staff in the mid-90s when they had access to state subsidies, however 
around 1998 they had to cut the employed staff because of sharp and sudden 
                                                          
139 Influence and control regulations 2012 [Invloed en zeggenschap] 
140 Influence and control regulations 2012 [Invloed en zeggenschap]). 
141 Influence and control regulations 2012 [Invloed en zeggenschap]). 
142 Newsletter 1996, Newsletter 1997 no.1, 7; Newsletter 1997 no.4, 20; Newsletter 1999 no.2, 
17 
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cuts in subsidies (JMA 13.11.2017). Therefore, in 1999 they started to receive 
financial support by Friends of the Earth Netherlands.143 Since then they have 
operated as a separate legal entity under the patronage of Friends of the Earth 
which provided funding and administrative support to JMA.144 There were four 
employees that worked on a project-basis until 2016 (JMA 23.10.2017). 
JMA adopted democratic governing structure when accessing legal personality 
in 1991. There were several changes in the statutes in 1995, 2004, 2010 and 
2014. After the change in 2010, the general meeting convened once a year and 
not twice as it was stipulated in the previous statute.145 With the 2010 statutes 
the members were given the right to create a members’ council to monitor the 
decisions of the board and the management (Article 15, Par. 4 and 5) and this 
remained the same in the 2014 statute. This right is given in line with the Civil 
Code (see previous chapter four). The annual general meeting is opened to all 
the members and members present at the meeting have one vote.146 The annual 
general meeting is the highest authority in the organisation where members of 
the board are elected and proposals from members and the board are discussed 
and voted.147 The annual general meeting can rule on any decision with a 50% 
+1 majority.148 In the 2014 statute it is stipulated that any matters which are not 
decided by other organs as defined in the statutes will be decided by the AGM 
(Article 24). The members at the annual general meeting elect the board149 and 
they can dismiss or suspend members of the board.150  
In line with expectations, JMA, being a formal association, has granted formal 
voting rights to the members upon becoming legal personality and this has 
remained the same throughout its existence. The organisation did not have a 
professional management and was mainly led by volunteers (executive board) 
and part-time staff. The reception of grant and state subsidy during the 90s and 
later the financial patronage by a bigger professional organisation did not result 
                                                          
143 Newsletter 1999 No.2, 18; Newsletter 2003 No.1; JMA 13.11.2017 
144 House regulations [Huishoudelijke Reglement] 2014; JMA 13.11.2017; JMA 23.10.2017 
145 Resolution for the amendment of the statute 2010 
146 Statute 2010, Article 17; Statute 2014, Article 25 
147 Statute 2014, Article 24 
148 House regulations [Huishoudelijke Reglement] 2014 
149 Statute 2010, Article 11; Statute 2014 Article 17 
150 Statute 2010, Article 12; Statute 2014, Article 18 
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in changes of the governing structure which was shaped by the regulation on 
associations.  
The Dutch Association for Dragonfly Studies (in Dutch: Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor Libellenstudie - NVL) was founded and accessed legal personality in 1997. 
The NVL was founded 1 March 1997 by the merger of Dutch Dragonfly 
Researchers (‘Nederlandse Libellen Onderzoekers’ - NLO), an organisation 
founded in the 1970s and the network of the Dragonfly Project of two youth 
associations for Nature Studies (NJN and JNM) which joined together in one 
association.151 The organisation decided to register as formal association 
because of the ability to open a bank account and have limited liability.152 NVL 
does not have a “high financial aim”, and it mainly relies on membership fees and 
does not want to attract funding through private donations and legacies.153  
The mission of NVL is to bring together people in the Netherlands, interested in 
dragonfly fauna and research154 and its members are citizens interested in 
dragonflies monitoring and conservation. The organisation does not undertake 
advocacy activities, but the data that volunteers produce are used for advocacy 
purposes by a partner organisation, the Butterfly Foundation.155 They have 
received sponsorships from private foundations to support their events and the 
magazine,156 however they have not been recipients of state subsidies.157 The 
organisation has never had employed staff and has always been governed on a 
voluntary basis.158 When asked why the organisation never hired anyone, one 
interviewee said that the aims of the organisation did not require additional human 
resources (NVL 27.09.2017). 
                                                          
151 ‘The Dutch Association for Libelle Studies (NVL) celebrated its tenth birthday!’ published on 
30th of March 2007, http://www.odonata.be/nieuws/107-2007-de-nederlandse-vereniging-voor-
libellenstudie-nvl-vierde-haar-tiende-verjaardag accessed on the 26.09.2017 
152 Email correspondence with member of the board 27.10.2017 
153 NVL 06.10.2017 
154 Newsletter 1997, No.1 
155 Newsletter 1997, no.1; NVL 24.10.2017; Written answers from NVL board received on 
26.10.2017 
156 Newsletter no.1 1997, Email correspondence October 8, 2017 with NVL board member; NVL 
24.10.2017; NVL 27.09.2017. 
157 Email correspondence October 8, 2017 with NVL board member 
158 Written answers from NVL board received on 26.10.2017; NVL 06.10.2017; NVL 27.09.2017 
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The first governing document was adopted in 1997 and it has remained 
unchanged until today.159 The association has adopted a democratic governing 
structure, in line with the Civil Code and members attend the annual general 
meeting and elect the board (Statutes 1997, Article 9). According to the statutes, 
the members can remove or suspend an individual from the executive board by 
2/3 majority in the general meeting (Statutes 1997, Article 9). Furthermore, the 
members at the general meeting approve the financial accounts (Statutes 1997, 
Article 16).  
NVL, as expected, upon incorporation adopted a governing document which 
guaranteed formal voting rights for members and this was not changed. They 
have been funded mainly through membership fees and led by voluntary board 
(there is absence of professional management), based on which we can expect 
that members also use their rights in practice.  
The National Association of Psychosocial Workers (in Dutch: Landelijke 
Vereniging Psychosociaal Werkenden - LVPW), set their governing structure 
when they accessed legal personality in 1995 and the statutes remained 
unchanged throughout their existence (LVPW 10.10.2017). The organisation 
pursues the interests of its members, psychosocial care workers and has 
undertaken lobbying activities. The main sources of funding are the 
membership annual contributions.160 They have one member of staff 
employed in the Secretariat since 2004 on a contractual basis.  
LVPW, as expected, upon incorporation adopted a governing document which 
guaranteed formal voting rights for members and this has not changed. The 
members can attend the annual general meeting where they are informed about 
the board’s activities and can vote on issues.161 The executive board consists of 
at least three persons who are appointed by the annual general meeting upon 
proposal from the members (Statutes 1995, Article 10). Additionally, the general 
                                                          
159 NVL 06.10.2017; NVL 27.09.2017 
160 LVPW 10.10.2017; Statutes 1995. 
161 Internal regulations [Huishoudelijke reglement] 
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meeting can decide upon complaints and appeals to decisions of the board.162 
The general members meeting can amend and set new internal regulations 
(Statutes 1995).  
In line with theoretical expectations, the four associations in the Netherlands 
where the law specifically mandates adoption of control powers of members over 
the executive i.e. right to attend the annual general meeting and elect the 
executive board, guarantee formal voting rights for members in their governing 
documents.  
 
5.5. The Link between Legal Form and Membership Rights – A 
Comparative Assessment 
 
This chapter has assessed the formal governing structures of organisations 
operating in different legal environments: one where the law on available legal 
forms does not regulate the adoption of formal voting rights for organisational 
members (the UK), and one where the law underwrites the control powers of 
members (the Netherlands). The Formal rights expectation was that 
organisations operating in regimes where there are specific legal forms for 
membership organisations will have formal voting rights guaranteed in the 
governing document, whilst organisations operating in legal regimes providing 
legal forms which do not require formal voting rights for members will either not 
have them or limit their use in practice. The specific expectation was that British 
organisations are more likely to adopt governing models which do not grant 
members formal voting rights or limit their use in practice, whilst Dutch 
organisations are more likely to grant formal voting rights to their members. For 
that purpose, I examined the formal rules and their evolution of four organisations 
with legal personality and two organisations without legal personality in the UK, 
and four organisations with legal personality in the Netherlands.163 Table 9 
summarizes the findings. 
 
                                                          
162 Internal regulations [Huishoudelijke reglement] 
163 In the Netherlands, I could not identify national organisations with similar size which operated 
without as informal associations, because registering legal personality is easy and only very 
small local clubs operate as in this form. Also, informal associations is a form available for 
membership organisations specifically.  
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Table 9: Summary of Empirical Findings on the Link Between Legal Form and 
Formal Voting Rights 
The results, as summarised in Table 9 show a greater diversity of organisational 
structures in the UK in comparison to the Netherlands. Specifically, organisations 
with legal personality in the UK currently do not grant formal voting rights to their 
members, with the exception of Songbird Survival. Organisations without legal 
personality (i.e. unincorporated associations) in the UK grant formal voting rights 
to their members, against theoretical expectations. The findings in the UK do not 
suggest that the policy field is relevant for the kind of governing structure 
Country  Organisation Legal form Theoretical 
expectations  
Results  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK  
Songbird 
Survival  
Company limited 
by guarantee  
 
Organisations 
are less likely to 
guarantee formal 
voting rights for 
members  
Not confirmed  
National 
Activity 
Providers 
Association 
Company limited 
by guarantee 
Confirmed  
Change 
happened in 
2014 
Surfers 
Against 
Sewage  
Company limited 
by guarantee 
Confirmed  
Change 
happened in 
2012 
Patient 
Information 
Forum  
Company limited 
by guarantee 
Confirmed  
Change 
happened in 
2015 
NHS Alliance  Unincorporated 
association  
Not confirmed 
Hardy Orchid 
Society  
Unincorporated 
association  
Not confirmed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
Vitiligo 
Netherlands 
Formal association 
Organisations 
are more likely 
to guarantee 
formal voting 
rights for 
members 
Confirmed  
Young 
Friends of the 
Earth 
Netherlands  
Formal association 
 
Confirmed 
National 
Association of 
Psychosocial 
Workers  
Formal association Confirmed  
The Dutch 
Association 
for Dragonfly 
Studies 
Formal association Confirmed  
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organisations adopt, because both groups - organisations that confirm my 
expectations and those that confound my expectations - are environmental and 
health groups. The four organisations with legal personality in the Netherlands 
(i.e. formal associations) - irrespective of policy field, and in line with the 
theoretical expectation - grant formal voting rights to their members.  
Three organisations with legal personality (NAPA, SAS and PIF) operate without 
formal voting rights at the moment, but upon incorporation have adopted a 
governing structure with formal voting rights for members. However, later on, 
these organisations limited formal voting rights to the members of the executive 
board. In all three cases there is evidence that these processes were initiated by 
professional management. Maintaining membership - unlike maintaining 
supporters - yields administrative costs of communication, organisation of 
meetings, maintaining up-to-date membership list, achieving a quorum for 
decision making etc. (Jordan and Maloney 2007). This, in combination with 
increased external accountability demands due to income from external sources 
(i.e. sponsorships, private donations, sales and state funding), has created 
incentives to limit the formal voting rights of members in these three cases. This 
is in line with studies that suggest that leaders will adapt an organisation’s 
structure to increase the chances of the organisation’s survival (Maloney 2015, 
99). One important conclusion regarding the role of regulation is that the absence 
of regulated voting rights for members - i.e. organisations are given the option to 
define members of the board as the members of the organisations under 
company law – enables organisations to alter their governing structure. Or, in 
other words, the law on available legal forms for membership organisations does 
not prevent the leadership from limiting formal voting rights to the members of the 
executive board.  
My analysis shows that both NAPA and SAS have changed their formal 
documents to reflect their centralised governing structure. This is not the case 
with PIF, where the decision to grant formal voting rights to the members of the 
executive board did not result in a change of formal rules because the framing of 
the formal rules allowed for such an interpretation. Unlike PIF, NAPA and SAS 
are registered as charitable companies with the Charity Commission of England 
and Wales. The Charity Commission is a particularly strict regulator, and may 
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intervene if members were to complain about an organisation’s administration or 
were concerned about mismanagement, an example of which may involve 
“trustees [...] not acting in accordance with the provisions of the governing 
document.”164 In fact, cases seen by the commission often involve organisations 
which have not amended governing documents (i.e. functioning with 
inappropriate or unclear provisions) to match the charity’s operations.165 One 
example involves the commission’s intervention in a charity where there was a 
confusion over the voting rights because the organisation did not have a clear 
formal definition of membership and lacked an updated membership list.166 
Failure to comply with the advice of the commission may result in opening a 
formal inquiry which is then published online. Hence, organisations which operate 
as charitable companies like NAPA and SAS are encouraged to align their 
governing documents with their governing practice.  
The other three organisations in the UK, SBS (with legal personality) and NHS 
Alliance and HOS (without legal personality), against the expectation, granted 
and retained formal voting rights for their members throughout their lifetime. The 
three organisations are similar because they depend directly (membership fees) 
or indirectly (connections to private donors) on members for their funding. SBS 
and NHS Alliance - unlike HOS, which does not have employed staff - are led by 
voluntary boards that work closely with the professionalised management. HOS 
is a conservation society which is maintained by membership fees and a board 
led entirely by members-volunteers. It is run for the members and by the 
members, so there are no incentives to limit formal voting rights. SBS, from its 
foundation until 2012 was not led by a professional manager and largely relied 
on members and their contacts for funding. After the employment of a 
professional manager, members remained the main source of funding, and 
therefore there was an incentive to keep formal voting rights. The NHS Alliance 
has had a part-time paid chief executive throughout its existence. The chief 
executive is a contracted position and chief executives are recruited from within 
the membership and work closely with the chairman and the elected executive. 
                                                          
164 Charity Commission for England and Wales (2004, 19); The document contains a range of 
examples on the intervention of the commission in matters related to proper administration of 
membership charities.  
165 Charity Commission for England and Wales (2004, 13). 
166 Charity Commission for England and Wales (2004, 8). 
 155 
 
NHS Alliance relies on diverse sources of funding including private sponsorships, 
state funding and membership fees. In the case of NHS Alliance, an organisation 
with pronounced lobbying agenda and representing the direct interests of health 
professionals, the formal voting rights for members is seen as a way to signal 
legitimacy in front of stakeholders. Moreover, the active organisational 
membership attracted funding from private pharmaceutical companies and the 
NHS. The evidence suggests that organisations that are dependent on their 
members for funding and have leaders that see member participation as positive 
- even though operating in a legal environment where the leadership is free to 
adopt a centralised decision-making structure - will keep providing formal voting 
rights to members. This means that factors such as a dominant source of funding 
(Cordery and Sim 2017) and leadership choices (Moe 1980) are relevant for 
understanding the formal role of members in the six non-profit membership 
organisations in the UK.  
Another relevant point for organisations that operate as unincorporated 
associations is that while they are free from ‘hard’ statutory constraints, the 
models of internal regulation for unincorporated associations offered by various 
legal experts are devised to match a democratic and participatory membership 
(see for example Warburton 1986, 110-116) suggesting the impact of ‘soft law’ 
on organisational governance. Another frequent issue with unincorporated 
associations is that when they adopt formal rules, they often do not specify a rule 
which permits the constitutional amendments, which makes altering the 
document difficult in practice (Steward QC 14.09.2018). In the absence of such 
a rule, based on contract law, the governing rules can be altered with consent by 
each member (Warburton 1986, 5), which in organisations with a sizeable 
membership is very difficult. Whilst the first reason could influence the initial 
adoption of formal voting rights in the two unincorporated organisations under 
study - NHS Alliance and HOS - the second reason cannot account for the 
retention of formal voting rights in their governing document, because the two 
organisations had specified rules for changing their constitution.  
In the Netherlands, as expected, all four organisations have governing 
documents that guarantee formal voting rights for their members. Dutch 
organisations, even when they want to centralise their governing structure, 
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cannot limit the rights of the general meeting of members. For example, after its 
leadership changed, Vitiligo.nl’s leaders ruled that members of the executive 
could spend an unlimited time on the board, but they could not change the 
governing powers of members. This suggests that, in contexts like the 
Netherlands, the non-profit law regulating the legal forms available for 
membership organisations has a constitutive function (Edelman and Suchman 
1997, 479). This means that it shapes the governing structure of organisations 
with specific implications for the formal voting rights of members i.e. the right to 
attend the annual general meeting and to appoint members of the executive 
board. As suggested by van der Ploeg (2009, 3), legal form regulates the position 
of organisational actors within organisations. In the Netherlands, the law 
regulating associations, as in other democratic countries with civil law non-profit 
tradition (Freise and Hallmann 2014, 4) gives a central role to organisational 
members through the membership assembly that elects, controls and gives 
authority to the executive board. Hence, non-profit membership organisations 
that come into being in such a legal context have a strong predisposition for the 
rule-based participation of members (Lansley 1996), one of the core 
characteristics of membership-centred models of governance. This is important 
from a normative point of view, because the formal rights of members to control 
and elect the executive board, if used in practice, can provide avenues for the 
development of members’ civic and political skills (Warren 2001; Dekker 2014), 
as well as strengthening the representational capacity of organisations (Guo and 
Musso 2007).  
My findings suggest that non-profit membership organisations that operate in 
regulatory regimes similar to the UK will have higher diversity in their formal 
governance, while non-profit membership organisations operating in similar 
regulatory regimes to the Netherlands will have more uniform formal governing 
structures – granting a central organisational role to members. Does this mean 
that non-profit law regarding legal forms plays a constitutive function in both legal 
contexts? In the UK, the law operates more as a background factor, a context in 
which decisions over formal structure and the role of members are made by the 
leadership. In the Netherlands, the law on legal forms is a factor that directly 
shapes the role of members in the internal governance of non-profit membership 
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organisations. The lesson from this investigation is that the non-profit legal regime 
in which organisations are formed should be considered in future theorisation of 
the internal governance of non-profit membership organisations.  
My analysis so far was limited to formal rules and their change. The main criticism 
of my study of formal governing structures is that these do not reflect the actual 
governance practice of the organisations (Cnaan 1991; Leardini et al. 2016). 
Therefore, to better understand the impact of legal regulation related to available 
legal forms on formal voting rights, I will turn to their use in practice. I will look at 
rule-based participation in organisations which guarantee formal voting rights in 
their governing document. Also, I will look at the use of voting rights in practice 
before organisations centralised their structure in order to better understand the 
context in which this change occurred.  
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6. Rule-based Participation: The Use of Formal Voting Rights by Members 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I examine rule-based participation of members, meaning the use 
of formal voting rights as enshrined in governing documents in practice. In 
accordance with the Rule-based participation expectation, I expect that 
organisations with formal voting rights stipulated in their governing document will 
provide opportunities for use of these rights in practice i.e. will have some level 
of rule-based participation. This means that stipulation of formal voting rights in 
the organisational statutes is a precondition for the existence of rule-based 
participation. In countries where legal regulation does not demand guarantees of 
key formal voting rights in organisational statutes, organisations can still stipulate 
such rights in their governing documents. For example, I have found such cases 
in the UK: SBS, HOS and the NHS Alliance. In countries where the law mandates 
the guarantee of formal voting rights in the governing document, organisations 
may also expand the members rights beyond what legal regulation demands. 
Often the right to participate at AGMs, the right to elect members of the board 
and the right to vote on programmatic issues go together in practice. Hence, rule-
based participation is measured as the presence or absence of members’ 
opportunities for: participation at AGMs, election of the executive and voting on 
programmatic priorities in practice.  
In addition, this chapter also assesses the level of rule-based participation before 
the three UK organisations, PIF, NAPA and SAS, changed their voting structure. 
The chapter aims to explore the factors that led to the limitation of formal voting 
rights. The expectation is that these organisations had low level or absence of 
rule-based participation in the period before the change, despite having formal 
voting rights for members stipulated in their early governing documents. This 
enabled the leadership to truncate voting rights, which was legally possible, 
because in line with company law in the UK organisations can posit that members 
of the board are the only members of the organisation with formal voting rights. 
 
Firstly, I will present findings on rule-based participation in the British and Dutch 
organisations which have formal voting rights stipulated in their governing 
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documents. Secondly, I will investigate the factors that led to the curtailment of 
formal voting rights for members in the British organisations, in order to 
understand what led to this change. The analysis focuses on the level of rule-
based participation before the change, the role of leadership and the legal regime 
in which the organisations operate.  
 6.2. Rule-based Participation in Organisations which have Formal Voting 
Rights 
 
In the following section I will present information on rule-based participation in 
British and Dutch organisations. The expectation is that in all seven cases, 
members will be invited to attend AGMs and are engaged in rule-based 
participation to some extent.  
Table 10: Expectations on Rule-based Participation in Organisations with Voting 
Rights 
Country  Organisation Formal voting 
rights for 
members 
Expectation  
 
 
 
UK  
Songbird Survival Yes  
 
 
Organisations that 
grant formal voting 
rights to members will 
have some level of 
rule-based 
participation by wider 
membership. 
NHS Alliance  Yes 
Hardy Orchid 
Society  
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
Vitiligo 
Netherlands 
 
Yes 
Young Friends of 
the Earth 
Netherlands  
Yes 
National 
Association of 
Psychosocial 
Workers  
Yes  
The Dutch 
Association for 
Dragonfly Studies 
Yes 
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British Organisations  
 
Songbird Survival (SBS), NHS Alliance and the Hardy Orchid Society (HOS) are 
three organisations in the UK that have formal voting rights for members. SBS is 
the only company limited by guarantee in the UK where members enjoy formal 
voting rights as stipulated in the governing document. In practice, evidence shows 
that members are given opportunities to attend the AGM and have the right to 
vote over programmatic issues throughout its existence.167 Moreover, members 
have the opportunity to elect who sits on the executive board. While members do 
not suggest board candidates, they vote for proposed candidates during the 
AGM:  
“So, the members could I suppose propose new trustees or members of the 
board but to my knowledge that has not happened. But at the AGM we would 
ask, we would vote within the trustees’ board to say who our trustees are, and 
they must be re-confirmed every two years I think, the positions, and then that 
goes to the membership who attend the AGM, or they can vote via proxy, which 
is a paper exercise. We send out proxy forms prior to the AGM and they fill-them 
all in. Quite often members will delegate the voting powers to the chairman of our 
board of trustees, so they will be tallied, and people confirmed in role or new 
trustees are elected in a position through that process. So that is the mechanism 
by which the membership can affect the make-up of the board of trustees.” (SBS 
06.07.2018).  
Members were also given actual opportunities to participate in the period after 
2012, when the organisation hired a chief executive for the first time, with 
membership size ranging from 1600-1800168. The members were invited to attend 
the AGM through the newsletter and e-mail (SBS 06.07.2018), and members who 
were not able to attend the AGM could influence decision-making through proxy 
voting: 
 “The time has now been resolved, and the meeting is in Rutland on 8th February. 
Members unable to attend personally may, of course, use their proxy vote which 
should be registered with the office by 6th February. Please remember that […] 
you need to allow several extra days in the post.” (Annual general meeting report 
SBS Update Winter 2003/2004, 1).  
 However, only a limited number of members engage in rule-based participation: 
“Out of 1800 members in total this year we had 15, last year we had 25. We never 
had lots of people come.” (SBS 26.03.2017) 
                                                          
167 SBS Update Winter 2003/2004; Songbird Survival Spring / Summer 2014; Spring / Summer 
2016 Newsletter, Song Bird Survival, 3; SBS 06.07.2018 
168 Account and reports 2012 
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According to another interviewee, members also use their right to send postal 
votes or use proxy voting, and in that way engage in authoritative decision 
making: 
“So, we only have perhaps 20 or 30 members attend but we have a far larger 
proportion of people who will send in their thoughts on and delegated votes by 
paper, but I do not know that number.” (SBS 06.07.2018) 
Considering that the board currently has 12 trustees, and employees also attend 
the AGM (SBS 26.03.2017), we can conclude that even though there are 
opportunities for rule-based participation, the exercise of these rights is low. 
Despite the low AGM attendance, we can conclude that SBS, being an 
organisation that has granted formal voting rights to members throughout its 
existence offers actual opportunities for members to engage in rule-based 
participation at the AGM.  
Regrading HOS, an unincorporated association which grants formal voting rights 
to the wider membership, I found that members attend the AGM in great numbers 
and participate in voting over program and strategy. For example, members were 
invited through the newsletters to propose questions for discussion at the AGM: 
“The next meeting, which includes our Spring Show and Annual General Meeting 
(May 10th, 1997 at Pershore) is creeping over the horizon. Consequently, the 
next issue of this newsletter will carry a copy of the Minutes of the last AGM and 
the Agenda for the next. If you wish to make any proposals for inclusion in the 
Agenda, please send them to me in writing, with your name and that of a 
seconder, by March 1st, 1997.” (The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 3, 
January 1997) 
Members discussed and voted over organisational policy.169 In one of the 
newsletters from 1998 it is reported that:  
“At the brief EGM [Extraordinary General Meeting], held at the beginning of the 
meeting, the proposal that the Show rules would no longer constitute part of the 
Society rules was passed after some discussion. There were 2 votes against the 
proposal.” (The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 7 January 1998, 1).170 
Furthermore, the document analysis shows that the wider membership has 
elected members of the executive organ throughout the existence of HOS.171 
                                                          
169 The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 24 April 2002, 3 
170 The meeting was attended by 65 members out of 200 paid members, as reported in the 
newsletter 
171 Agenda of the Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid Society at Kidlington, Oxford on 
Sunday, 10th April 2016; Minutes of the 20th Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid 
Society at Exeter Hall, Kidlington, Oxford on Sunday 21st April 2013; Draft Minutes of the 15th 
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Members were also invited through the newsletters to propose nominations for 
available positions in the committee:172 
“Nominations have already been received for some of these posts but please do 
apply if you are interested. In the event of no nominations for an office being 
received, nominations shall be accepted from the floor.” (The Hardy Orchid 
Society Newsletter No. 24 April 2002, 4). 
 
In the 90s, meetings were attended by around 50 members,173 whilst during the 
2000s and later, many of the HOS annual meetings were attended by around 100 
members.174 The latter was confirmed by an interviewee, who suggested that in 
the past years’ AGMs are attended by 100-150 members (HOS 06.10.2017). 
They combine the annual events (shows) with the AGM to be able to attract as 
many as members as possible.175 Hence, we can conclude that HOS, as 
expected, throughout its existence has provided regular opportunities for 
members to engage in rule-based participation at AGMs, and high number of 
members use their formal voting rights. 
The last organisation, NHS Alliance, which operates as an unincorporated 
association, as expected, also provides opportunities for rule-based participation 
and members participate in high numbers. The organisation invites members to 
attend AGMs and elect the National Executive Committee.176 According to the 
interview data, members elected the members of the National Executive since 
the organisation was formed.177 In the words of one of the interviewees:  
“Members always have the right to attend the Annual General Meeting, members 
always have the right to propose motions to the Annual General Meeting as long 
as they were properly proposed and seconded in accordance with the 
constitution. And it was always the members who elected the National Executive.” 
(NHS Alliance 23.06.2017) 
                                                          
Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid Society 2007; Chairman’s report 2008, accessed 
at: http://www.hardyorchidsociety.org.uk/HOS%201012/HOSweb5/AGMchairman08.htm on 
14.09.2018 
172 The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 12 April 1999, 2; The Hardy Orchid Society 
Newsletter No. 24 April 2002, 4 
173 The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 1 July 1996 
174 Newsletter No.29 July 2003 Report of the 11th AGM; Journal of the Hardy Orchid Society 
Vol. 2 No. 3 July 2005, HOS AGM and Spring Meeting; Chairman report 2007, accessed at: 
http://www.hardyorchidsociety.org.uk/HOS%201012/HOSweb5/AGMchair07.htm on 14.09.2018 
175 The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 1 July 1996; The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter 
No. 3, January 1997; HOS 06.10.2017 
176 Notice of Annual General Meeting 2006 Accessed on 07 July 2018; Report by the Executive 
Committee 2005/6 
177 NHS Alliance 23.06.2017; NHS Alliance 31.05.2017 
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Membership participation at AGMs in the first 10 years fluctuated between 50 and 
200 (NHS Alliance 23.06.2017). Like other organisations with formal voting rights 
for members, the NHS Alliance aligned the AGM with the annual conference and 
they: 
“took advantage of the fact that there were between 600 and 1,000 people 
attending an annual conference of the NHS Alliance [which was opened to non-
members as well] and held the Annual General Meeting during that.” (NHS 
Alliance 23.06.2017).  
One of the interviewees suggested that the level of membership involvement was 
roughly the same throughout and for the AGM in 2017 they were expecting 
around 100 members (NHS Alliance 31.05.2017). They have recently created a 
manifesto for health care which was done with the involvement of members. The 
organisation has included members in decision-making over programmatic and 
policy matters throughout its existence to be able to demonstrate to the 
government that they represent the majority of the health authorities (NHS 
Alliance 23.06.2017). Thus, we can conclude that the NHS Alliance, as expected, 
offered opportunities for use of formal voting rights and had some level of rule-
based participation by the wider membership. 
Dutch Organisations  
 
In this section, I will review the rule-based participation of the four Dutch 
organisations whose governing documents guarantee formal voting rights for 
members. Vitiligo.nl is the only Dutch organisation where members were given 
the opportunity to attend the AGM178 and elect the members of the board179 in 
accordance with the statute, but they do not use such rights in practice. More 
specifically:  
“At the annual meeting [held] in April all the participants can vote regarding new 
board members. They get a presentation about last year results and next year 
plans. They do not vote regarding this, but can give their opinion.” (E-mail 
correspondence 19.09.2018). 
Nevertheless, interviewees report that members do not engage in rule-based 
participation i.e. do not use the opportunity to attend the AGM and elect the board 
                                                          
178 Vitiligo.nl Newsletter No. 1, May 2007; Newsletter May 2010, 3; E-mail correspondence 
19.09.2018  
179 Newsletter May 2007; E-mail correspondence 19.09.2018 
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members.180 In the past few years, only members of the board attend the AGMs 
(Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). When asked why members do not participate at the 
AGMs, one of the interviewees explains that the members of the organisation are 
vitiligo patients who join the organisation to receive information about advances 
in research on finding a cure for the disease:  
“[…] they only want to know when there will be a solution for it, a medicine or 
something like that. That is not the case, but they hope that they will be the first 
one to get an information and most people join the organisation for that.” 
(Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017).  
They invite members to the AGM and inform them about their upcoming plans181 
and decisions made by the executive board, however members are generally not 
responsive.182 This means that Vitiligo.nl, against the expectation that 
organisations with formal voting rights will generate some level of rule-based 
participation, the data indicates that members do not use the opportunity to 
influence organisational governance. Also, whilst members are given the 
opportunity to elect the members of the board they are not given the right to vote 
on programmatic priorities (plan of activities).  
The members of the National Association of Psychosocial Workers (LVPW), an 
organisation representing the professional interests of psychosocial workers 
offers its members opportunities to engage in rule-based participation. LVPW 
invites members to participate at the annual general meeting and members 
receive the preparatory documents in advance (financial account, summary of 
past activities), including the program plan for the forthcoming year.183 Members 
elect the members of the board during the annual meeting.184 They also influence 
the programmatic activities of the organisation during the AGMs185:  
“[…] the members are annually asked, on the general meeting of members, what 
their opinion is about the plans of the board, the policy changes or new 
developments. Sometimes the members vote on proposals and other times the 
board will change the proposals according to the option heard on the meeting. 
Members can always make their own proposals and ask the members present 
what their opinion is over the suggested proposal.” (LVPWb E-mail 
correspondence 08.05.2018) 
                                                          
180 Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017, Vitiligo.nl 16:10.2017 
181 Newsletter August 2006, 2 
182 Newsletter May 2010, 3; Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017 
183 LVPW 10.10.2017; LVPWb E-mail correspondence 08.05.2018 
184 Vitiligo.nl E-mail correspondence 15.05.2018 
185 LVPWa E-mail correspondence 08.05.2018 
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Despite that, the data indicates that members engage in small numbers. 
According to the one interview, on average, 40 out of 250 members attend the 
AGM (LVPW 10.10.2017). Nevertheless, this confirms the expectation that 
organisations like LVPW with formal voting rights for members experience some 
level of rule-based participation, they offer annual opportunities for members to 
attend the AGM, and not only elect the board but also vote on the programmatic 
priorities of the organisation.  
Young Friends of the Earth Netherlands (JMA) also invites members to 
participate at the AGM. Interview and newsletter data suggests that throughout 
the whole existence of the organisation the wider membership was regularly 
informed about the AGM by email or multiple letters containing the invitation, 
agenda and the documents for the general meeting.186 During the 90s, the AGM 
had to approve every new campaign and project.187 At an AGM held in 1997 they 
discussed the upcoming campaigns and approved their budget.188 During the 
AGM in 2003, the members discussed what to invest in, strategies for growth,189 
and decided that JMA would become the official youth organisation of Young 
Friends of the Earth Netherlands [‘Milieudefensie’].190 Members also made 
decisions regarding organisational policy and structure.191 The newsletter data 
also shows that members regularly appointed new members to the board.192  
More recently, interviewees suggest that the majority of the members are passive 
– they like to support the organisation and hear updates, but do not engage in 
rule-based participation.193 One interviewee suggested that – in the last few years 
- around 30 members attend the AGM on average, not counting the employees 
and the board (JMA 13.11.2017). According to another interviewee, when they 
have actively asked for feedback on a strategic matter, the AGM was attended 
                                                          
186 JMA 23.10.2017; JMA 08.11.2017; Members are invited to participate in the AGM in the 
‘Green Wave’ magazine; see Newsletter No.1 1999; Newsletter May 2000 
187 Newsletter 1996 No.4, 14 
188 Newsletter 1997, No.4, 6 
189 Newsletter 2003 No.7 
190 Newsletter 2003 No.1 
191 Newsletter 1999 No.1, 4; Newsletter AGM 2000 no.2 
192 Newsletter 1998 No.1, 8; Newsletter 1999 no.1,4; Newsletter 2001 No.2; Newsletter 2003 
No.7 
193 JMA 23.10.2017; JMA 08.11.2017 
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by 25 members (out of 600 members), which nowadays is considered high 
attendance (JMA 23.10.2017). As expected, JMA provides opportunities for rule-
based participation, even though small numbers of members in practice elect the 
board and decide on the programmatic priorities of the organisation.  
Finally, NVL, provides opportunities for rule-based participation, and members 
are engaged in high numbers. When asked how many people participated in the 
annual general meetings over time, the current executive board answered that, 
based on the meeting reports, there have always been between 60 and 100 
members in attendance.194 According to interview data, at the annual meeting - 
which is held in March-April every year- around 100-120 members would join.195 
At the annual meeting the board presents an overview of activities and results 
from the past year and their plans for next year (NVL 06.10.2017). The members 
of the board expect feedback from the members after which a central vote follows 
(NVL 06.10.2017). Members decide the strategic direction of the organisation:  
“So, the members, they have a great vote in what direction the organisation is 
going and at these annual meetings, they can vote for new ideas, for new people 
to be members of the board and […] they have great influence.” (NVL 
27.09.2017). 
Based on this we can conclude that NVL, being an organisation that grants formal 
voting rights to members, as expected, has wider membership which is engaged 
in rule-based participation.  
In summary, as presented in Table 11, the evidence shows that organisations 
with formal voting rights in their governing document provide actual opportunities 
for members to attend the annual general meeting and experience some level of 
rule-based participation in practice. The only exception is Vitiligo.nl, where the 
wider membership does not engage in rule-based participation. The interviewees 
suggest that this is due to the type of membership, the organisation’s membership 
being mostly patients. This suggestion is in line with some previous suggestions 
in the literature that patient groups are “laggards” when it comes to internal 
democracy (Binderkrantz 2009, 670). The received wisdom is that when formal 
voting rights are required by law, voting becomes common and regularised in 
                                                          
194 Written answers from NVL board received on 26.10.2017 
195 NVL 06.10.2017; NVL 27.09.2017 
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organisations that have to meet this legal requirement. However, according to my 
findings, patient organisations may be an exception to this ‘rule’. 
Table 11: Empirical Findings on Rule-Based Participation in Organisations with 
Voting Rights 
 
Importantly, across all the organisations under study that experience some level 
of rule-based participation, members not only elect the executive board, but also 
participate in decision making regarding programmatic priorities. Besides SBS 
Country  Organisation Formal 
voting 
rights for 
members 
Expectation  Use of rights in 
practice  
 
 
 
UK  
Songbird 
Survival 
Yes  
 
 
Organisations 
that grant 
formal voting 
rights to 
members will 
have some 
level of rule-
based 
participation 
by wider 
membership. 
Confirmed 
Members 
participate in 
voting but in a 
small number 
NHS Alliance Yes Confirmed 
Members 
participate in 
voting in high 
number 
Hardy Orchid 
Society  
 
Yes 
Confirmed  
Members 
participate in 
voting in high 
number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
Vitiligo 
Netherlands 
 
Yes 
Not confirmed  
Members do not 
vote  
Young 
Friends of the 
Earth 
Netherlands  
Yes Confirmed 
Members 
participate in 
voting but in a 
small number 
National 
Association 
of 
Psychosocial 
Workers  
Yes  Confirmed 
Members 
participate in 
voting but in a 
small number 
The Dutch 
Association 
for Dragonfly 
Studies 
Yes Confirmed 
Members 
participate in 
voting in high 
number 
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which explicitly granted members with power to determine issues related to 
policy, the other organisations have regulated the right to propose and vote for 
motions without specifying the decision-making area i.e. programmatic priorities. 
The findings indicate that organisations, across the legal regimes, that provide 
actual opportunities for rule-based participation i.e. organise AGMs and hold 
board elections, simultaneously give members the possibility to vote for 
programmatic priorities. 
6.3. Rule-based Participation before Organisations Lost Formal Voting 
Rights 
 
In this section I evaluate the three British organisations that currently do not 
provide formal voting rights to their wider membership: National Activity Providers 
Association (NAPA), Surfers Against Sewage (SAS), and Patient Information 
Forum (PIF). The previous chapter found that both NAPA and SAS, have 
changed their formal documents and granted formal voting rights to members of 
the executive, whilst in the case of PIF, the decision to grant formal voting rights 
to the members of the executive board did not result in them changing their formal 
rules. PIF’s governing document allowed for such interpretation. The aim in this 
section is to assess the level of rule-based participation before the organisations 
in question changed the voting structure, and the extent to which the legal regime 
in combination with other factors may account for the change. The expectation is 
that these organisations had low level or absence of rule-based participation in 
the period before the change, as well as leadership that wanted a more 
centralised decision-making structure. In accordance with company law, 
organisations may formally re-define or posit that members of the board are the 
only members of the organisation with exclusive voting rights.  
 
NAPA, as the previous chapter showed, had formal voting rights for the wider 
membership until 2014. The analysis of available data found that members of 
NAPA had the opportunity to attend the AGM and exercise their formal voting 
rights in practice in the years after the organisation was formed. For example, in 
1999, a year after accessing charitable status, the self-selected team of trustees 
resigned, and a new team was elected at the annual general meeting by 
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members.196 The newsletter reminded the members that each year one third of 
the trustees step down and that trustees were elected.197 Additionally, at the same 
meeting the trustees presented a report on the associations’ progress, and 
members discussed and voted for approval of the report.198 In 2005, when the 
first CEO was employed, NAPA still advertised the AGM in the newsletter.199 To 
increase participation at the AGM, in 2006, NAPA held it as part of a Sharing Day 
in London, and all members attending were eligible to vote.200 According to a long-
standing member of the organisation, before 2002 there were less opportunities 
to participate in the AGM (NAPA 06.06.2017). This changed later, when the 
organisation started holding the annual general meetings together with the 
annual conference which was often attended by 200 people. However, not many 
individual members were involved in decision-making through voting (NAPA 
06.06.2017). Interview data suggests that before 2014, members had the 
opportunity to attend the annual general meetings and elect the members of the 
board (NAPA 30.05.2017). Members were also involved in decision making over 
programmatic priorities: 
“[…] the wider membership was involved in constitutional requirements of the 
AGM e.g. proposing and seconding decisions including our strategic and 
spending plans and approving the Annual report and budget (NAPA E-mail 
correspondence 13.09.2018). 
In the years before the formal change, the members who attended the annual 
conference - the context of which annual general meetings were held - were not 
significantly interested in rule-based participation.201 The professional 
management reviewed the governing structure and proposed that the board of 
trustees should be defined as voting members of the organisations, whilst the 
rest of the members should be defined as supporters.202 The minimum 
attendance for the AGM to convene was set at 10 members in 2004203, which 
equals the number of members that participated in enacting the resolution that 
defined trustees as organisational members.204 In line with expectations, before 
                                                          
196 NAPA Newsletter Spring 1999, Volume 2 Issue 3 
197 NAPA Newsletter Spring 1999, Volume 2 Issue 3 
198 NAPA Newsletter Spring 1999, Volume 2 Issue 3 
199 NAPA Spring 2005 Volume 9 Issue 1, 1 
200 NAPA Summer 2006 Volume 10 Issue 2, 5 
201 NAPA E-mail correspondence 13.09.2018 
202 NAPA 30.05.2017; E-mail correspondence 15.09.2018 
203 Special resolution, June 2004 
204 Minutes of Trustees Meeting 14 March 2014, Companies House 
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undergoing a formal rule change, NAPA had a passive membership and a 
leadership interested in instigating change. The legal form in which the 
organisation operates together with the low quorum for convening an AGM 
enabled the change of formal voting rights to occur.  
Regarding SAS, which in 2012 limited formal voting rights to the executive board, 
I observed the same pattern. In May 1990, SAS was formed at a meeting 
organised by a group of concerned surfers and during this first meeting a 
provisional committee was elected for a period of six months, until the AGM was 
held.205 The first public meeting in which they enabled people to become 
members was attended by more than 150 people.206 In terms of rule-based 
participation at annual general meetings, until the adoption of the first governing 
document in 1994, the organisation regularly held AGMs where the wider 
membership had a chance to attend and elect the members of the executive 
Committee.207 Members were also presented with the latest financial and 
programmatic updates and they decided on funding matters such as “whether 
SAS should make donations or offer sponsorship to surfing teams entering 
competitions” and organisational policy such as employment of new staff 
members,208 establishing a regional network of representatives and similar 
questions: 
“There was discussion on setting up regional committees and this was voted as 
a good idea with eventual input from all these to central SAS.” (Pipeline news 
1991, Number 3, 7). 
This indicates that members had the chance to influence the organisation’s 
governance.  
SAS had a fast-growing membership in the period when they experienced rule-
based participation. By October 1990, the membership of SAS was approaching 
1000 members.209 The leadership (i.e. founders) wanted a participatory 
organisation. In 1991, they held the AGM a day after the annual ball of SAS, to 
                                                          
205 Pipeline news 1990, Number 2, 4 
206 Pipeline news 1990, Number 1 
207 SAS E-mail correspondence 18.09.2018; SAS 26.05.2017; Pipeline news 1991, Number 2, 
1; Pipeline news 1991, Number 3, 7 
208 Pipeline news 1991, Number 2, 1 
209 Pipeline news 1990, Number 2, 4 
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enable members from other areas in the country to attend and elect the members 
of the committee.210 Interview data confirms that SAS had an AGM every year in 
the early days and members could put themselves forward for election to the 
executive committee (SAS 26.05.2017).  
After incorporation in 1994, when the organisation adopted a two-tier 
membership system, there were a “couple of hundred members” attending the 
annual general meeting and voting rights were opened to the members during 
the second half of the 90s.211 Specifically, as stipulated in the governing 
document, the wider membership was invited to attend the AGM and elected A-
members (delegates). During the 2000s, members were still invited through the 
newsletter to attend the AGM.212  
However, by the late 2000s as the organisation was increasingly focused on their 
lobbying and advocacy activities, members were less involved in determining the 
programmatic priorities. Members were mobilised to support the lobbying agenda 
of the organisation through volunteering, supporting petitions, campaigns etc.213 
For example, SAS established a “Take action” section on their website where 
members could get information about their political activities and get involved:  
“We have over 20 campaigns on the go at the moment so there’s a lot of help we 
need from you right now! Keep an eye on it, as it’s a key campaign tool for us in 
generating momentum on an issue.” (Pipe Line news issue 67, February 2007, 
9) 
In 2008, SAS started using the term ‘supporters’ rather than ‘members’ in their 
newsletters, signalling a different understanding of their role:  
“Whatever way you choose to help us in 2008, whether it’s joining a demo or just 
keeping your membership up to date then that’s fine by us. All support is truly 
valued here and that’s what makes SAS supporters so special.” (Pipeline news 
issue 71, February 2008, 2). 
This period overlaps with the change in SAS’s leadership, i.e. hiring a new chief 
executive. By the end of the 2000s, even though members were regularly 
informed about the activities of the organisation,214 there is no evidence that 
opportunities for rule-based participation were in practice. This was confirmed by 
                                                          
210 Pipeline news 1991, Number, 3, 7 
211 SAS 26.05.2017; SAS Email correspondence 18.09.2018 
212 Pipeline news, issue 58, October 2004, 20; Pipeline news, issue 64, May 2006, 19; Pipeline 
issue 68 May 2007, 22 
213 Pipe Line news issue 67, February 2007; Pipe Line news October 2007, Issue 70 
214 For example, the newsletters had a Membership news page (Pipe line issue 73, July 2008).  
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an interviewee who explained that even before changing the governing rules in 
2012, members did not engage in authoritative decision-making through voting 
at the annual general meetings:  
 “Indeed, from a constitutional point of view, the members were actually the board 
of trustees, rather than the members. So, the constitutional framework set out 
that the trustees or the board of directors would take the decisions, and that 
remains the case to today.” (SAS 16.06.2017a).  
As expected, in the period before SAS limited formal voting rights to members of 
the executive, members of the board, and not the wider membership, participated 
at the AGMs. Interviewed members also confirmed that they did not attend an 
AGM and they were not involved in electing members of the board or decision-
making over the programmatic priorities of the organisation.215 Similarly to NAPA, 
in the case of SAS we can note absence of rule-based participation and presence 
of an initiative for formal centralisation of the governing structure by the 
leadership. Both organisations operate as companies limited by guarantee, a 
legal form which enables such change.  
In the case of PIF, we found that the decision to grant formal voting rights only to 
the members of the executive board in 2015 did not result in a change of formal 
rules, because the framing of their formal rules allowed for such interpretation. 
There is limited information on the governance of PIF before incorporation. Whilst 
interview data suggests that PIF did not have a governing document and it was 
governed by a board of non-executive directors (PIF 02.05.2017), a newsletter 
from 2002 indicates that PIF invited members to the AGM which was held 
together with the annual conference:  
“I hope to see as many of you as possible at the AGM; we would like to hear your 
ideas for the future direction of PIF and for you to help us drive the work of the 
Forum forward.” (PIF Newsletter issue 3 April 2002, 1).  
This indicates that members were engaged in rule-based participation.  
As presented in the previous chapter, the first governing document of PIF was 
adopted in 2008 and then amended in 2010. Since 2010, the advisory group and 
the regional coordinators together with the board members were invited to 
                                                          
215 SAS 16.06.2017b; SAS 23.06.2017; One of the interviewees has been a long-term member 
of the organisation, involved in the period before 2012 when the organisation changed the 
governing document.  
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participate at AGMs.216 The network of Regional and Country Co-ordinators was 
absorbed into the Advisory Group in 2014.217 In 2013, the leadership initiated a 
revision of the governing structure of PIF, and it was decided that the wider 
membership would not be given voting rights (PIF 04.06.2018). Even though this 
did not result in change of the governing document, since 2015 the AGM of PIF 
has not been open to the members of the advisory board anymore (PIF 
02.05.2017). The executive board determines the programmatic priorities and 
plays a fundamental role in the running of the organisation.218  
Even though the 2008 governing document guaranteed formal voting rights for 
all members, interview data suggests that in the past, the main decisions related 
to organisational activities and strategy were made by the chairperson, who was 
PIF’s founder.219 Members were not engaged in rule-based participation. A 
member who was an active volunteer in PIF said that she did not remember being 
invited to the AGM in the past:  
“[…] no, you know I do not recall seeing anything about AGMs or anything like 
that because I might have gone, you know.” (PIF 25.05.2017).  
From the perspective of members, the chair and the director of operations were 
responsible for strategic decision-making: 
“I suppose really that the chair and the director of operations were sort of the two-
key people. The board clearly had a role strategically, but I guess in my 
involvement I was a bit less aware of that really. It was really the chair, thinking 
about it, the chair and the director of operations the key people who set the tone 
and set the agenda for us in the voluntary roles really and that translated into the 
activity that we delivered for members.” (PIF 25.05.2018).  
Another interviewee suggests that in the last few years the employed staff remain 
heavily involved in decision-making processes over programmatic priorities (PIF 
02.05.2017).  
This means that before 2015, only a limited section of the membership was 
invited to participate at AGMs and engaged in rule-based participation. And even 
though wider members had formal voting rights from 2008-2010, the main 
                                                          
216 PIF 02.05.2017; PIF 31.05.2017 
217 Our History https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ accessed on 17.08.2018 
218 Our History https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ accessed on 17.08.2018; 
PIF 04.06.2018 
219 PIF 04.06.2018; PIF 02.05.2017 
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decisions were carried by the leadership. This was reflected in the low quorum 
for holding a general meeting in the statutes set on two persons entitled to vote 
upon the business of the company. The de facto limitation of formal voting rights 
was enabled by the presence of leadership interest for centralisation, absence of 
rule-based participation and the legal form, according to which members of the 
executive can be the only voting members in the organisation.  
The findings, as summarised in Table 12, indicate that in the three cases 
presented, wider membership did not engage in rule-based participation in the 
period before the centralisation of formal voting rights was initiated by the 
leadership. In other words, a lack of legal backing for the wider membership’s 
enfranchisement, the absence of available voting rights, and the leadership’s 
desire for centralisation combine to limit formal voting rights to the executive 
board. NAPA and SAS are two cases where we find a change in the governing 
document in the UK, whilst PIF did not alter the governing document, but 
interpreted that only members of the executive board had voting rights.  
When contrasting NAPA and SAS with Vitiligo.nl - a Dutch case characterised by 
absence of rule-based participation of the wider membership and presence of 
leadership’s interest for centralisation – it becomes clear that the combination of 
factors that resulted in change to the governing document in the former cases did 
not have the same effect in the latter case. Vitiligo.nl in practice decreased the 
number of members on the board from 9 to 4. This was further underpinned by a 
change in the governing document in 2011 that allowed unlimited office terms for 
members of the board.220 The amendment of the governing document to increase 
the power of board members shows that formal rules are an important reflection 
of the leadership’s interest in centralising the decision-making of the organisation. 
Nonetheless, Vitiligo.nl did not limit the formal voting rights of the wider members 
because, legally, they cannot limit the powers of the annual meeting of members. 
Their governing document, as long as they are formal association, will provide 
formal (and actual) opportunities for members’ influence. Hence, the legal regime 
and the legal form in which organisations operate shapes the potential for 
membership influence.  
                                                          
220 E-mail correspondence on 10.24.2017 and 10.26.2017. 
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Table 12: Conditions for Change of Formal Voting Rights 
Regulatory 
regime  
Organisation Use of voting 
rights before 
change  
Leadership 
initiative for 
centralisation  
Outcome  
 
 
 
 
UK  
National Activity 
Providers 
Association 
Limited  Yes Change of 
governing 
document in 
2014 
Surfers Against 
Sewage  
 
Limited Yes Change of 
governing 
document in 
2012 
Patient 
Information 
Forum  
Limited Yes Informal 
change in 2015 
Netherlands  Vitiligo.nl  Limited Yes  No change  
 
6.4. Comparative Assessment of the Use of Member Rights in UK and 
Netherlands 
 
In this chapter, I have focused on the rule-based participation of members in the 
ten organisations under study in the UK and the Netherlands. Firstly, I have 
presented findings on rule-based participation in the British and Dutch 
organisations that have formal voting rights guaranteed for their wider 
membership in their governing documents. Organisations were assessed on 
whether they hold AGMs for the wider membership and enable members to elect 
the executive in practice, as two aspects of formal voting rights which are subject 
to statutory regulation. In addition, I assessed whether members’ participated in 
decisions regarding the programmatic priorities through voting, an area not 
specified in statutory regulation, but often being a part of the formal voting rights 
package granted in organisational rules. The expectation was that organisations 
with formal voting rights stipulated in their governing document will provide 
opportunities for use of these rights in practice and will have some level of rule-
based participation.  
The results suggest that irrespective of the legal system and the policy field, six 
out of seven organisations which granted formal voting rights for members in their 
governing documents have - as expected - some level of rule-based participation 
by the wider membership i.e. these organisations provide opportunities for usage 
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of formal voting rights in practice. This indicates that it is important to account for 
formal voting rights, because when given in the governing document, the 
leadership (board and/ or staff) offers actual opportunities for participation and 
members use these rights in practice. Importantly, across all the organisations 
that experience some level of rule-based participation, members not only elect 
the executive board, but also vote on programmatic priorities. The findings 
suggest that the presence of formal voting rights can be used as a proxy for rule-
based participation, considering that accessing organisational data on rule-based 
participation is often more difficult than accessing data on formal rights in 
governing documents.  
Secondly, I assessed the level of rule-based participation by members in 
organisations which currently limit such rights to the executive during the period 
when they still granted formal voting rights to the wider membership. The goal 
was to understand what led to the rule change, with an emphasis on the role of 
the legal regime and legal form in which organisations operate. The expectation 
was that the three organisations (NAPA, SAS and PIF) had low levels or an 
absence of rule-based participation in the period before the change, and a 
leadership with interest for centralisation of decision-making rights. The evidence 
shows that the three organisations (NAPA, SAS and PIF), before the change (i.e. 
limitation of formal voting rights to the executive board) experienced a 'lack of 
usage of formal voting rights' and action by the leadership to limit members’ voting 
rights. These two factors in combination with the pre-existing option to limit rights 
to the executive for companies limited by guarantee in the UK led to the outcomes 
of memberships without formal voting rights. If we contrast the organisations that 
have formal voting rights in the UK (SBS, HOS and NHS Alliance) with those that 
do not (SAS, NAPA and PIF), we can notice that the former experience some 
rule-based participation in practice and have leadership which perceived 
members as important for the organisation’s survival (SBS) and mission 
attainment (NHS Alliance, HOS).  
In the Netherlands, despite the absence of rule-based participation and 
demonstrated interest of the leadership for centralisation of decision making, as 
found in the case of Vitiligo.nl, organisations have to provide for formal voting 
rights in the governing document and opportunities for the use of those rights in 
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practice.221 This means that members of organisations that operate in legal 
regimes like the Netherlands have formal rights - even if they do not participate 
in practice - that can be activated in the future. This matches Lansley’s (1996, 
224) assertation that “legal or similar requirements may place the organisation in 
a constitutional strait-jacket which predetermines the amount of membership 
involvement which is possible.”  
In the UK, membership organisations have discretion to have or not to have 
formal voting rights for members and hence offer or not offer opportunities for 
rule-based participation, whilst in the Netherlands, membership organisations are 
required by law to give members formal voting rights, and organisations do so 
formally, and in practice. As said earlier, it is not strategically viable nor necessary 
for each non-profit membership organisation to have voting membership (Jordan 
and Maloney 2007). For example, surveyed membership charities in the UK have 
pointed out that members are often interested only in accessing information and 
they are not interested in exercising their right to vote (Charity Commission 2004, 
14, 17). This means that the leadership often, beyond their interest in efficient 
decision-making processes, has other legitimate reasons to centralise formal 
voting rights. Therefore, the UK makes a convenient legal environment which 
enables organisations to adapt their governance in line with their needs. In 
comparison to the UK, the legal environment in the Netherlands, while protecting 
members’ powers and, encouraging internal democracy, can pose a limitation for 
organisations for which it is more strategically viable to maintain a non-voting 
membership.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
221 Legally speaking, organisations like Vitiligo.nl have an option to re-register as foundation 
(alternative form available for non-membership non-profits) if they wanted to operate without 
membership altogether. 
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7. The Impact of Non-Profit Regulation on Board Professionalisation 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I present the results of the organisational level analysis regarding 
board professionalisation. The organisational level assessment aims to capture 
whether organisations exposed to regulation linked to distinct configurations of 
indirect benefits show different levels of board professionalisation. The second 
argument of this thesis is based on the analytical distinction that in each 
regulatory regime there are up to three configurations which differ in the 
combinations of indirect benefits they have. The three configurations differ in the 
type and intensity of regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting requirements) they are 
exposed to, that is to say organisations which have all indirect benefits are more 
constrained than those that have only legal personality, which in turn are more 
constrained than organisations which have none.  
The Board professionalisation expectation is that non-profit membership 
organisations maintaining indirect benefits which are exposed to high reporting 
requirements and external supervision will undergo board professionalisation, 
whilst organisations which are exposed to lenient reporting requirements and little 
or no external supervision will not. The political entrepreneur (a chief executive, 
chairman or someone else within the leadership) facilitates professionalisation of 
the board in response to increased regulatory pressures related to indirect 
benefits. The need for increased competencies in the executive board may be 
reinforced by increased financial capacity which has implications for the 
complexity of the reporting requirements in relation to maintaining indirect 
benefits (see legal analysis).  
Based on the legal analysis, we can expect that charitable companies (UK) and 
ANBIs (Netherlands), being exposed to high regulatory constraints, are more 
likely to show signs of board professionalisation than organisations exposed to 
low regulatory constraints i.e. operating only with legal personality or no indirect 
benefits. However, we need to keep in mind the qualitative differences between 
regulatory constraints to which ANBIs and charitable companies are exposed. 
Whilst ANBIs in the Netherlands have been exposed to higher reporting 
requirements since 2014, supervision of ANBIs is less strict and there are no 
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additional constraints on political activities such as those faced by charitable 
companies in the UK.  
As discussed in the conceptual section, board professionalisation here is defined 
as the external recruitment of professionals and experts with competence (skills, 
experiences and knowledge) relevant for organisational maintenance, including 
administrative and policy skills.222 For smaller membership organisations to have 
their descriptive representation affected by board professionalisation, i.e. the 
extent to which members of the board mirror the organisational membership (Guo 
and Musso 2007), the element of external recruitment of professionals with skills 
for organisational maintenance for unpaid positions should be present. Hence, 
the concept of board professionalisation has two elements, the first being external 
recruitment and the second being recruitment of professionals with competencies 
relevant for organisational maintenance such as legal, managerial, accounting, 
financial, PR, charity and non-profit experience. If the data shows that 
organisations satisfy both elements, then we consider that the organisation 
shows signs of board professionalisation. The organisational data was coded with 
0 if the organisation did not recruit board members externally with particular skills 
in mind relevant for organisational maintenance or coded with a 1 if the 
organisation - after being exposed to regulatory constraints - sought board 
members with particular competencies relevant to organisational maintenance 
outside of the organisation.   
Ten non-profit membership organisations were selected. Five are exposed to low 
regulatory constraints including two unincorporated associations in the UK, two 
formal associations in the Netherlands, and one company limited by guarantee in 
the UK (see Figure 4). The other five organisations are exposed to high regulatory 
constraints including three charitable companies in the UK and two formal 
associations with ANBI status in the Netherlands. As explained in the 
methodology, informal associations in the Netherlands were not selected 
because only small local clubs operate in this form, and the focus here is on 
national membership organisations. However, since the expected difference in 
the outcome is between organisations in the configuration of ‘all indirect benefits’ 
                                                          
222 The roles in the executive organ are voluntary and unpaid, however, members of the board 
may be eligible to reimbursement or small honorarium for traveling and meetings. 
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versus the configurations of having only one indirect benefit and ‘no benefits at 
all’, the selected cases were suitable to explore the expectations.  
Figure 4: Organisations Distribution across Configurations 
Note: Lighter grey (on the right) are organisations that are exposed to higher regulatory 
constraints, while darker grey organisations (on the left) are exposed to lower regulatory 
constraints.   
 
In the next section first, I present the findings for organisations in the UK and the 
Netherlands exposed to high regulatory constraints, and then I present the 
findings for organisations exposed to low regulatory constraints or none. In the 
end the chapter concludes with summary and discussion of the findings.   
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Table 13: Summary of Theoretical Expectations on Board Professionalisation 
 
7.2. Organisations Exposed to High Regulatory Constraints in the UK 
 
National Activity Providers Association  
 
NAPA, a charitable company in the field of health and social care, was set and 
effectively run by professionals in the care sector field on a voluntary basis (NAPA 
30.05.2017). Since registration with the Companies House in 1997 until 2018 the 
organisation had 55 officers in total sitting on the executive board.223 The paying 
members of NAPA were professionals working in care homes in the beginning, 
while later the organisation expanded the membership by registering care homes 
as members in 2006 and today membership is available to individuals, homes, 
                                                          
223 See: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03482943/officers 
Name of 
organisation 
Country and 
policy field 
Intensity of 
regulatory 
constraints 
Theoretical 
expectation 
SongBird Survival 
(SBS) 
UK 
Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exposure to high 
regulatory 
constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisations are 
more likely to 
show signs of 
board 
professionalisation 
 
National Activity 
Providers 
Association 
(NAPA) 
UK 
Health 
Surfers Against 
Sewage (SAS) 
UK 
Environment 
Jongeren Milieu 
Actief (JMA) 
Netherlands 
Environment 
Vitiligo.nl Netherlands 
Health 
Patient 
Information 
Forum (PIF) 
UK 
Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exposure to low 
regulatory 
constraints or none 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisations are 
less likely to 
shows signs of 
board 
professionalisation 
 
Dutch Association 
for Dragonfly 
Studies (NVL) 
Netherlands 
Environment 
The National 
Association of 
Psychosocial 
Workers (LVPW) 
Netherlands 
Health 
NHS Alliance  UK 
Health 
Hardy Orchid 
Society (HOS) 
UK 
Environment 
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groups of homes and organisations. NAPA experienced the oversight of the 
Charity Commission once it accessed charitable status in 1998. In 1998, the 
organisation employed briefly one of its trustees as Director of Training because 
of her “unique relevant experience”.224 The Charity Commission advised NAPA 
that the trustee who was employed for the training post should resign225 from the 
position as a trustee due to receiving payment.226  
In the early days, members of the board were recruited from within the 
membership. Some of the board members recruited early on had experience in 
the non-profit and public sector. For example, one of the board directors in 1997 
had 20 years of experience as an Education and Policy officer for Age Concern, 
a big charity in the UK.227 She could contribute with knowledge of the wider non-
profit care sector focusing on the needs of older people.228 This board member 
was initially invited to join the Steering committee and remained active as a 
trustee until 2006.229 Another member of the board was an Inspector for the Royal 
Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and representative of the National 
Association for Inspection and Registration Officers.230 This means that the 
organisation early on was relying on people with professional skills which can 
support organisational maintenance within the non-profit care sector.  
In the years after accessing indirect benefits, NAPA continued to recruit 
professionals from within the membership. The trustees recruited in the period 
after accessing charitable status had considerable experience in the care sector 
and professional careers in the non-profit sector.231 Profiles of newly appointed 
trustees were presented in NAPA’s newsletters. One of the board members 
recruited in the year after accessing charitable status, worked in a charity called 
Turning Point and later became a Leisure Services Manager at a care home.232 
Another board member with experience in the non-profit sector was recruited by 
                                                          
224 Annual Report and Accounts 31st December 1999, 3; Annual Report and Accounts 1998, 3 
225 The trustee resigned on March 31th 2000 (Annual Report and Accounts 1999) 
226 Annual Report and Accounts 1999 
227 NAPA Newsletter 2003, Vol. 7, issue 2, 5 
228 NAPA Newsletter Winter 2003 Volume 7 Issue 2, 5 
229 NAPA Newsletter Summer 2006 Volume 10 Issue 2, 13 
230 NAPA Newsletter December 1997 Volume 1, Issue 2, 11 
231 NAPA Newsletter 1999, 2:3, 3; NAPA Newsletter 2000, 4:3, 2; NAPA Newsletter 2002, 5: 3, 
4 
232 NAPA Newsletter Spring 1999, Volume 2 Issue 3 
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invitation from within the group of active NAPA members.233 This trustee was a 
leader of the longest standing NAPA regional group in North East Region, and 
the organisation believed that “her appointment as a trustee brings the regions 
into the heart of NAPA management and development […].”234 The chairman 
appointed in 2002 was also an ‘organic leader’ coming from the membership of 
NAPA. He was an employee at the Royal National Institute for the Blind.235 The 
current chairman of the board of NAPA has become a trustee in 2001 and later 
chairman in 2012.236 He also had a long-life experience in the care sector and 
was recruited from within the membership of the organisation. In 2002 they invited 
the Regional Coordinator of Disabled Persons Assembly to become a trustee.237 
One of the trustees appointed in 2003 was a “qualified social worker and has an 
MSc in policy analysis and social policy development.”238 She had a long-life 
career in the voluntary sector with skills related to community development, 
training and management.239 Another new trustee recruited the same year was a 
National Leisure Advisor for BUPA Care Services and had experience in local 
government management of sport, leisure, recreation and healthy lifestyle 
provision.240 
In the period after a full time CEO position was hired in 2005,241 the organisation 
continued to appoint skilled trustees from within the membership. In 2005, the 
newly appointed trustee at the time of joining the board was a Centre Consultant 
to the Leveson Centre for the Study of Ageing, Spirituality and Social Policy and 
Secretary of the Christian Council on Ageing Dementia Working Group.242 In 
2006, NAPA recruited an area manager working for Anchor Homes.243 In 2009, 
the chair of Age Concern became NAPA’s trustee.244 
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Since a new chairman was elected in 2012, NAPA developed a strategy for 
allocation of specific tasks to the trustees with the aim to “make use of their talents 
and enhance the Officers’ work.”245 According to the leadership, trustees 
complement the work of employed staff and represent the organisation:  
 “Every charity has to have a board of Trustees or similar overseeing body. We 
are very lucky to have Trustees that support the staff team really well and 
represent NAPA in many ways.” (NAPA Living Life 2012 Issue 3, 4). 
In 2013, we see the first sign of a better planned approach towards the utilisation 
of skills of members of the board. Additionally, since 2013 NAPA recruited a 
group of specialist advisors with the aim to complement the skills that members 
of the board were missing. According to interview data, the people recruited in 
the advisory group were “key influencers in the sector”.246 One of the interviewees 
highlighted the need for expertise:  
“We don’t know everything. We need people who are experts. When you’re a 
trustee you’re supposed to be an expert in everything because it can be legal, 
financial, democratic, philosophical. All sorts of questions come-up and decisions 
have to be made.” (NAPA 06.06.2017)   
Even though this advisory body was not formed immediately after accessing 
charitable status, an interviewee suggests that it was established to be able to 
meet, among other things, increasing requirements related to charitable status. 
NAPA has recruited a legal advisor on the advisory board who supports legal 
matters related to governance (NAPA 06.06.2017). In 2015 NAPA recruited 
highly skilled and experienced trustees who they hoped will help them develop 
their work.247 They planned to identify a skill set for trustees and continue to 
develop the board of trustees through recruitment in the following years.248 When 
asked about any change in the way the organisation recruited members of the 
board, a member of the leadership said:  
“The only change is that we have recently developed a policy and skills matrix 
which make recruitment a bit easier, but the method of recruitment has been the 
same. It is getting harder to find Trustees, and it appears there are more and 
more charities seeking Board Members, so the pool of available recruits is 
smaller.” (NAPA E-mail correspondence 13.09.2018) 
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In 2016 NAPA’s board was expanded by three “very experienced and skilled 
people” working in the care sector.249 The three new trustees had a diverse 
background in the care sector, including an activity organiser, a regional controller 
for Care Accounts at Unilever (financial skills) and a director of design studio 
which collaborates with third sector organisations.250 In addition, NAPA 
developed specific role descriptions for the Special advisors251 and recruited 
special advisors for dementia care, catering, legal and regulatory issues, 
marketing and events, and IT.252 When asked about the way members of the 
board were recruited, an interviewee specified that new members are recruited 
through networking and that both trustees and staff are actively involved in this 
process.253 They are looking for skills which they are missing in the board and 
members of the board commonly are expected to have experience with care 
homes, activity provision, housing, accounting, fundraising and strategy.254 Out 
of the five last trustees that were recruited, three were recruited from outside of 
the organisation, suggesting that NAPA has partially underwent board 
professionalisation. The trustees are appointed by invitation and from a network 
of contacts from the care sector:  
“We aim to have a cross-section of skills and geographic representation. Potential 
Trustees are invited to attend and observe a Meeting prior to being formally 
appointed. All new Trustees are sent an information pack based on materials 
generated by the Charity Commission.” (Financial Statements for The Year 
Ended 31 March 2016, 3). 
According to an interviewee, NAPA limits the recruitment of trustees to people in 
the care sector who, even though recruited externally, are representative of the 
boarder sector: 
“The people who are on the board who are members out in the world of care; 
they are a representative member, they don’t represent all members because 
that would involve a huge complex system of gathering information and seeking 
opinion from 3000 people, which would just be too cumbersome, too difficult. So, 
we take note, we have members on the board, […], we are looking for more 
trustees at the moment and we’re trying to make sure that they are members.” 
(NAPA 06.06.2017). 
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254 NAPA E-mail correspondence 13.09.2018 
 186 
 
In summary, NAPA is recruiting members of the board externally with targeted 
skills for organisational maintenance in addition to recruiting members with 
specific skills within the organisation. The advisory board brings complementary 
skills for organisational maintenance in addition to the skills represented in the 
board of trustees. In terms of alternative explanations, NAPA was not dependent 
on state funding during the period when signs of board professionalisation 
appeared, so increased interest in bringing external competencies in the 
organisation did not come as a result of maintaining state contracts or grants. In 
fact, the organisation generated its own income and experienced weakening of 
financial capacities in this period. Board professionalisation can be potentially 
related to the need to enhance the pool of competencies NAPA could use on a 
voluntary basis, in light of decreased financial capacity and paid support. 
Interview data suggests that the perceived complexity of maintaining a charitable 
organisation and particularly the responsibilities of trustees, invited for a more 
careful planning and focused recruitment of competencies beyond the 
organisational membership.  
Songbird Survival  
 
Songbird Survival, a charitable company working in the field of environment, was 
formed in 1996 and in the first three years of its existence was led by a group of 
15-20 people who were all involved on a voluntary basis (SBS 26.03.2017). Since 
2000 when the organisation registered with the Companies House, a total of 35 
officers served as directors of the organisation255. After incorporation and gaining 
charitable status in 2001256 and until 2005, SBS continued to operate without 
employed staff, and the trustees managed the financial and administrative 
matters, publicity and events, and membership responsibilities on a voluntary 
basis.257 In the formative stage, the executive board largely developed from the 
founding members who set the organisation and some of them were part of the 
board until 2004.258 The initial members of the board looked for like-minded 
people who would carry forward the aims of the organisation (SBS 06.07.2018). 
                                                          
255 See: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04078747/officers 
256 Before accessing charitable status, the organisation operated under the name Songbird 
Survival Action Group (SBS Update Winter 2003/2004, 1).  
257 Annual Report 2004, Companies House 
258 SBS Update Winter 2003/2004, 1 
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In the period 2001-2003, one of the trustees recruited influential trustees 
externally, some of whom are still members of the board (SBS 26.03.2017). The 
newly recruited trustees had links and influence that could bring finances to the 
organisation (i.e. fundraised for scientific research) and support its survival (SBS 
26.03.2017). One of the trustees was a registered accountant and maintained the 
reporting to the Companies House and Charity Commission (SBS 26.03.2017), 
however this was not extremely demanding because of the small budget.259 The 
office work was done by another trustee on a voluntary basis to get the charity 
started.260  
Some of the trustees engaged in the organisation had considerable experience 
in the non-profit conservations sector. One of the long-standing trustees was 
active in the non-profit conservation sector in the UK and actively involved in the 
Countryside Movement, the Game and Wildlife Conservation Trust, the Council 
of the National Trust, Natural England and the Countryside Business Trust.261 
Also, another of their long-term trustees who acted as a treasurer was involved 
in the work of other charities.262 In the past, the directors met four to six time a 
year to decide on the organisational direction.263 In their annual accounts, SBS 
points out that the organisation benefits from the voluntary work of its directors 
and they estimate a sum which is saved by not paying the professional expertise 
of their trustees each year.264  
In the years following access to charitable status, as well as in recent years, the 
members of the board were dominantly recruited outside of the organisation. 
According to the interview data, the organisation is looking to recruit trustees who 
have management skills and have interest in the countryside and songbirds (SBS 
06.07.2018). In addition, trustees are expected to have financial skills and 
knowledge of the policy making process. Some of the skills that are commonly 
represented in the board are: “Ornithology, Environment, Countryside, 
                                                          
259 In the year after accessing charitable status the organisation had a small budget - £13 983 
total income and £2427 total spending in 2001- and £18 681 total income and £5770 total 
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Government/Politics, Networking, PR, Charity/Governance/Legal, Finance, 
Fundraising” skills.265 Trustees have the responsibility to maintain the charitable 
status:  
“So, the responsibility lies with the board of trustees and they will [go] through a 
series of regular by-monthly meetings [to] ensure we are meeting all our 
obligations under the Charities Act and other things, ensure that we are following 
our strategic direction, and ensure that we are getting the best value for money 
from the funds we raise from our members and from charitable trusts and other 
sources.” (SBS 06.07.2018). 
Another interviewee explains that the process of recruiting trustees is happening 
on a continuous basis “as it can take a long time to find people with the right skills 
and understanding of our charity”.266 In addition, the interviewee said that the 
trustees prefer to recruit new trustees through their own contacts outside the 
organisation, and in the past 12 years very few long-standing members were 
interested to join the board of trustees when invited.267 The existing profiles of 
trustees indicate that most of them had some experience in leading positions in 
other non-profit organisations. For example, the nominated treasurer trustee is 
an experienced trustee who has overseen the financial work of other charities in 
the past (SBS 06.07.2018).  
In summary, SBS is a charitable company, and we expect that it will undergo 
board professionalisation over time. The findings indicate that the element of 
external recruitment is present –as well– as the targeted recruitment of trustees 
with particular skills is present,268 which means the theoretical expectation is 
confirmed. The organisation did not have access to state funding throughout its 
lifetime, and board members were sought outside of the membership when 
accessing charitable status and later. Trustees were engaged in maintaining 
indirect benefits in the past, and yet new trustees with understanding of charity 
and legal matters are sought after, despite the fact that the organisation is being 
led by a professional manager since 2012 and has five members of staff.269  
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268 SBS 06.07.2018; SBS E-mail correspondence 20.06.2018 
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Surfers Against Sewage  
 
SAS is a charitable company that operated as a company limited by guarantee 
for most of its life. From its foundation until it accessed legal status in 1994, SAS 
had a voluntary Committee of about eleven people. SAS operated as a national 
pressure group and concluded early on that it could not access charitable status 
due to their lobbying activities.270 The Charity Commission informed them that 
charities “are not allowed to try to change the stance of government”.271 SAS 
helped to set a charity which was registered in 1993 and for a while operated as 
the educational arm of the organisation, however, this was a marginal activity.272 
In terms of paid staff, few months after the Committee was formed in May 1990, 
the organisation hired the first member of staff. This was possible because the 
organisation’s budget grew in the first months through membership contributions, 
private sponsorships and selling of merchandise. The membership rapidly grew 
to 1000 in 1990.273 The employee had the responsibility to propose the budget 
and the program, which were then approved by the executive organ, the 
committee (SAS 26.05.2017).  
In the early days, members of the board were recruited from the local community 
i.e. local members, while later on the board opened for members from other 
regions who were interested to serve in the board and had certain skills.274 
Occasionally the organisation drew board members outside of the organisation, 
for example they had the membership director of Friends of the Earth on the 
board. However, they expected that these people would be members or joined 
the organisation as members.275 This means that early on SAS recruited skilled 
members on the executive board. Members attending the AGM in 1990s could 
                                                          
270 Pipeline news 1990, Number 2, 7 
271 Pipeline news 1990, Number 2, 6  
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also be up for an election as members of the board.276 Additionally, through the 
newsletter they were seeking skilled volunteers such as doctors, solicitors, 
microbiologists to play a positive role in the organisation.277 Nevertheless, 
according to an interviewee, these volunteers had an advisory role and did not 
serve as board members.278 The total number of board directors since the 
incorporation in 1994 is 48 officers.279  
The members of the board in the period after accessing legal personality were to 
a large extent the founding members, and according to one interviewee they 
understood the business and offered advice regarding management matters 
(SAS 26.05.2017). During the 1990s, one of the trustees and chairman was a 
surfer who organised ‘Surf to Save’ contest and fundraised for SAS.280 Another 
trustee was also a surfer with keen interest in the marine environment and 
recruited within the membership.281 In that sense they were ‘organic leaders’ 
emerging from the constituency.  
SAS accessed charitable status in 2012 becoming a marine conservation charity. 
According to the new chief executive, gaining charitable status was a “huge 
catalyst for the growth of the organisation”.282 Among other things, charitable 
status helped the organisation to fundraise more effectively, get bigger projects, 
improve transparency, and recruit voluntary trustees that help the managing of 
the charity.283 The professional management of SAS believed that nothing will 
effectively change in the operation of the organisation since, in their opinion, SAS 
had been operating as a charity even before assuming this status.284 The trustees 
by law became responsible for the charity’s management and the annual 
(financial) reporting in line with charity and company law.285 Trustees were 
externally recruited, which is one of the elements of board professionalisation. 
New trustees were recruited by the existing trustees who approached people that 
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might be interested to stand for an election.286 Despite having nine employees 
when accessing charitable status in 2012, SAS still benefited from the help of 
trustees and volunteers:  
“(…), we had some pro-bono support from a solicitor’s firm and two of our trustees 
at the time [of gaining charitable status] had legal experience.” (SASa 
16.06.2017).  
 
Moreover, the organisation recruited voluntary trustees that had legal skills which 
helped to shape the organisation,287 meaning people with competencies relevant 
for organisational maintenance – the other element of board professionalisation. 
The organisation reported receiving services from trustees and their connected 
business organisations, including legal services.288 
The organisation had access to state funding since 2012, however, that was not 
a dominant source of funding. Moreover, the organisation experienced increased 
financial capacities from £514,046 in 2012 to £1,009,846 in 2016.289 This resulted 
in increase of paid staff. Increased financial capacity also meant increased 
reporting requirements for maintaining indirect benefits. SAS, being a charitable 
company since 2012, and exposed to high indirect benefits as expected, 
underwent board professionalisation i.e. recruited trustees with skills relevant for 
organisational maintenance externally, specifically after accessing charitable 
status. The findings show that, as expected, the three organisations in the UK 
which have ‘all indirect benefits’ i.e. operate as charitable companies (NAPA, 
SBS and SAS), showed signs of board professionalisation after being exposed 
to high regulatory constraints. 
7.3. Organisations Exposed to High Regulatory Constraints in the 
Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands, the expectation is that organisations maintaining ANBIs 
status are more likely to undergo board professionalisation since they need to 
comply with increased reporting requirements since 2014. These last 
                                                          
286 Accounts and Reports 2013, Companies House, 2 
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288 Annual Accounts 2014, 31 
289 Register of charities: 
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requirements are related to higher public transparency e.g. publishing documents 
on the website. Two organisations with all indirect benefits – Vitiligo Netherlands 
(Vitiligo.nl) and Young Friends of the Earth Netherlands (JMA) were analysed.  
Vitiligo.nl, is a formal association with ANBI status, working in the health sector. 
Vitiligo.nl does not have to report to the Chamber of Commerce because they are 
too small for that (according to law, reporting applies to big associations with 
sizable enterprises) (Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017). From its foundation until today the 
organisation has relied only on volunteers and did not employ any staff.290 They 
did not employ staff even though since the early days Vitiligo.nl continuously 
benefited from state subsidy (institutional support) for patient organisations 
(Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017).291  
In the beginning (1990s) there were around nine people in the board and there 
was a division of tasks: some were preparing the newsletter and some organised 
regional events for members/ meetings with dermatologists (Vitiligo.nl 
14.10.2017). Up until 2000, there were many different people who were running 
the organisation and were responsible for maintaining reporting requirements 
(Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017). In the past it was difficult to recruit any volunteers among 
members, so people were not intentionally recruited for the skills they possessed 
in the board – but whoever wanted to join and had a little experience in 
administrative work or PR could join (Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017). The organisation has 
a treasurer who has been responsible for the financial operation of the 
organisation (i.e. accessing state subsidy) for around 16 years and he is a highly 
skilled volunteer (financial auditor) with experience in the private sector who was 
recruited from the membership. All invoices are overseen by treasurer and 
members-administrator (Newsletter May 2010). In accordance with law, when the 
subsidy does not require external accountants, an auditing committee composed 
of ordinary members takes on the responsibility of supervising the treasurer’s 
work (Newsletter May 2010).  
The organisation underwent board professionalisation in 2011, defined here as 
the external recruitment of skilled board members for unpaid positions who 
                                                          
290 Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017; Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017 
291 Later the subsidy was allocated by Fonds PGO which manages the subsidy scheme on 
behalf of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. 
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possess competencies relevant for organisational maintenance. This followed 
change in voluntary leadership in 2009 when a new chair was invited to the board. 
The new chair wanted to “make the association a real organisation with business 
aims” and “a real strategy” (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). In that period, the mission of 
the organisation changed from being focused on exchanging patients’ 
experiences about the disease towards making vitiligo visible for the medical 
world and the wider public in the Netherlands (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). To achieve 
the new mission the chairman allocated 75% of the state subsidy to a qualified 
communication consultancy to devise a communications strategy for the 
organisation (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). On the basis of the new strategy, the 
chairman found that 50% of the members of the board cannot contribute to the 
realisation of the communication strategy – thus, new job profiles were designed 
for members of the board (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). As a consequence, the 
organisation went from 9 to 4 members of the board – which was a significant 
change underpinned by a change in the governing document in 2011 allowing 
unlimited term for members of the board.292  
Before the leadership change in 2009 the board was composed mainly of 
volunteers who were patients and did not have specialised skills for maintaining 
the organisation, except the treasurer (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). The new chairman 
had extensive experience with health consultancy in the Netherlands in the past 
and wanted to install professional governance in the association to be able to 
achieve the new organisational mission/strategy (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). There 
was an expressed intention to make the administering of the organisation as of 
that of a think tank and to bring [skilled] volunteers to occupy leading positions 
(Newsletter 2011). According to one of the interviewees, all the members of the 
board were intentionally recruited because of being professionals in their area of 
work (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017).  
Vitiligo.nl had tax beneficial status in the early years, however it lost it due to non-
compliance with reporting (Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017). Later, it accessed ANBI status 
in 2014, the year when regulatory constraints were increased. This means that 
board professionalisation occurred before accessing ANBI status. The main 
sources of funding for the organisation are membership fees, sponsorships and 
                                                          
292 E-mail correspondence on 10.24.2017 and 10.26.2017 
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state subsidy by the Ministry of Health. Vitiligo.nl, as expected underwent board 
professionalisation, however, at the time when that happened the organisation 
was exposed to lower regulatory requirements related to the receipt of indirect 
benefits, meaning there is absence of the cause of interest. The board 
professionalisation was initiated by the leadership (chairman occupying unpaid 
position), who had a strong managerial and business background (i.e. health 
consultancy). This case shows that, in contrast to SAS and NAPA, organisations 
can also undergo board professionalisation when they are entirely led by 
volunteers i.e. do not have paid professional management to initiate this. The 
new leadership initiated a change in mission, and consequently adjusted the 
composition of the board to be able to meet the new mission. Hence, board 
professionalisation in this case is not related to exposure to regulatory constraints 
related to indirect benefits.  
JMA, a formal association with ANBI status working in the field of environment, 
was registered at the Chamber of Commerce in 1991 (JMA 23.10.2017) and 
accessed ANBI status in 2012. The organisation had staff in the mid-90s when it 
started to receive subsides from the government to promote environmental 
education among youth.293 However, in 1997-1998 JMA had to cut the employed 
staff because the decline of state funding was sharp and sudden (JMA 
13.11.2017). In 1999 they started to receive financial support by Friends of the 
Earth Netherlands and soon they became their youth organisation.294 Since then, 
even though operating as a separate legal entity, JMA is under the patronage of 
Friends of the Earth Netherlands and benefits from their funding and 
administrative support.295 There were four employees that worked on projects in 
JMA until 2016 and as of 2017 there were no employees (JMA 23.10.2017). 
As suggested by the legal analysis, reporting to the Chamber of Commerce in 
practice is minimal and they have more obligations towards their members by 
law, suggesting a greater focus on internal accountability (JMA 23.10.2017). The 
only contact they have with the Chamber of Commerce is once a year when they 
have to provide an update on organisational information i.e. change of members 
                                                          
293 JMA Newsletter 1996; Newsletter 1997 No.1 February, 7 
294 JMA Newsletter 2003 No.1; JMA 13.11.2017 
295 Huishoudelijke Reglement; JMA 13.11.2017; JMA 23.10.2017 
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of the board (JMA 13.11.2017). This is further confirmed by interview data - 
reporting requirements are not directed towards the state bodies but towards the 
members on annual level, they report how they spend the money and they have 
to submit an account to the members about their financial budget and the plans 
(JMA 13.11.2017). Similarly, based on interview data, JMA does not have to 
report information to the tax authorities to be able to maintain its ANBI status.296 
Instead, they need to publish their policy plan, policy report and financial report 
on the website, and they share their statutes with the public (JMA 13.11.2017). 
The board is responsible for maintaining this status: 
“If you receive it, it is quite easy to maintain it, because as an association you 
need to get a financial report anyway, because you need policy report and a plan 
anyway, so it is just updating the files on the website.” (JMA 13.11.2017). 
The responsibility for financial reporting is held by the treasurer who is preferably 
someone with knowledge of administration and accounting, but they had 
treasurers that did not have experience and learned how to do the financial 
account (JMA 13.11.2017). The members of the board are recruited both 
internally and externally,297 and this has been a practice from the beginning:  
“We usually try to ask people whom we know to apply for the board. At the same 
time, we post the vacancy externally since we would like to be transparent about 
these positions and also not miss the opportunity for talented people. This has 
been happening since its existence.” (Email correspondence 07.08.2018). 
This means that the organisation recruits members of the board outside and 
within the membership, however, they are not necessarily recruiting skilled 
volunteers who would be able to maintain legal personality and ANBI status, since 
in practice, indirect benefits are straightforward to maintain.  
In 2016 JMA started the process of integrating within the structure of Friends of 
the Earth Netherlands. In 2017 Friends of the Earth employed youth coordinators 
who were previously involved in JMA with the task to align the activities of JMA 
with the campaigns of Friends of the Earth (JMA 23.10.2017). The youth 
coordinators can influence JMA governance, even though they do not occupy 
formal positions in the governance, by providing advice to the board (JMA 
08.11.2017). For example, the youth organisers were involved in choosing the 
                                                          
296 JMA 13.11.2017; JMA 23.10.2017 
297 Interestingly, the 2010 statutes indicate that members of the board have to be members of 
the organisation (Article 12).  
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new board in 2017 (JMA 23.10.2017). They selected 10 out of 20 candidates for 
an interview for board roles. They looked for candidates which are affiliated with 
JMA to assure continuity and who had some experience in organising activities, 
communicating, team work (soft skills) and engagement in environmental issues 
(JMA 23.10.2017). 
JMA is an organisation operating under high regulatory constraints related to the 
receipt of indirect benefits. While there are signs of external recruitment of 
members of the board with particular skills, this practice was established before 
the organisation accessed ANBI status. JMA relied on a bigger organisation for 
finance and administrative support since 1999, which have led to the introduction 
of more formalised recruitment of members of the board with targeted set of skills. 
Importantly, the data indicates that in practice maintaining legal personality and 
ANBI status is straightforward and this is especially true for organisations with 
smaller budgets like JMA. It seems, from this, that board professionalisation is 
not related to maintaining indirect benefits in the case of JMA, similar to Vitiligo.nl.  
In the Netherlands, we find evidence that organisations operating with all indirect 
benefits have professionalised their boards, however, there is no evidence that 
this happened in relation to increased exposure to high constraints. The findings 
show that Vitiligo.nl underwent board professionalisation before accessing ANBI 
status, on the initiative of a chairman with business and managerial background. 
In the case of the Young Friends of the Earth Netherlands (JMA), the organisation 
showed signs of board professionalisation before they accessed ANBI status in 
2012.  
7.4. Organisations Exposed to Low Regulatory Constraints in the UK 
 
In the following section the data on the three UK cases which are exposed to low 
regulatory constraints (PIF, HOS and the NHS Alliance) will be presented. The 
expectation is that these organisations will not show signs of board 
professionalisation.  
PIF, an organisation exposed to low regulatory constraints, upon the initiative of 
staff and following the advice of external management experts underwent board 
professionalisation, even though the expectation was that organisations that have 
only legal personality are less likely to undergo board professionalisation. PIF, a 
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health non-profit, was founded in 1997, and accessed legal personality in 2008 
by incorporating as a company limited by guarantee.298 Since incorporation in 
2008 the organisation has had 13 board directors (unpaid positions) in total.299 
The organisation was founded by a small group of patient information managers 
and health professionals led by the need to share information and facilitate 
learning in light of changing health policy and increasing importance of health 
information.300 The organisation has been led by the founder for a long time and 
the formal governing structure was established a decade since formation. This 
means that the formation of executive board followed also in the late 2000s: 
“And my understanding is that this organisation was set up by one person 
because this one person had passion for having better information […] So for a 
number of years the governance structures were not in place in the same way 
that they are now is my understanding. Actually, they’ve had to work very hard to 
get into more transparent processes just because of the way the organisation 
had grown up in the beginning […] And so over the last number of years they’ve 
been working very hard for example to get a board up and running and be clear 
about the responsibilities of that board etc.” (PIF 21.05.2018).  
In the early days, the organisation had a Steering Group, equivalent to an 
executive body whose members were recruited from within the membership.301 
Around 2005-2006, PIF had hired first paid staff to deal with members’ 
administration and services.302 In 2009, after incorporation PIF employed three 
members of staff (executive manager, office manager and administration officer), 
two of whom were part time employees (PIF 31.05.2017). The staff was carrying 
out the administrative tasks and reporting to the Companies House with the 
additional support from an external professional accountant. During that period 
the strategic direction of the organisation was given by the chairman of PIF (PIF 
31.05.2017). In the same period a Strategy Group was formed responsible for the 
organisational development and an Advisory group composed of members.303 In 
2013 a Task and Finish Group conducted a review of the governance structure 
and recommended a board of executive directors to be elected, which would be 
responsible for “proper governance” and play a “fundamental role in the effective 
                                                          
298 PIF did not accesses charitable status because that would require setting up a new entity 
from scratch and a lot of paperwork to be prepared (PIF 02.05.2017). 
299 https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06562222/officers accessed on 25.07.2018 
300 Our History accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018 
301 Our History accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018 
302 Our History accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018 
303 Our History accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 07.08.2018 
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running and growth of the organisation.”304 The Task and Finish Group was “a 
small group of outside senior people from various organisations” who had senior 
positions including chief executives of organisations, and people with finance and 
business background (PIF 04.06.2018). Based on their recommendations PIF 
started advertising “quite widely for people to come and join the organisation in 
order to move in a strategic direction and to give much firmer footing.” (PIF 
04.06.2018). The organisation professionalised the board through targeted 
external recruitment of board members with skills relevant for organisational 
maintenance. An interviewee describes the kind of skills they recruited on the 
board: 
“And within that they asked someone who had a finance expertise, they asked 
somebody who had a background in a fairly senior position within the voluntary 
sector who would be able to help us in strengthening our governance […]. And 
then they did a board recruitment procedure, they had a full day of interviews with 
some of the people that had been involved in that review they set on the panel 
and after that they recruited about 4 or 5 new members as a governing board to 
become directors and they went from there really, and as far as I am aware that 
structure is still in place.” (PIF 04.06.2018).  
In the following years, while some board members came from the membership, 
PIF continued to recruit members of the board externally (PIF 04.06.2018). The 
members of the board are recruited via online platforms and direct contacts (PIF 
21.05.2018). In the past few years the selection and appointment of directors оn 
the board is a formal process which entails application phase followed by an 
interview.305 They wanted to recruit people from outside of the organisation to 
help them see the bigger picture of how their cause fits the health sector:  
“So […] we asked for somebody in the NHS for example to join the governance 
body and that we would have that perspective, and that was someone who did 
not have anything to do with the organisation before, so we sort of got to the point 
where just having people from the membership was too internally focused and 
too much focused on just health information so we wanted to expand that a little 
bit and that is what we did than […].” (PIF 04.06.2018).  
Another interviewee recalls that in the period between 2012 and 2014 PIF mainly 
looked for directors who had knowledge about the patient information landscape 
and not necessarily people from other sectors (PIF 25.05.2018). However, more 
                                                          
304 History section accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/on 02.05.2017; 
‘Board level opportunities at PiF’ https://www.pifonline.org.uk/leading-the-way-in-consumer-
health-information-board-level-opportunities-at-pif/ accessed on 19.06.2018 
305 PIF 02.05.2017; PIF 21.05.2018 
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recently, PIF identifies the kinds of skills required and recruits people who can 
bring those skills in the organisation (PIF 21.05.2018). For example, one of the 
directors recruited more recently has an experience working on a senior level in 
a statutory organisation and could bring knowledge on how to enhance 
transparency and establish sound internal procedures, while another director 
comes from an accounting background (PIF 21.05.2018).  
According to the expectations, PIF is less likely to undergo board 
professionalisation. The findings show that after a suggestion by the full-time 
staff, the organisation reviewed the governing structure by following external 
group of senior managers coming from different sectors. Following the advice of 
this task force, PIF started implementing external recruitment of board members 
targeting professionals with skills relevant for organisational maintenance, 
manifesting signs of board professionalisation after 2013. In 2013, PIF received 
a three-year grant from the Department of Health’s Innovation, Excellence and 
Strategic Development (IESD) fund. Board professionalisation was initiated at the 
time when state funding was received, however the finances and constraints 
related to its maintenance were dealt with by the staff. Even though the 
organisation was not exposed to high regulatory constraints related to indirect 
benefits, it operated in an environment where high external accountability is 
expected. Therefore, one plausible explanation is that under normative 
pressures, i.e. professional staff and external professional managers’ ideas of 
how the board should look like in light of the complex regulatory environment for 
non-profits in the UK, the organisation adapted through changing the 
characteristics of the board. There is no evidence that the organisation has been 
part of a self-regulatory initiative which might have inspired board 
professionalisation.  
In line with the expectations, organisations that do not have any indirect benefits 
from the state i.e. are not required to report to any external body (HOS and the 
NHS Alliance) did not show signs of board professionalisation via external 
recruitment of skilled volunteers in the UK. HOS, an unincorporated association, 
since its foundation has been governed by a Committee (equivalent to an 
executive board) composed from members engaged on a voluntary basis. HOS 
has never had employed staff. The organisation has grown through the dedicated 
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work of volunteers - amateurs (HOS 06.10.2017). There are several defined roles 
in the Committee: treasurer, general secretary, conservation and publicity officer 
and chairman. In 2008, when the organisation had 667 members, HOS debated 
at an AGM whether they should pursue charitable status but decided that that will 
not benefit the organisation. HOS did not access charitable status because of the 
perceived regulatory constraints on internal governance that this might have 
posed:  
“Well if you are a charity, a formal legal charity, you have to be governed and you 
are subject to the whims of the Charity Commission. So basically, […] the 
complexity of your governance increases. So, although there are advantages of 
being a charity, […] there are governance issues, you are subject to having a 
formal governing body that has to report back to the Charity Commission.” (HOS 
06.10.2017).  
They believed that the emphasis on external accountability brought by the charity 
status will distort their governing structure.  
The members of the committee have been recruited internally at the AGM. For 
example, in 2001 the members were urged to join the Committee on a voluntary 
basis: 
“This society can only survive and thrive if more members take on some 
responsibility for the running of it. If the 'usual suspects' are left to do all the 
donkey work, and no new blood comes onto the committee, the society will 
stagnate and eventually fade away. So, come on.” (HOS Newsletter 21, July 
2001). 
Similarly, at the 2002 AGM the Chairman urged the members to consider 
volunteering for the committee.306 In 2008, during the AGM the members were 
asked to volunteer for the post of the secretary:  
“I would love to have a volunteer from the floor, or a small slip of paper or do 
come and talk to me or other committee members afterwards to discuss what is 
needed.” (Draft Minutes of the 15th Annual General Meeting, Sunday 20th April 
2008).  
This shows that the recruitment process of members of the committee was 
entirely inward-looking. HOS currently has a treasurer who happens to be a 
professional accountant in her business, however they do not intentionally recruit 
people with specific skills (HOS 06.10.2017). This means that the organisation 
has recruited board members internally and without targeting skills for 
                                                          
306 HOS Newsletter, No. 24 April 2002 
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organisational maintenance, as expected for organisations with no or little 
exposure to regulatory constraints. The mission of HOS requires limited financial 
and human resources and does not entail public engagement (this is very limited 
to a few conservation initiatives over the years), which might account for the lack 
of interest to recruit members with particular professional skills from within the 
organisation, and possibly beyond.  
Unlike HOS, NHS Alliance is an organisation with great public presence and 
strong political agenda, and yet does not recruit professionals externally. Dating 
back to 1993, in 1998 it was formed by a group of general practitioners that were 
concerned about primary care,307 and over the years employed staff and used 
diverse funding sources, including state funding. In fact, because of their 
favourable financial situation, they had an employed member of staff from the 
very beginning. The size of staff reached around 10 members in 2000.308 The 
income from members was around a third of the total income over the existence 
of the organisation, the other sources of funding came from private sponsorships 
and state agencies such as the NHS and the Department of Health (NHS Alliance 
23.06.2017). This means that the organisation was exposed early on to reporting 
requirements related to state funding. In 1998, the NHS Alliance established a 
subsidiary company limited by shares to be able to engage in trading activities 
(e.g. conferences) and receive private and public funding:  
“One of the things we did do by the way, in order to satisfy some other 
requirements that we had about liabilities and VAT registration, was to establish 
a Private Limited Company as a wholly owned subsidiary, if you like, of the NHS 
Alliance which became it’s trading arm. And that was an incorporated body with 
formal directors etc. (NHS Alliance 23.06.2017). 
 
The change in leadership coupled with change in financial circumstances 
(decreased funding from private companies) in 2012 led to the redefinition of 
organisational mission (NHS Alliance 02.06.2017). Since then the organisation 
operates virtually without office-based staff.309 Instead, the organisation has 
contractual relationships for services with external professionals – finance officer, 
                                                          
307 Michael Dixon Speech ‘Thank you and goodbye’ posted on 10.12.2015 at 
http://www.nhsalliance.org/michael-dixon-thank-you-and-goodbye/ accessed on 20.02.2017 
308 NHS Alliance 24.05.2017; NHS Alliance 23.06.2017 
309 NHS Alliance 02.06.2017, NHS Alliance 24.05.2017 
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accounting firm, administration person and PR and communication agency. This 
means that the changes in professional staff followed changes in the financial 
capacity of the organisation. 
 
The organisation was governed by a National Executive (equivalent to an 
executive board) composed of 12 elected members and 12 co-opted members 
(without voting rights) and the leadership composed of the Chief Executive, 
chairman, vice-chairman and treasurer.310 The leadership carried the strategic 
guidance and day-to-day decisions (NHS Alliance 02.06.2017). All the members 
of the executive were engaged on a voluntary basis except the chairman and the 
chief executive who received honorarium for their part-time work. The officers of 
the executive are professionals in the health sector with managerial skills and 
non-profit experience, however they are all elected or co-opted from within the 
membership of NHS Alliance.311 According to one of the interviewees the national 
executive is an open group where anyone can get involved and take an active 
role: 
“[…] the people who’ve tended to get much more involved have been described 
as the national executive and that’s a pretty open group so if anyone wants to be 
a part of it it’s fairly easy to get involved and to play a more active role. […] We 
have people that are experts in different areas and aspects of the primary 
healthcare field. And we would always go and try to recruit people who seem to 
be of similar mind and have particular expertise that would help support what we 
are trying to do.” (NHS Alliance 24.05.2017). 
 
A long-term member of the NHS Alliance, when asked about the way members 
of the National Executive were recruited, said that potential members of the 
executive were nominated by a proposer and seconder and recruited from within 
the membership of the National Executive.312 This practice has not changed over 
time and “there was always a majority of elected members to reflect a democratic 
organisation.”313 The organisation also recruited associate members which 
reflected clinical, managerial and patient perspectives, and appointed “special 
                                                          
310 Michael Dixon Speech ‘Thank you and goodbye’ posted on 10.12.2015 at 
http://www.nhsalliance.org/michael-dixon-thank-you-and-goodbye/ accessed on 20.02.2017; NA 
02.06.2017 
311 National executives and officers accessed at https://www.nhsalliance.org/team-
category/national-executives-and-officers/ on 11.06.2018 
312 NHS Alliance E-mail correspondence 11.09.2018 
313 NHS Alliance E-mail correspondence 11.09.2018 
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advisers” without voting rights, who often attended the meetings of the executive 
and provided expertise on some clinical area, functional or political matters.314 
 
NHS Alliance, operating under low regulatory constraints, is less likely to undergo 
board professionalisation through external recruitment of skilled volunteers. The 
findings show that the organisation did not look for members of the board beyond 
the membership of the organisation. The organisation was exposed to regulatory 
constraints related to state funding and did not undergo board 
professionalisation, which shows that state funding is not related to board 
professionalisation. This is due to the fact that the leadership wanted an 
organisation representative of members, despite the variety of funding sources 
from private and public sources.  
 
NHS Alliance and HOS, as expected, did not show signs of board 
professionalisation during their lifetime. NHS Alliance was exposed to higher 
regulatory constraints related to the receipt of state funding through contracts and 
grants – it had employed staff and recruited experts in the organisation, without 
granting voting power. The members of the national executive were recruited 
within the organisation. HOS similarly recruited members of the executive within 
the organisation but did not target people with professional skills. The two 
organisations differ in their funding structure, membership type and core 
missions, NHS Alliance being an advocacy group representing professional 
interests, and HOS being a conservation organisation gathering orchid 
enthusiasts. The shared trait of the two organisations is that they were not 
incorporated and did not have charity status. NHS Alliance is similar to NAPA and 
PIF in its core mission, membership type, staff and funding structure, however, it 
did not show signs of external recruitment of professionals for unpaid positions in 
the executive board. In the next section the findings of the four Dutch cases will 
be presented.  
 
 
                                                          
314 NHS Alliance E-mail correspondence 11.09.2018 
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7.5. Organisations Exposed to Low Regulatory Constraints in the 
Netherlands 
 
In this section we will assess the expectations that organisations exposed to low 
regulatory constraints in the Netherlands are less likely to undergo 
professionalisation of the board. Organisations operating as formal associations 
are exposed to minimal reporting requirements and are supervised internally by 
the members who elect the board. To assess the expectations, two organisations 
exposed to low regulatory constraints– Association for Dragonfly studies (NVL) 
and Association of Psychosocial Workers (LVPW), being organisations with legal 
personality only, were analysed. As expected, they did not show signs of board 
professionalisation. 
NVL, an organisation exposed to low regulatory constraints in the field of 
environment has never had employed staff and has always been governed on a 
voluntary basis.315 The organisational goals of NVL did not require employment 
of staff according to one interviewee (NVL 27.09.2017). The board mainly 
organises the annual study day, the annual meetings and the publishing of the 
magazines (NVL 24.10.2017). Moreover, this is possible because NVL is not 
exposed to government regulations [reporting requirements] and does not 
receive state subsidy.316 An alternative explanation was given by one of the 
interviewees, who said that NVL benefits from the collaboration with two 
professionalised organisations which focus on dragonfly protection and that this 
is one of the reasons why NVL did not employ staff (NVL 06.10.2017). The two 
organisations which NVL partners with recruit professional staff in formal projects 
related to dragonflies i.e. to construct an online app for recognizing dragonflies, 
and these organisations benefit from the recruitment of volunteers-observers in 
NVL (NVL 24.10.2017).  
In NVL, the voluntary board is responsible for maintaining the reporting 
requirements for the Chamber of Commerce.317 There was no need to hire any 
professionals to be able to meet the reporting requirements.318 The same was 
                                                          
315 Written answers from NVL board 26.10.2017; NVL 06.10.2017; NVL 27.09.2017 
316 E-mail correspondence October 8, 2017 with NVL board member 
317 Written answers from NVL board 26.10.2017 
318 Written answers from NVL board 26.10.2017 
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confirmed by one of the founders who said that they did not recruit skilled 
volunteers to be able to maintain registration.319 According to one interviewee, 
the board usually consists of 6-7 people who are playing various roles: a 
chairman, a secretary, a treasurer, youth organisations’ representative, someone 
who is responsible for members activities (i.e. excursions, annual meetings etc.), 
PR and communications and someone who is responsible for the magazine (NVL 
27.09.2017). When there is a free vacancy usually members offer to volunteer 
and sometimes they are invited from within the membership (NVL 27.09.2017). 
Sometimes people who are recruited for managing finances are expected to have 
some understanding of finances (NVL 27.09.2017). This means that the 
organisation, in line with expectations, recruited members of the board within the 
organisation.  
LVPW, an organisation exposed to low regulatory constraints in the field of health, 
does not report financial accounts to the Chamber of Commerce, but they report 
to their members (LVPW 10.10.2017). According to an interviewee, in terms of 
“the development of the organisation, the Chamber of Commerce has no 
influence at all” (LVPW 10.10.2017). The first paid person was engaged in the 
organisation in 2004, nine years after registering as an association. The board 
governs the organisation (LVPW 10.10.2017). The board decided that they need 
paid support in the secretary office because the organisation was growing bigger 
and they were communicating with the health insurance companies and the 
Ministry of Health (LVPW 10.10.2017). Only one person was employed in the 
secretariat on a contractual basis – this person provides administrative support 
including finances, bookkeeping, communication with members etc. (LVPW 
10.10.2017).320 The treasurer is responsible for the financial reporting to the 
members, however the secretary office prepares the account and the 
bookkeeping, and the treasurer just signs it (LVPW 10.10.2017). The treasurer is 
someone who has more or less experience with accounting, and this changes 
from year to year – in the moment they have an accountant for treasurer, but if 
they do not find someone with specialised skills they appoint whoever wants to 
volunteer for the position (LVPW 10.10.2017). The treasurer has to be able to 
                                                          
319 NVL E-mail correspondence 11.10.2017 
320 This position does not involve managerial and strategic tasks commonly performed by chief 
executives.  
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control the finances and make sure bills are paid, to be able to report to the 
members (LVPW 10.10.2017), and not external bodies.  
The organisational structure of the LVPW was affected by the requirements of 
the insurance companies – they had to establish various specialised committees 
(validation, registration, education committee etc.) to satisfy the insurance 
companies’ standards (LVPW 10.10.2017). The committees are run by skilled 
volunteers, who are recruited to match the needs of the committees – for example 
they look for someone who understands the accreditation and the educational 
system to serve in the education committee (LVPW 10.10.2017). When it comes 
to members of the board, they are recruited internally, and once elected, their 
qualifications are reviewed for establishing whether they fit the positions of 
chairman, secretary of financial advisor.321 The organisation does not target 
members with particular skills:  
“There are no other qualifications for board members. Generally, it has to do with 
trust that members of our organisation put in the people who have put themselves 
up for the job.” (E-mail correspondence 05.15.2018) 
This means that LVPW, being exposed to low regulatory constraints, as expected 
did not show signs of board professionalisation. In summary, the two 
organisations in the Netherlands, which were exposed to low regulatory 
constraints, did not show signs of board professionalisation through recruitment 
of professionals outside of the organisation to occupy unpaid positions.  
7.6. Comparative Assessment of Regulatory Constraints and Patterns of 
Board Professionalisation  
 
In this chapter I assess whether in the period after the organisations became 
exposed to increased reporting requirements and external supervision322 they 
have shown signs of board professionalisation, defined as the external 
recruitment of professionals and experts with competence (skills, experiences 
and knowledge) relevant for organisational maintenance, including administrative 
and policy skills. Table 14 summarizes the findings across all organisations 
analysed. 
                                                          
321 E-mail correspondence 05.15.2018 
322 This happens when an organisation changes configuration from ‘no indirect benefits’ to ‘all 
indirect benefits’ 
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The results, as summarised in Table 14, show that the expectations hold for 
charitable companies in the UK, being the most constrained configuration, as well 
as for unincorporated associations in the UK and formal associations in the 
Netherlands, being the least constrained configurations. The three cases in the 
middle, JMA, Vitiligo.nl and PIF do not conform with the expectations. Even 
though JMA and Vitiligo.nl show signs of board professionalisation, the evidence 
does not support the claim that this occurred after the organisations accessed tax 
beneficial status i.e. changed configuration and become exposed to higher 
regulatory constraints. In the case of PIF, against the expectations, the 
organisation underwent board professionalisation. The policy field in which 
organisations operate, according to the results, is irrelevant, since both 
environmental and health organisations can show signs of board 
professionalisation in the UK when exposed to high regulatory constraints, and 
do not show signs of board professionalisation in the Netherlands.  
Firstly, I have presented findings from the British organisations exposed to high 
regulatory constraints, followed by the Dutch organisations exposed to high 
regulatory constraints. In line with the theoretical expectations, the findings show 
that the three charitable companies in the UK, being exposed to high regulatory 
constraints and supervision, underwent board professionalisation. In the 
Netherlands, I found evidence that organisations operating with all indirect 
benefits (i.e. formal associations with ANBI status) have professionalised their 
boards, however, there is no evidence that this happened in relation to increased 
exposure to regulatory constraints. Rather, a reform of the board composition and 
targeted recruitment of external professionals was initiated by a chairman while 
the organisation was still exposed to low regulatory requirements. Similarly, in the 
case of JMA, external recruitment of members of the board with particular skills, 
as suggested, happened throughout the organisations’ life, and not in correlation 
with increased regulatory constraints.  
Secondly, I have presented the analysis of British and Dutch organisations 
exposed to low regulatory constraints. The findings show that two out of three 
organisations exposed to low regulatory constraints in the UK, as expected, do 
not show signs of board professionalisation. NHS Alliance and HOS, 
organisations operating as unincorporated associations, recruit the members of 
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the board from within their memberships. The outlier is PIF, a company limited 
by guarantee, which against the expectations, shows signs of board 
professionalisation. At last, organisations in the Netherlands which were exposed 
to low regulatory constraints, as expected, did not undergo board 
professionalisation during their lifetime.  
Table 14: Summary of Empirical Findings on Board Professionalisation 
Name of 
organisation 
Country and 
policy field 
Intensity of 
regulatory 
constraints 
Theoretical 
expectation 
Results: 
 
SongBird 
Survival (SBS) 
UK 
Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exposure to 
high 
regulatory 
constraints 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisations 
are more likely 
to show signs of 
board 
professionalisati
on 
 
 
Confirmed 
National 
Activity 
Providers 
Association 
(NAPA) 
UK 
Health 
 
Confirmed 
Surfers 
Against 
Sewage (SAS) 
UK 
Environment 
 
 
Confirmed 
Jongeren 
Milieu Actief 
(JMA) 
Netherlands 
Environment 
Not 
confirmed 
Vitiligo.nl Netherlands 
Health 
Not 
confirmed 
Patient 
Information 
Forum (PIF) 
UK 
Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exposure to 
low regulatory 
constraints or 
none 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisations 
are less likely to 
shows signs of 
board 
professionalisati
on 
 
 
 
Not 
confirmed 
Dutch 
Association 
for Dragonfly 
Studies (NVL) 
Netherlands 
Environment 
 
 
Confirmed 
The National 
Association of 
Psychosocial 
Workers 
(LVPW) 
Netherlands 
Health 
 
 
Confirmed 
NHS Alliance  UK 
Health 
  Confirmed 
Hardy Orchid 
Society (HOS) 
UK 
Environment 
 
Confirmed 
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This means that organisations on the ‘extreme’ sides of the continuum (see 
Figure 4) – charitable companies in the UK and formal associations in the 
Netherlands, conform to the theoretical expectations. To be able to meet the 
complex regulatory requirements of charity status, including constraints on 
political activities, organisations tend to recruit trustees that have the skills and 
experience to meet these responsibilities. In the three cases the professional 
management facilitated board professionalisation by actively seeking new 
trustees with specific skills. My findings on charitable companies resonates with 
findings from previous studies. For example, Breen (2013, 854) has suggested 
that maintaining charitable status requires professional help and the diversion of 
volunteer labour from implementing the charity’s aims towards administrative 
demands. Morgan (1999) has studied the effect of the accounting regime 
applicable to charities as first implemented with the Charities Act 1993 and the 
Charity Accounting regulation 1995 and observed that the accountability regime 
led to the development of the role of the treasurer and the bookkeeper in small 
charities. He noted a regulatory push towards the semi-professionalisation of 
treasurers in charities (Morgan 1999). According to him: “One very substantial 
effect of the new regime, observed in charities of all sizes in the study, was an 
increased understanding of the role and responsibility of trustees as a whole in 
relation to the accounts.” (1999, 102). This has been reinforced with the 
development of regulation and accounting standards for charities, which means 
that trustees face increased responsibility towards the public (Cornforth 2003). 
Hence, Locke et al. have argued that “trusteeship is concerned with ‘proper 
administration’ rather than representation” (2003, 60). The complex regulatory 
requirements (Locke et al. 2003; Harrow and Palmer 2003) together with the 
strengthened powers of the Charity Commission place the burden of compliance 
on the board of trustees. The evidence on board professionalisation of executive 
boards of charitable companies also resonates with new research conducted by 
the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (Francis 2017) on the 
composition of executive boards of charities in the UK. The research found that 
the boards of charities in the UK rarely mirror the communities that they serve, 
and that trustees are selected from a narrow section of the society with above 
average education and income (Francis 2017).  
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Figure 4: Organisations Distribution across Configurations 
Note: Lighter grey (on the right) are organisations that are exposed to higher regulatory 
constraints, while darker grey (on the left) are exposed to lower regulatory constraints  
 
In terms of the three cases in the middle, there is one organisation (PIF) which 
does not conform with the expectations for low regulatory constraints in the UK, 
and has underwent board professionalisation, and two Dutch organisations which 
have not underwent board professionalisation related to maintaining indirect 
benefits, even though they were expected to. PIF, similar to NAPA (high 
regulatory constraints with signs of board professionalisation) and the NHS 
Alliance (low regulatory constraints with no signs of board professionalisation), 
operates in the health sector, represents professional interests, and had state 
funding and paid staff throughout its lifetime. Board professionalisation in the 
organisation happened under normative pressures generated by managerial staff 
and external advice given by senior managerial professionals from the health and 
care sector. As suggested in the literature, the professional management may 
shape the functions of the board (Cornforth 2003, 16) and use them to protect 
the organisation from the changing legal and financial environment (Baluch 2012, 
18). This shows that organisations which operate exposed to low regulatory 
constraints, under isomorphic normative pressures can adapt their structure as if 
they are exposed to high regulatory constraints (Di Maggio and Powell 1983). 
The regulatory environment for charities and the increasing emphasis on external 
accountability may have spill-over effects, and prompt organisational 
entrepreneurs to over-fulfil by adaptation to perceived regulatory constraints. This 
will result in organisations exposed to different regulatory pressures adopting 
similar structures. In the case of the NHS Alliance, I did not find such isomorphism 
because the organisation had professional management that was drawn from 
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within the organisation and perceived value in having members as 
representatives on the executive body. 
In the case of the Dutch organisations which have all indirect benefits (JMA and 
Vitiligo.nl), I found that board professionalisation happened before exposure to 
increased regulatory constraints. The findings show that Vitiligo.nl underwent 
board professionalisation before accessing ANBI status, on the initiative of a 
chairman with a business and managerial background. In the case of the Young 
Friends of the Earth Netherlands (JMA), the organisation showed signs of board 
professionalisation before they accessed ANBI status in 2012. Interestingly, what 
was observed as a constraining configuration (formal association with ANBI 
status), in practice manifested itself as low constraints’ configuration. This means 
that the external regulatory pressures in the Netherlands related to indirect 
benefits are minimal. Even though ANBIs are supervised by the Tax Authorities, 
the supervisory powers are minimal in comparison to the Charity Commission of 
England and Wales. The tax authorities do not have the power to oversee and 
interfere with the internal workings of the organisations. Moreover, the additional 
reporting requirements in 2014 were not perceived as an additional burden. 
Organisations with ANBI status do not face constraints on political activities like 
organisations in the UK do. This means that board professionalisation in the two 
cases happened under normative pressures from the organisational leadership 
and not under coercive pressures from legal regulation (Di Maggio and Powell 
1983).  
Organisations on the left end of the continuum (see Figure 4), operating as 
unincorporated associations in the UK and formal associations in the Netherlands 
show no sign of board professionalisation. This means that organisations 
operating in configurations with low regulatory constraints have predominantly 
organisational members as board members, this being a characteristic of a 
membership-centred governing model. On the other hand, charitable companies 
in the UK are more likely to develop one of the characteristics of leadership 
centred governing models; a professionalised board. The findings on charitable 
companies in the UK are important because, in the case of membership 
organisations, this has implications for their representational capacity (Guo and 
Musso 2007). If members of the executive are not recruited organically from 
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within the organisation, then members of the board may not reflect the 
characteristics of the membership they represent and, whilst they might have 
professional skills to maintain the organisation, they might be less interested in 
pursuing the substantive interests of members (Bramble 2000; Guo 2018). In 
other words, it will shift the logic of operation from an expressive value-oriented 
mission to an instrumental logic of operation focused largely on organisational 
performance and survival (Frumkin 2002; Stewart 2014, 9-10). Whilst this might 
not be of central importance for solidary-style groups (Halpin 2010), it has direct 
relevance for groups which represent the direct interests of their members. 
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8. Consultative Participation across Governing Models 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
In the previous three chapters we have explored the potential ways in which non-
profit regulation related to legal forms and maintaining indirect benefits shape 
different aspects of internal governance. Here I use the results presented in 
previous chapters on rule-based participation and board professionalisation of 
organisations to develop expectations related to consultative participation across 
organisations. Organisations’ governing model can be divided in membership 
centred, in which members engage in rule-based participation and are 
represented on the boards and leadership centred model in which members do 
not engage in rule-based participation and have boards dominated by external 
professionals. Consultative participation is defined as the opportunities for 
members’ input on organisational matters and programmatic priorities. Unlike in 
the case of rule-based participation, members’ input through consultative 
representation is not binding for the leadership because it is not rooted in formal 
voting rights enshrined in organisational statutes.  
Four organisations - three in the UK and one in the Netherlands – have leadership 
centred models, meaning they do not have rule-based participation and have 
board professionalisation (NAPA, SAS, PIF, Vitiligo.nl). Four organisations - two 
in the UK and two in the Netherlands – have rule based participation and do not 
show signs of board professionalisation (HOS, NHS Alliance, NVL and LVPW). 
Two organisations, Songbird Survival (SBS) and Young Friends of the Earth 
Netherlands (JMA) have rule-based participation and professionalised boards. 
This means that in comparison to the previous group, members participate at 
AGMs, elect the leadership and vote on programmatic issues, but the board is 
mainly composed from externally recruited experts. Due to the presence of rule-
based participation, I classify them as closer to having membership centred 
models and I develop the same expectations as for the organisations that fully fit 
the membership-centred model.  
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Table 15: Types of Governing Models across Organisations 
 
Note: Songbird Survival and Young Friends of the Earth Netherlands do not fully fit the 
characteristics of the membership centred model.  
 
Organisation Legal regime 
and 
configuration  
Rule-based 
participation  
Board 
professionalisation 
Governance 
model 
Songbird 
Survival  
UK  
High 
constraints  
Present  Present  Membership 
centred* 
National 
Activity 
Providers 
Association 
UK  
High 
constraints 
Absent  Present  Leadership 
centred 
Surfers 
Against 
Sewage  
UK 
High 
constraints  
Absent  Present  Leadership 
centred 
Patient 
Information 
Forum  
UK  
Low 
constraints  
Absent  Present Leadership 
centred 
NHS Alliance  UK  
Low 
constraints  
Present  Absent  Membership 
centred 
Hardy Orchid 
Society  
UK  
Low 
constraints  
Present  Absent  Membership 
centred  
Vitiligo 
Netherlands 
Netherlands  
High 
constraints  
Absent  Present  Leadership 
centred 
Young 
Friends of the 
Earth 
Netherlands  
Netherlands  
High 
constraints  
Present  Present Membership 
centred* 
National 
Association 
of 
Psychosocial 
Workers  
Netherlands 
Low 
constraints 
Present  Absent  Membership 
centred 
The Dutch 
Association 
for Dragonfly 
Studies 
Netherlands  
Low 
constraints  
Present  Absent Membership 
centred 
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The Consultative participation expectation is that organisations that are 
leadership-centred, to maintain the connection with their membership and 
prevent fluctuations, will provide many opportunities for consultative participation. 
Organisations with membership-centred model of governance will provide fewer 
opportunities for consultative participation because they already invest in rule-
based participation and have members who serve on the executive board.  
Table 16: Expectations on Consultative Participation across Organisations 
 
8.2. Consultative Participation in Organisations with Leadership-centred 
Model 
 
In this section I will present the findings for the organisations with leadership 
centred models: NAPA, SAS, PIF and Vitiligo.nl, characterized by absence of 
rule-based participation and the presence of professionalised boards. The 
expectation is that these organisations offer many opportunities for consultative 
participation to compensate for the lack of members access to authoritative 
decision making through participation at the AGM and the board room.  
NAPA is an organisation with leadership centred model of governance and 
throughout its existence provided many opportunities for consultative 
participation. This has remained the same since 2014, when rule-based 
Organisation Governing model Expectations for 
consultative 
participations  
National Activity 
Providers Association 
 
 
 
Leadership-centred 
 
 
 
Organisations will offer 
many opportunities for 
consultative participation  
Surfers Against 
Sewage  
Patient Information 
Forum  
Vitiligo Netherlands 
Young Friends of the 
Earth Netherlands 
 
 
Membership-centred 
 
 
 
Organisations will offer only 
few opportunities for 
consultative participation  
Songbird Survival  
 
Hardy Orchid Society  
NHS Alliance  
National Association of 
Psychosocial Workers  
The Dutch Association 
for Dragonfly Studies 
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participation was limited. In the early days NAPA involved members in 
consultations over the strategic priorities of the organisation in various ways. For 
example, in 1999 the members were involved in a discussion over the future 
development of NAPA and their input was taken as a basis for drawing the 
Strategic plan for 1999-2000.323 This continued later, and trustees asked 
members through the newsletter to contribute with their ideas in the making of 
the development strategy for the following three to five years: 
“It would be excellent if individual members or groups of members would share 
with us in this task. Planners speak of a 'SWOT' analysis analysing what are the 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats - facing an organisation. 
During the next three months we shall be preparing the 'Business Plan'. Please 
contribute your ideas to our thinking on your behalf.”324 
During the second half of the 2000s, employed staff and trustees continued to 
invite members’ input through the newsletter.325  
NAPA’s office supported the work of local groups and local groups’ 
representatives were invited at least twice a year to provide input on NAPA’s work 
during the executive board’s meetings.326 NAPA’s staff also met with regional 
groups to map out members’ needs in the regions and tailor the training approach 
of the organisation in accordance with those needs.327 Furthermore, through the 
newsletter, NAPA implemented a membership survey in 2003, to be able to 
assess the profiles of their members and understand their needs and 
expectations.328 In 2010 they conducted an online survey on how to improve the 
members services.329  
In NAPA’s newsletters, members’ suggestions and feedback were regularly 
published in a section called ‘How you see NAPA’.330 In addition to their magazine 
they created an online forum on NAPA’s website to provide chance for people to 
                                                          
323 NAPA Newsletter Spring 1999, Volume 2 Issue 3 
324 NAPA Spring 2001 Volume 4 Issue 3 
325 NAPA Summer 2005 Volume 9 Issue 2, 2; NAPA Spring 2007 Volume 2 Issue 1 
326 NAPA Spring 2001 Volume 4 Issue 3 
327 Summer/Autumn 2003 Volume 7 Issue 1, 5 
328 NAPA Winter 2003 Volume 7 Issue 2; Summer/Autumn 2003 Volume 7 Issue 1, 4; NAPA 
Summer/Autumn 2003 Volume 7 Issue 1, 1 
329 NAPA Autumn 2010 
330 NAPA Summer/Autumn 2002 Volume 6 Issue 2, 3; Spring 2005 Volume 9 Issue 1, 5 
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interact and provide feedback.331 Members regularly provided feedback through 
their membership renewal forms332:  
“Once again, we have received a good response to our questionnaire, thank you 
to members for their comments when renewing membership. Only by this 
exchange can we gauge our service to you.”333 
An interviewee confirms that the NAPA’s approach towards members was direct 
and personalised and the organisation catered to members’ needs (NAPA 
06.06.2017). Since 2014, when rule-based participation was limited, to maintain 
the link with the members, they have surveyed them on an annual basis.334 
Moreover, NAPA organises annual conferences where members have a chance 
to provide feedback on the quality of services and express their needs (NAPA 
30.05.2017).  
PIF also has a leadership centred model of governance, and the expectation is 
that the organisation provides many opportunities for consultative participation. 
In the earlier days PIF established a newsletter to keep members updated and 
invited them to express their views in the newsletter: 
“The Newsletter will now become a quarterly publication to keep you up to date 
with PIF activities and outside news, events and resources of interest. But above 
all we want the Newsletter to be your Newsletter a place where you can share 
your views and concerns about the issues that affect us all as the producers and 
providers of information for patients. So please put pen to paper (or fingers to 
keyboard) and send in your thoughts, questions and news. (PIF Newsletter issue 
3 April 2002, 1).  
PIF also introduced a discussion forum on the website.335 The main way in which 
the organisation received input from the members was through the regional 
coordinators, who are coordinated by the paid staff.336 Regional coordinators had 
access to members in their region and organised individual meetings with 
members, especially in the period 2011-2013 when there were less national 
events and trainings (PIF 31.05.2017). The regional coordinators reported on the 
concerns of the members in the area they represented and discussed the wider 
                                                          
331 NAPA Summer/Autumn 2002 Volume 6 Issue 2, 2 
332 NAPA Summer/Autumn 2003 Volume 7 Issue 1 
333 NAPA, Summer/Autumn 2002 Volume 6 Issue 2, 3 
334 NAPA 30.05.2017; Reports and Accounts, Year ended 31 March 2013, 8; NAPA 30.05.2017 
335 PIF 25.05.2018; PIF 21.05.2018; PIF 04.06.2018 
336 PIF 31.05.2017; Services Manager Role description and person specification July 2014 
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national issues that impacted members.337 The network of the Regional and 
Country Co-ordinators was integrated in the Advisory Group in 2014.338 One of 
the regional representatives who was involved with PIF explains that the 
organisation was receptive for members opinions: 
“As I recall the whole culture of the organisation was quite open to that, although 
it had all these formal structures it had an informal feel to it and I think it was the 
kind of organisation where any members could voice an opinion and that opinion 
would be listened to. […].” (PIF 25.05.2018). 
The advisory group contributes to the strategic direction of the organisation.339 
People from the membership are asked to join the advisory group.340 The 
advisory board does not have a formal governance role, and one of the main 
roles is to support the information flow between the members’ groups and the 
secretariat (PIF 21.05.2018). One of the interviewees suggested that the input 
from the members represented on the advisory group was integrated in the 
organisational and programmatic planning of the organisation:  
“And they were members from across the whole spectrum, because the 
membership is made up of NHS members of voluntary sector, charities, 
community interest companies and then also we had some private sector 
members from pharmaceutical companies and PR firms and various places like 
that and there was a mix of different members, so we tried to reflect that within 
the advisory group role, so they can bring some insights of the different sectors 
in the work of the organisation. That advisory group met twice a year and we 
would talk about the major issues within health information and try and make sure 
that what was going on the ground with the membership was fed up into our 
plans, in the business planning but also the longer strategic direction of the 
organisation.” (PIF 04.06.2018).  
PIF has surveyed members regularly to get feedback on the kind of activities they 
would like to see in the future and other matters that helped the organisations 
tailor programmatic activities e.g. topics to be covered at events, difficulties they 
face in their practice or the kind of skills they want to develop.341 Also, the surveys 
helped PIF to stay informed about the major concerns in the sector (PIF 
                                                          
337 PIF 31.05.2017; PIF 25.05.2018 
338 PIF website: https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ accessed on 17.08.2018; PIF 
25.05.2018 
339 PIF 02.05.2017; PIF website: https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/people-at-pif/ accessed 
on 16.03.2018 
340 PIF 02.05.2017; PIF 21.05.2018 
341 PIF 02.05.2017, PIF 31.05.2017; PIF 04.06.2018 
 
 219 
 
04.06.2018). They administer a biannual online members’ survey (PiF Pulse) and 
other surveys.342  
 “[…] quite a lot of the work is based on feedback from members. So, the 
organisation regularly surveys its members both generally and specifically. So 
generally, in terms of what’s important and specifically around particular projects.” 
(PIF 21.05.2018). 
On the website, they report the survey results from different years on the 
satisfaction with PIF.343 In addition to surveys, members are asked to give regular 
input on policy and programmatic matters during PIF’s events e.g. trainings and 
annual conferences.344 For example, members were asked during the annual 
conference to share their views on three key questions around consumer health 
information through electronic voting.345 While in the past there was an annual 
conference, now there are smaller events for members organised throughout the 
year (PIF 04.06.2018). In 2016, PIF launched their five-year strategy after 
consultation with members, partners and stakeholders.346 We can conclude that, 
as expected, PIF has provided multiple opportunities for consultative participation 
for members and maintained connected to them throughout its existence.  
SAS, an organisation with a leadership-centred model of governance, throughout 
its existence has consulted members on various aspects such as campaigns and 
policy stances via surveys.347 Members also received questionnaires through the 
Pipeline newsletter to be able to represent their views on matters related to 
organisational policy.348 They were also surveyed about their needs and 
satisfaction with the membership.349 SAS wanted to understand the profile of the 
membership better for advertising and sponsorship purposes: 
“Sadly a few people have been a bit upset by the income question – please don’t 
take it personally, as we have no idea which questionnaire belongs to who! We’re 
                                                          
342 Services Manager Role description and person specification July 2014 
343 https://www.pifonline.org.uk/membership/what-do-other-members-think-of-pif/ accessed on 
16.03.2018 
344 PIF 25.05.2017; PIF 02.05.2017 
345 PIF Online. 4.05.2012, accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/voting-results-from-
conference-show-integrating-health-information-into-healthcare-delivery-is-the-biggest-
challenge/ on 16.03.2018 
346 New PIF Strategy posted on 14 June 2016 at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/pifs-new-strategy-
glance/ accessed on 16.03.2018 
347 SAS 15.06.2017; SAS 16.06.2017; Wheaton 2007 
348 Pipeline news issue 58, 2004, 14 
349 Pipeline news issue 70 October 2007, 19 
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not being nosey, all this demographic information is actually terribly important 
when trying to attract sponsors and advertisers. […] The more data we collect, 
the more accurate it is, so if you haven’t already, take your place in SAS history 
and take part in the most in-depth membership survey we’ve ever undertaken!” 
(Pipeline issue 72 May 2008, 20) 
According to Wheaton (2007, 269) who did interviews with SAS` staff in August 
2000, SAS were not interested that much in involving members actively, but more 
in attracting and retaining members as donors. He reports that “they capitalised 
on the ‘cool factor’, using the money earned from consumption to fund their 
campaigns” (Wheaton 2007, 269). However, in the same article, Wheaton (2007) 
talks about the membership survey that SAS conducted in 2000 which asked 
members about their opinion on SAS`s strategy of influence. This suggests that 
members were consulted to some extent. 
Another way in which members are involved is through regional representation. 
Members were recruited as regional representatives in an informal way during 
the 90s (SAS 26.05.2017). Regional representation was formalised in the second 
half of the 2000s, and regional representatives are SAS’s link to the local 
members.350 The representatives are engaged on a voluntary basis and 
participate in local campaigns, recruitment and management of volunteers’ 
activities, educational activities, fundraising and other projects of SAS.351 The 
regional network reached 75 representatives in 2015.352 The members of SAS 
are regularly encouraged through the newsletter to get in touch with their regional 
representative and get involved in the campaigns, fundraising activities and other 
events.353 The regional representatives are then consulted by SAS’s staff via 
questionnaires on the situation in their areas and are asked to give feedback on 
the policy direction of the organisation.354 This suggests that members are mainly 
mobilised as volunteers, and they are not directly consulted on the programmatic 
priorities, except indirectly, through the members who serve as regional 
representatives. Except as volunteers, members in the past were mobilised to 
                                                          
350 Pipeline news, issue 63, February 2006, 11; Pipeline issue 78 winter 2009, 12; Pipeline 
autumn/winter 2011 issue 86, 19 
351 Accounts and Reports 2015, Companies House; SAS 15.06.2017 
352 Accounts and Reports 2015, Companies House 
353 Pipeline news, issue 76 summer 2009; Pipeline news issue 78 winter 2009, 12; Pipeline 
news issue 79 spring 2010 
354 SAS 23.06.2017; SASb 16.06.2017 
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report cases of pollution in their areas as part of SAS’ project campaign Protect 
Our Waves,355 and in that way influenced the campaigns focus.356 SAS acted 
upon their reports and kept members informed about the outcomes of their 
lobbying and campaigning activities.357 
After the organisation limited formal voting rights of members in 2012, members 
are still consulted through surveys. One of the interviewees said that in the past 
10 years, SAS tried to create 360-degree feedback on what, how and whether 
they perform well, which included consultation with members (SASa 16.06.2017). 
For example, their 5-year strategy (2017-2022) was developed “in consultation 
with staff, trustees, regional reps, members, funders and experienced external 
facilitators.”358 The decisions over the final strategy were informed by members 
and supporters’ opinion.359 This means that SAS offers opportunities for 
consultative participation, however, in comparison to NAPA and PIF, there are 
fewer opportunities. Considering that since its foundation until 2012 rule-based 
participation was limited in practice, and since 2012 members did not have formal 
voting rights, we would expect plenty of opportunities to be offered for members 
to provide input on organisational and programmatic priorities. Even though there 
is evidence that they consult members on programmatic priorities, these are 
sparse. In line with the organisational mission, the focus is on political 
mobilization of members to support SAS’s causes and engaging them in the role 
of volunteers.  
Lastly, Vitiligo.nl is the only Dutch organisation in the sample with a leadership 
centred governing model. Members have formal voting right, meaning they have 
the right by statute to attend the annual general meeting and elect the members 
of the board. 360 They also have an opportunity to give non-binding input on the 
programmatic priorities.361 In practice, I found that there is absence of rule-based 
                                                          
355 The POW campaign was dedicated to the protection of surf spots from unacceptable levels 
of environmental impact, excessive impacts on wave quality and recreational water users right 
of access (Pipeline news issue 77 autumn 2009, 12).  
356 Pipeline issue 77 Autumn 2009; Pipeline news issue 86, Autumn/ Winter 2011, 4 
357 Pipeline news issue 86, Autumn/ Winter 2011, 5 
358 Accounts and Reports 2016, 14 
359 Accounts and Reports 2016, 17 
360 E-mail correspondence 19.09.2018 
361 E-mail correspondence 19.09.2018 
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participation in the organisation. Therefore, the expectation is that the members 
will be given alternative opportunities in addition to the AGM to provide input on 
the programme and the strategy of the organisation. 
In terms of consultative participation, the organisation has provided a forum on 
the website for interaction with members.362 The organisation informs members 
about its events and campaigns through the newsletter (now magazine) and 
social media.363 Members are invited to provide input on the programmatic 
priorities of the organisation during annual thematic meetings.364 Vitiligo.nl have 
conducted a membership survey for their 20th anniversary,365 however there is no 
evidence that they conduct such surveys on a regular basis. Some members 
organise regional contact points, but this is something the organisation is trying 
to develop further (Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017). The available evidence points at few 
opportunities for consultative participation. 
Against the expectation, we find varying offer of opportunities for consultative 
participation within the group of four organisations with leadership centred 
governing model. NAPA and PIF, being service oriented organisations provide 
many opportunities for members’ input on the services of the organisation, 
programmatic and policy matters. The two organisations represent professional 
interests within the health and care sector, therefore they have to be regularly 
informed about policy developments in the health and care sector and react in 
accordance with members interests. To achieve that, they regularly survey 
members, ask for feedback during events, maintain online forum for members, 
and have mediating structure (e.g. regional coordinators or an advisory group) 
through which staff is updated about members’ needs. SAS, being an 
environmental advocacy group operating in the UK and Vitiligo.nl, being a 
patients’ group operating in the Netherlands, have comparatively fewer 
opportunities for consultative participation than PIF and NAPA. SAS maintains 
the link to the members through regional coordinators and consults them through 
surveys. The members of SAS are citizens concerned for the marine and coastal 
environment and the organisation mainly engages them as volunteers in 
                                                          
362 Newsletter 1 May 2007 
363 Newsletter February 2012; Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017 
364 Newsletter May 2010, 3; Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017 
365 Newsletter February 2011 
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campaigns and activities. Vitiligo.nl on the other hand, gets input from members 
during their events and online (e.g. social media and website) and there is no 
evidence that they conduct membership surveys on a regular basis, while their 
regional contact points are yet to be developed. The members of Vitiligo.nl are 
mainly passive information recipients. The organisation has become more 
advocacy oriented and publicly visible since 2011, but that has not resulted in 
higher consultative participation. The four cases indicate that the offer of 
consultative participation can be better understood in reference to the core 
mission and type of membership of the organisation than in reference to the 
governing model.  
8.3. Consultative Participation in Organisations with Membership-centred 
Model 
 
In this section we turn to organisations with membership centred models. 
Organisations that have rule-based participation in practice, meaning members 
attend the AGM, elect the members of the executive board and vote on matters 
related to programmatic priorities are expected to provide only few opportunities 
for consultative participation. The organisations already invest in organisation of 
AGMs, and whilst there are channels for communication with the members, they 
do not invest additional resources for consultative participation.  
SBS, an organisation that does not fully fit the membership centred model of 
governance, is characterised by both presence of rule-base participation and 
board professionalisation. SBS mainly consults members on matters related to 
the program and the strategy during regional events and through surveys 
conducted every few years.366 The leadership meets members at various shows 
throughout the country367 and discusses the policy of the organisation: 
 “[The shows] give members and supporters the chance to come and meet the 
Trustees, Director and Office Manager face-to-face and discuss Charity policy, 
direction-of-travel and other issues of mutual interest.”368  
                                                          
366 SBS 26.03.2017; SBS 06.07.2018 
367 SBS Newsletter Winter 2010, 1; SBS Newsletter Summer/Autumn 2011, 12; SBS Autumn/ 
Winter 2013, 2; SBS Newsletter Autumn / Winter 2014, 3; Newsletter Autumn / Winter 2015, 5 
368 Accounts and report 2015, Companies House, 7 
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Members had a chance to directly communicate views with both trustees and 
staff during these shows:  
“Your trustees and staff look forward to meeting members on our stands at the 
shows. It is good to meet faces behind the data-base details and hear your 
views” (SBS Newsletter Summer 2010, 9).  
The views and concerns raised by members at these meetings were taken in 
consideration by the staff and trustees. The Director of SBS wrote the following 
in the organisational newsletter:  
“Most importantly, I attended several Game and Country fairs in Scotland, Wales 
and England where I met many of you, our loyal members. It was refreshing to 
be able to hear your views, thoughts and concerns at first hand. I can’t promise 
that we will be able to address everything that was raised, but we will attempt to 
incorporate as many of your suggestions as we can, into forthcoming research 
projects.” (SBS Autumn/ Winter 2013, 2).  
During the face-to face meetings across the country, the staff provides members 
with a “condensed version of the annual general brief” and the members’ input is 
then fed into the strategy development process (SBS 06.07.2018). In 2014 the 
executive director promised that much of the members’ feedback will be 
incorporated in the business plan (strategy) of SBS.369 When asked about the 
extent to which members are involved in shaping programmatic priorities and the 
strategy of the organisation, one of the interviewees said that membership 
involvement varies depending on members interest, however, members are 
given opportunities to provide input on the programmatic priorities of the 
organisation: 
“So, members as I mentioned before are encouraged to tell us how we are doing 
and tell us, give us their ideas and agree or disagree with the state of our priorities 
and put forward alternatives if they disagree. […] So those ideas will filter up, and 
they will be coalesced into policy or other positions, which we wish to take, and 
they find themselves expressed in the sort of research we commission to other 
scientific and academic research institutions to carry out for us. But all ideas 
filtering up will be collected together and the trustees will then look at it and decide 
in which direction we wish to go. So, for example, two years ago we held a what 
will become one of a regular series of strategy sessions whereby all the input is 
taken and kicked around, and we look at progress or lack of progress and set 
ourselves the next sort of five years’ worth of objectives.” (SBS 06.07.2018) 
In 2015 they conducted a questionnaire which was circulated with the AGM 
notification pack.370 The aim of the survey was to assess the level of members’ 
                                                          
369 SBS Newsletter Autumn / Winter 2014, 3 
370 SBS Newsletter Spring / Summer 2015, 3 
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satisfaction with the running of the charity, the ways the charity represented their 
views and overall lobbying and communication efforts.371 The review of the 
survey answers was presented at the AGM in the presence of members and 
trustees.372 SBS promised that the raised concerns will be addressed by the 
trustees:  
“Finally, thanks to all of you who took time out to complete our members’ 
questionnaire last month. The results were very encouraging and gave us a 
resounding mandate to continue upon the Trustees’ current chosen path and 
strategy. And for those few who were not content about certain aspects of our 
business, rest assured that we will be debating how best to address your valid 
concerns and taking steps where possible to improve our business and other 
practices.” (SBS Newsletter Spring / Summer 2015, 5).  
At last, members are also encouraged to provide input through social media, the 
website and through the bi-annual magazine.373 They also invited members to 
volunteer at the shows.374 The evidence suggests that SBS in addition to rule-
based participation provides many opportunities for consultative participation 
through surveys, face-to-face meeting during events and online.  
JMA is the other organisation under study which does not fully fit the membership 
centred governance model. The members are invited to contribute to a new 
strategy that is usually enacted every five years and it is a one-year process (JMA 
13.11.2017). Members have the possibility to share ideas via email and when 
JMA was deciding on the merger with Friends of the Earth Netherlands they 
formed an advisory group composed of members to discuss the consequences 
of the merger (JMA 23.10.2017). The working groups of the organisation are 
invited to propose viewpoints and actions (JMA 13.11.2017). Considering that 
JMA holds two AGMs a year were all the members are invited to participate and 
have the chance to shape the meeting agenda in advance,375 JMA as expected 
does not offer many opportunities for consultative participation. 
Similarly to JMA, we find that NVL, having a membership-centred governance, 
offers few opportunities for consultative participation. The main way in which 
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members can raise their issues and propose ideas is through the online forum or 
social media.376 For example, one of the interviewees, through the online forum 
initiated a re-introduction of an organisational newsletter377 for members to share 
their experiences and small contributions (NVL 06.10.2017). The executive board 
endorsed the initiative and planned the re-introduction of a digital newsletter.378 
The organisation does not provide other opportunities for consultative 
participation, because they have a high AGM participation, and during the AGM 
members regularly provide feedback and vote on the planned program for next 
year (NVL 06.10.2017).  
HOS, having a membership centred governing model, as expected provides very 
few opportunities for consultative participation of members. The main way in 
which members can raise an issue in between AGMs is through direct contact 
with the leadership: 
“I mean if there’s anybody wishing to raise an issue they have the ear of the 
committee. All of our contacts: our telephone numbers, our addresses, our emails 
are available to the membership and if anyone has a problem or an issue they 
can simply, you know, talk to somebody. So, there’s, the communication with the 
entire membership is very good. I mean in practice I can’t honestly think if there’s 
ever been an issue that’s been raised by the membership but if they wished to, 
they could do.” (HOS 06.10.2017).  
Members are also encouraged to participate in discussion at the online forum, 
even though this is used mainly to exchange information on orchids.379 Similarly 
to JMA and NVL, members are regularly invited through the newsletter to send 
proposals for discussion to be included on the AGM’s agenda380 and they are 
invited to provide feedback on the AGM minutes via the HOS website.381 HOS, 
similar to NVL is a conservation organisation which is not involved in advocacy 
activities and has high level of rule based participation and executive board led 
by members. Hence, the organisation does not have the need to invest in 
opportunities for consultative participation.  
                                                          
376 NVL 06.10.2017; NVL 27.09.2017 
377 NVL maintained an organisational newsletter in the period 1997-2011. 
378 Written answers from NVL board 26.10.2017 
379 AGM Minutes report 2013, April; AGM of the Hardy Orchid Society 19th April at 10.30.2015 
380 HOS Newsletter January 1997 
381 Minutes of the 21st Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid Society 30th March 2014 
 
 227 
 
The NHS Alliance has a membership governance model, and against the 
expectations provided multiple opportunities for consultative participation by 
members. In addition to the AGM, members had the opportunity to give feedback 
on policy matters and direction through the policy networks and at events 
organised throughout the years.382 Due to the strong advocacy focus of the 
organisation, members are regularly consulted on policy matters. For example, 
in August 2005 the chief executive called on members to express views on the 
Department of Health’s reform of commissioning:  
“The DH paper which will lead to local reviews on roles, responsibilities and 
structures has led to much speculation, and some knee-jerk reactions in the 
media. In the Alliance, we believe this is unhelpful and we would like to take a 
more considered view, informed by the views of members as to the key issues in 
implementation. Such views will inform the NHS Alliance’s media stance, but 
more importantly, will be fed into meetings with Ministers, discussions with DH 
officials, and policy advisors, which have been arranged already. […] You have 
told us before that the most valuable service we can provide to members is to 
give a voice where it matters. We are committed to doing just that and I look 
forward to receiving your views […]”383 
Much of the work of NHS Alliance was organised through national networks which 
focused on a specific primary care area – “each with a national lead, facilitator 
and steering group with secretarial support.”384 There were thirteen professional 
networks of members that brought specialist expertise in the organisation.385  
In addition, members opinion was surveyed regarding their policy stances (NHS 
Alliance 31.06.2017). One interviewee explains that the process of consultation 
with members occurred through questionnaires and emails, when more rapid 
response was required:  
“Now, over and above [the formal] governance arrangements, the organisation 
would quite often send out questionnaires canvassing members’ views on some 
things that we were dealing with. So for instance when the government of the day 
were intent on changing the commissioning arrangements and abandoning 
PCT’s and moving into something else, we would canvass all of our members 
both in writing and sometimes, more rapidly, using emails and basically say to 
them ‘Look, we have a meeting with the government next week, what do you 
think about these issues and are there other items that you would like to raise?’” 
(NHS Alliance 23.06.2017).  
                                                          
382 NHS Alliance 02.06.2017; NA 31.06.2017 
383 Message from Chief Executive August 2005 
384 NHS Alliance Report – Leading Primary Care 2008, 9  
385 NHS Alliance Yearbook 2008, 11 
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This means that the NHS Alliance, being an advocacy group, which represents 
members’ interests, in addition to rule-based participation and members 
presence in the executive organ, provides many additional opportunities for 
consultative participation in between AGMs. This is against the theoretical 
expectation. Similarly, to NAPA and PIF, two health organisations in the UK with 
leadership centred models, NHS Alliance is representing professional health 
interests. The NHS Alliance is a particularly active and influential advocacy group, 
so to be able to understand the positions of the membership and articulate policy 
stances in accordance with members interests, in addition to other forms of 
membership involvement, the organisation regularly consults members on 
strategic and policy matters.  
Finally, LVPW is a Dutch health organisation with a membership centred 
governing model. There is limited evidence that they provide opportunities for 
consultative participation. One of the correspondents suggested that members 
can contact the organisation with their input throughout the year.386 Members are 
recruited as volunteers in several policy committees,387 and there are 17-20 
members that participate in these committees (LVPW 10.10.2018). The 
organisation provides mandatory training for the members few days a year where 
they can provide feedback on the work of the organisation (LVPW 10.10.2018). 
However, the main way in which members are consulted about the programmatic 
priorities of the organisation is at the annual general meetings.388  
In summary, the six organisations with membership centred governing models 
differ in their offer of consultative participation opportunities. Four organisations 
with membership centred model (JMA, LVPW, HOS and NVL), as theoretically 
expected, provided limited opportunities for consultative participation. Two 
organisations, SBS and NHS Alliance, against the expectations provide many 
opportunities for consultative participation in-between AGMs where members 
engage in rule-based participation. HOS and NVL are inward looking 
                                                          
386 LVPWa E-mail correspondence 08.05.2018 
387 Volunteers take part in several committees including: the validation committee, the schooling 
committee, the registration and visitation committee, the complaints committee, the PR-
committee (LVPW website accessed at https://www.lvpw.nl/vereniging/commissies on 
09.11.2018). 
388 LVPWb E-mail correspondence 08.05.2018 
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conservation groups that do not react to policy dynamics, therefore for them it is 
sufficient to consult members on organisational and programmatic matters from 
one AGM to another. JMA is a Dutch environmental youth group representing 
broader causes, and in the past years has not been actively engaged in lobbying 
or policy activities, even though they have implemented raising awareness 
campaigns. Hence, the organisation does not have a need to consult members 
regularly on policy or programmatic stances. Also, LVPW, a Dutch health 
organisation that represents professional interests of members, has very limited 
lobbying activities because they represent an aspect of health which is not a core 
responsibility of the Ministry of Health, but a complementary health branch 
(LVPW 10.10.2017). On the other hand, both NHS Alliance and SBS389 are active 
in the policy processes. The NHS Alliance particularly – similar to PIF and NAPA 
has to respond rapidly to policy changes in the health and care sector. The 
evidence suggests that the ‘politicalness’ of the group (i.e. its core mission), the 
type of membership and policy field dynamics matter for understanding 
consultative participation across organisations.  
8.4. Comparative Analysis of Consultative Participation across Governing 
Models 
 
In this chapter, I investigated whether organisations with different governing 
models differ in terms of the level of consultative participation, defined as the 
opportunities for members’ input on organisational matters and programmatic 
priorities. On the one hand, the expectation was that organisations with 
leadership centred governing model will offer many opportunities for consultative 
participation to be able to maintain the link with their members. On the other hand, 
the expectation was that organisations with membership centred governing 
model will offer only few opportunities for consultative participation because the 
organisation already invests in maintaining rule-based participation. 
The findings from the analysis are summarised in Table 16. They show mixed 
results across the different governing models, which indicate that there are other 
factors that account for the variation of consultative participation across 
                                                          
389 SBS in addition has professionalised board, so to keep the link with the members, they 
introduce many opportunities for consultation in between AGMs. 
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organisations. We find that four organisations in the UK, two with leadership-
centred model (health organisations PIF and NAPA) and the two with 
membership centred model (health organisation NHS Alliance and environmental 
organisation SBS) provide many opportunities for consultative participation. The 
six remaining organisations provide only few opportunities for consultative 
participation. Two leadership centred organisations (environmental group SAS 
and health group Vitiligo.nl) against the expectations provide only few 
opportunities for consultative participation. Also, four organisations with 
membership centred governing models, environmental groups JMA, HOS and 
NVL, and health group LVPW, provide few opportunities for consultative 
participation in line with the theoretical expectations. 
Table 17: Results on Consultative Participation across Organisations 
Organisation Country and 
policy field  
Governance 
model 
Expectations for 
consultative 
participations  
Results  
National 
Activity 
Providers 
Association 
UK 
Health 
 
 
 
Leadership 
centred 
 
 
 
Organisations will 
offer many 
opportunities for 
consultative 
participation  
Confirmed  
Surfers 
Against 
Sewage  
UK 
Environment 
Not confirmed  
Patient 
Information 
Forum  
UK 
Health 
Confirmed  
Vitiligo 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Health 
Not confirmed  
Young 
Friends of the 
Earth 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Environment 
 
 
 
Membership 
centred 
 
 
 
Organisations will 
offer only few 
opportunities for 
consultative 
participation  
Confirmed  
Songbird 
Survival  
UK 
Environment 
Not confirmed  
Hardy Orchid 
Society  
UK 
Environment 
Confirmed 
NHS Alliance  UK 
Health 
Not confirmed  
National 
Association of 
Psychosocial 
Workers  
Netherlands 
Health 
Confirmed  
The Dutch 
Association 
for Dragonfly 
Studies 
Netherlands 
Environment 
Confirmed  
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Based on the results, we can discern inductively some patterns that account for 
consultative participation across the ten organisations. There is a country and 
policy pattern, namely, I find that only UK organisations provide many 
opportunities for consultative participation and that all the three health 
organisations in the UK, despite their difference in governing model have strong 
consultative participation. NAPA and PIF are service organisations operating in 
the health sector in the UK, and they represent the professional interests of their 
members. The NHS Alliance, despite being different in terms of the governing 
model, is very similar to NAPA and PIF in terms of core mission, type of 
membership and policy field. To be able to react to the changing policy processes 
in the health sector in the UK and accurately represent and serve members 
interests, these organisations maintain various channels for members’ input.  
However, there is no policy specific dynamic when it comes to British 
organisations that operate in the environmental field, where we find mixed results. 
Only one organisation, SBS, out of the three environmental British organisations 
under study provides many opportunities for membership involvement. And this 
is against the expectations in the case of SBS, because the organisation was 
classified as having membership centred model. On the other hand, SAS, an 
organisation with leadership centred model against the expectations offered few 
opportunities of membership involvement and HOS, the last environmental group 
in the UK with membership centred governing model, in line with expectations, 
offers few opportunities for membership involvement. This means that SBS and 
SAS do not conform with the initial theoretical expectations, and additionally differ 
in the offer of consultative participation opportunities. SBS does not fully fit the 
membership-centred model because it has professionalised board. This in 
combination with the dependence on members for funding and its active policy 
participation accounts for the fact that the organisation has created many 
opportunities for members’ input in-between AGMs. SAS, on the other hand, fully 
fits the model of leadership centred governance and does not offer additional 
opportunities for consultative participation. In that sense, it resembles the model 
of protest business (Jordan and Maloney 2007) and confirms that organisations 
that are driven by the logic of influence (Schmitter and Streeck 1999) and led by 
staff will provide only for little opportunities for members’ input on policies (Jordan 
2012, 97). Instead they will treat members as source of resources, financial and 
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voluntary support for organisational campaigns). Jordan and Maloney (2007, 
169) find that large campaigning groups in the UK provide venues for 
membership involvement on local level through volunteering. The evidence on 
SAS being a smaller national environmental campaign group, fits well their 
description.  
In the Netherlands, we find that all four organisations under study provide very 
few opportunities for consultative participation. This reinforces the country 
specific divide. Three organisations with diverse core mission, NVL and JMA 
being environmental groups and LVPW being a health group hold regular AGMs. 
Their members shape the agenda during AGMs and use their formal voting rights 
to influence programmatic priorities. Therefore, for these organisations, investing 
in additional opportunities for feedback is not essential to maintain the link with 
members and incorporate their needs in the organisational agenda. Vitiligo.nl is 
the only Dutch organisation with leadership centred model which represents 
patient interests and provides information of interest to its members, patients of 
vitiligo and their families. They have not developed many opportunities for 
involvement in consultative participation because their members do not demand 
such opportunities and do not use the formal voting rights they are given. As it 
was said earlier, this corresponds to findings based on survey data by 
Binderkrantz (2009, 670) that suggest lower levels of membership involvement 
among patient groups in comparison to other types of groups in the population.  
The findings in this chapter furthers our understanding about consultative 
participation in smaller groups by showing that some level of consultative 
participation as a distinct way of involving members exists across different types 
of non-profit membership organisations. Importantly, it suggests that differences 
in the leadership interest to invest in such opportunities can be better understood 
in terms of country and policy specific dynamics, membership type and 
organisational mission. The difference in governing models cannot account for 
differences in consultative participation across groups. These theoretical 
expectations should be further assessed with a large-N study design.  
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9. Conclusion 
 
9.1. Introduction  
 
The main research question guiding this study was ‘whether and how does non-
profit law related to legal forms and indirect benefits affect - or fail to affect - the 
internal governance of non-profit membership organisations in developed 
democracies?’. To answer this question, the study chose a theoretical 
perspective building on institutional theory of organisational isomorphism and 
resource dependence theory (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Ashworth et al 2007; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hodge and Piccolo 2005). Coercive pressures and 
provision of privileges were considered key for understanding how law affects 
organisations. In addition, the organisational leadership was considered central 
in initiating organisational change based on their understandings of the legal 
environment, and in line with their interests for increasing social legitimacy or 
increased organisational efficiency (Hall and Taylor 1996; Scott 1987).  
The main argument that the research assessed empirically is that non-profit law 
affects internal governance by shaping two central aspects of internal 
governance – members’ formal voting rights and their usage on the one hand, 
and board professionalisation on the other. Formal voting rights are defined as 
the rights of ordinary members to attend the annual general meeting and elect 
their representatives. Rule-based participation is defined as the use of formal 
voting rights that are enshrined in organisational rules (governing documents 
such as statutes, constitution, articles of association etc.). And board 
professionalisation is defined as the external recruitment of skilled volunteers with 
professional competencies, such as the skills, experience, and knowledge 
relevant for organisational maintenance, to fill in unpaid positions on the 
executive organ. These aspects of internal governance are important because 
they outline the governing model of an organisation and the role that members 
play within the governing model. Matters of internal governance are key to our 
understanding of the value of non-profit membership organisations for members 
and societies (Tschirhart 2006, 534). 
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I expected these aspects of internal governance to be shaped by legal forms 
available in the legal regimes and the intensity of regulatory constraints related 
to maintaining configurations of indirect benefits within these legal regimes 
respectively. Legal forms were defined as the types of organisational structures 
an organisation can adopt from a legal perspective. Indirect state benefits 
encompass legal personality and tax beneficial status, which are the two types of 
benefits most frequently accessed by non-profit membership organisations. The 
first analytical distinction was that legal regimes differ in the types of legal forms 
available for membership organisations, with some specifically regulating formal 
powers for members and others not. The second main analytical distinction was 
that regardless of the non-profit tradition (common law or civil law) and the type 
of regulatory regime (constraining or permissive), within a regulatory regime we 
can distinguish between up to three configurations which differ in the 
combinations of indirect benefits they have and consequently they differ in the 
type and intensity of regulatory constraints (i.e. reporting requirements) they are 
exposed to.  
The main expectation was that, non-profit regulation, depending on the legal 
forms available in the legal regime and the configuration of indirect benefits the 
organisations maintain, will encourage the presence or absence of formal voting 
rights and their use (i.e. rule-based participation), and the presence or absence 
of board professionalisation. Rule-based participation and board 
professionalisation are two characterise of governance that combine in two 
contrasting ideal typical governing models: a membership centred model in which 
members use their formal voting rights in practice and sit on the executive board; 
and a leadership centred model in which members do not use their formal voting 
rights in practice and do not sit on the executive board. In line with institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) the expectation is that organisations 
operating in the same legal forms and exposed to the same regulatory constraints 
related to maintaining indirect benefits will tend to develop similar governing 
models.  
To empirically assess the impact of non-profit law on central aspects of internal 
governance of interest, I have selected two countries, UK and the Netherlands, 
that represent different traditions of non-profit law and represent constraining 
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legal regimes in terms of the intensity and complexity of regulatory constraints. I 
have also selected ten smaller non-profit membership organisations, six in the 
UK and four in the Netherlands that operate across two policy fields, environment 
and health, and differ in the configurations of indirect benefits they maintain. The 
advantage of doing so is that there is a variation in the cause of interest, firstly 
within each country there are different legal forms available for membership 
organisations. Moreover, the organisations are diverse cases in terms of 
configurations of indirect benefits. I have selected two policy fields that differ in 
the available state funding and organisational density, to be able to assess if there 
are any policy specific influences on internal governance related with these 
factors, and if identified patterns hold across policy fields. Finally selecting 
younger organisations helped accessing information about the earlier days of 
organisational life.  
To answer the research question, I have implemented an exploratory qualitative 
comparative case study design that synthesizes legal analysis of non-profit law 
related to legal forms and indirect benefits in the UK and the Netherlands and 
organisational level analysis of changes in non-profit governance across the ten 
non-profit membership organisations. I have utilized multiple sources of evidence 
for both the legal and the organisational analysis including statutory regulation, 
secondary sources, organisational documentation, semi-structured interviews 
and email correspondence with legal experts and organisational actors.  
In this chapter I will firstly summarise the empirical findings and try to give an 
answer to the overall research question. Secondly, I will discuss the theoretical, 
empirical and normative implications of the study. Finally, the last words will be 
dedicated to avenues for future research.  
9.2. Summary of Empirical Findings  
 
In this section I will present a synthesis of empirical findings for each of the 
theoretical expectations that guided the research: The Formal rights expectation 
and the Rule-based participation expectation, the Board professionalisation 
expectation and the Consultation expectation as elaborated in the following.  
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Formal rights expectation and Rule-based participation expectation 
The first link that the thesis explored is between the types of legal forms available 
for membership organisations in the two countries and the adoption of formal 
voting rights in the governing documents of the ten organisations under study. 
Drawing on the understanding of law as a constitutive environment (Edelman and 
Suchman 1997, 479) that shapes the building elements of organisations and 
relations between internal actors (Van der Ploeg 2009, 3) I devised two 
expectations: The Formal rights and the Rule-based expectation. Following 
Lansley (1996) I expected that non-profit law shapes the internal governing 
structure, which in turn shapes the extent to which members are involved in 
authoritative decision-making. Hence, I expected that organisations operating in 
legal regimes where there are specific legal forms for non-profit membership 
organisations will guarantee formal voting rights for members in the governing 
document, whilst organisations operating in legal regimes which do not regulate 
formal voting rights will either not stipulate them in the governing document or will 
tend to limit them in practice (Formal rights expectation). The Rule-based 
participation expectation was that organisations that stipulated formal voting 
rights in their governing document will provide opportunities for use of these rights 
in practice i.e. members will be engaged in rule-based participation. The Rule-
based participation expectation, hence aims to clarify the link between the legal 
rights which the organisation provides in the governing documents and the actual 
use of formal voting rights, since common criticism of the study of formal voting 
rights is that these are not reflective of actual membership involvement (Cnaan 
1991; Leardini et al. 2016).  
The legal analysis in Chapter four showed that two legal forms available for non-
profit membership organisations that are most frequently used in practice – 
companies limited by guarantee and unincorporated associations in the UK 
provide freedom for organisations to decide whether the wider membership will 
have the right to attend the AGM and elect the executive board. In the 
Netherlands, non-profit membership organisations operating in the legal form of 
the formal association, by law, have to provide mandatory rules to the meeting of 
members to control and elect the executive board.  
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Given these legal differences, I expected that British organisations operating in 
the form of companies limited by guarantee and unincorporated associations are 
more likely not to grant formal voting rights in the governing document or limits 
such rights in practice, whilst Dutch formal associations are more likely to 
stipulate formal voting rights in the governing documents. Indeed, the 
organisational analysis in Chapter five assessing the Formal rights expectation 
found that all Dutch organisations, irrespective of policy field, stipulate formal 
voting rights for members in the statutes.  
The assessment of the British organisations is not straightforward. Namely, three 
of the British organisations, two unincorporated associations and one company 
limited by guarantee stipulated formal voting rights for members in their governing 
documents. The evidence suggests that organisations that are dependent on 
their members for funding and have leadership who sees membership 
participation as an added value, even though operating in a legal environment 
where the leadership is ‘free’ from constraints to adopt a centralised decision-
making structure, will keep providing formal voting rights to members. The 
remaining three British organisations operate in the legal form of companies 
limited by guarantee, and when accessing legal personality, they have stipulated 
formal voting rights for members. However, the analysis showed that later during 
their lifetime these three organisations limited formal voting rights to the executive 
board, which is more in line with the Formal rights expectation. The change has 
happened under the initiative of professional management, highlighting the 
crucial role that organisational leaders have in shaping internal governance. The 
law in the UK, by not stipulating constraints related to granting formal voting rights 
of members, opens the door for leadership initiatives to centralise decision 
making rights to the executive board. Interestingly, the two of these three 
organisations have tax beneficial status in addition to being companies limited by 
guarantee, and exactly these organisations changed their formal documents to 
reflect their centralised governing structure. The remaining organisation of the 
three, kept the old formal rules, whilst the leadership interpreted and applied 
these rules to match a centralised decision-making structure in which wider 
members do not attend the AGM and do not elect the executive board.  
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The finding that charitable companies in the UK adjust their formal rules to match 
the intended governing structure is indicative of the intervening role that tax 
beneficial status and the legal and supervisory structures attached to its 
maintenance have on organisational governance. Organisational members can 
formally complain to the Charity Commission of England and Wales if 
organisations do not act in accordance with the governing rules, which in turn 
might lead to formal inquiry and reputational costs for charitable companies. In 
summary, in the UK, where non-profit law does not regulate the powers of 
organisational members, non-profit membership organisations vary in terms of 
who is granted with formal voting rights – the wider members or the executive 
board. The variation of formal voting rights across the six British organisations 
can be accounted by factors such as dominant source of funding (Cordery and 
Sim 2017) and leadership choices (Moe 1980).  
The organisational analysis assessing the Rule-based participation expectation 
in Chapter six found that, except in the case of one Dutch organisation, all the 
organisations that guarantee formal voting rights also provide opportunities for its 
usage and experience rule-based participation by members. The presence of 
formal voting rights is a precondition for the presence of rule-based participation 
stressing the importance of formal rules for the actual operation of membership 
organisations. British membership organisations have discretion to have or not to 
have formal voting rights for members to start with, which in turn accounts for the 
presence or absence of rule-based participation. In the Netherlands, membership 
organisations are required by law to give members formal voting rights, and 
organisations do so not only formally but also in practice. This means that the 
presence of formal voting rights is the foundation for rule-based forms of 
membership involvement that entail AGM attendance, election of board 
members, and voting on programmatic priorities. The one Dutch organisation that 
did not experience rule-based participation in practice, however, did not alter the 
formal voting rights, which means that members are able to activate such rights 
in the future. The three British organisations that limited formal voting rights 
during their lifetime experienced low level or absence of rule-based participation 
before the change. This together with the legal form in which they operated 
allowed the leadership to initiate formal rule change, something that in the 
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Netherlands would not be possible for organisations operating as formal 
associations. The findings suggest that non-profit membership organisations 
operating in legal regimes similar to the Netherlands will provide central role to 
organisational members and, in turn have a strong predisposition for rule-based 
participation.  
Board professionalisation expectation 
The second link that the thesis explored was between the configurations of 
regulatory constraints related to maintaining indirect benefits and executive board 
professionalisation in the ten organisations under study. Drawing on the 
understanding of law as a regulatory environment (Peters and Nispen 1998; 
Edelman and Suchman 1997) that shapes organisational behaviour through the 
allocation or regulatory constraints and privileges (James 2000; Bolleyer 2018) I 
devised the Board professionalisation expectation. Following suggestions in the 
third sector literature I expected that maintaining indirect benefits and the 
reporting and accountability requirements attached to them (Salamon and 
Flaherty 1996; Cordery et al. 2016) will incentivise organisational adaptation 
through recruitment of professional competencies in the executive board (Breen 
2013; Edwards and Cornforth 2003). The organisations adapt by exposure to 
coercive pressures (Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Edwards and Cornforth 2003; 
Cornforth 2003). According to the Board professionalisation expectation I 
expected to find that non-profit membership organisations which are exposed to 
high reporting requirements and external supervision will undergo board 
professionalisation, whilst organisations which are exposed to lenient reporting 
requirements and little or no external supervision will not. Organisation that 
changed from ‘no indirect benefits’ towards ‘more indirect benefits’ and 
consequently are exposed to higher constraints are more likely to undergo board 
professionalisation.  
The legal analysis in Chapter four showed that non-profit membership 
organisations maintaining legal personality and tax beneficial status in the UK 
since the 1980s have been exposed to higher reporting requirements and 
external supervision than organisations receiving the same configuration of 
benefits in the Netherlands. Overall, charitable companies in the UK are the most 
constrained configuration, followed by organisations with tax beneficial status in 
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the Netherlands, both being exposed to high regulatory constraints. 
Organisations operating as companies limited by guarantee and unincorporated 
associations in the UK, and formal associations in the Netherlands are exposed 
to low regulatory constraints. Based on the legal analysis the specific 
expectations where that organisations with ‘all indirect benefits’ (charitable 
companies and ANBIs) are more likely to undergo board professionalisation in 
the two countries than organisations operating with legal personality (companies 
limited by guarantee and formal associations) or ‘no indirect benefits’ 
(unincorporated associations).  
The organisational analysis in Chapter seven assessing the Board 
professionalisation expectation found that British organisations operating as 
charitable companies with ‘all indirect benefits’, being the most constrained 
configuration under study, after being exposed to higher regulatory constraints, 
show signs of board professionalisation. Moreover, unincorporated associations 
in the UK and formal associations in the Netherlands, being the least constrained 
configurations, as expected, do not undergo board professionalisation during 
their lifetime. Three out of ten organisations do not conform with the expectations: 
a British company limited by guarantee being exposed to lower regulatory 
constraints underwent board professionalisation against expectations; and two 
Dutch formal associations with ANBI status underwent board professionalisation 
in the period before they accessed tax beneficial status i.e. when operating under 
lower regulatory constraints. These three organisations underwent board 
professionalisation under the initiative of their organisational leadership. In the 
language of institutional isomorphism, these organisations adapted the 
composition of their executive organ under normative pressures carried by 
professional management (Zucker 1987; Mosley 2012) and not under coercive 
pressures from legal regulation (Di Maggio and Powell 1983). In summary, the 
findings suggest that organisation operating under lower regulatory constraints 
across different legal regimes are more likely to have executive boards filled in 
with members. Organisations that operate in the configuration of ‘all indirect 
benefits’ i.e. in legal regimes similar to the UK are more likely to have executive 
boards filled in with professionals recruited outside of the organisation.  
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Consultation expectation 
The final link that the thesis explored is that between consultative participation as 
a distinct form of membership involvement across the ten organisations 
characterised by different governing models. Drawing on the third sector and 
interest group literature I focus on membership involvement though consultative 
means (Warleigh 2001; Maloney 2015; Saidel 1998; Guo and Musso 2007), being 
an important cost-effective form of membership involvement used by 
organisational entrepreneurs for membership retention (Moe 1980; Puyvelde et 
al. 2016). Here I build on the idea that professional management will maintain 
channels for communication and non-binding input by members in absence of 
other avenues for participation (Guo and Musso 2007). The Consultation 
expectation expected to find that organisations that have leadership centred 
governing model characterised by absence of rule-based participation and 
presence of board professionalisation provide more opportunities for consultative 
participation. And organisations with membership centred governing models 
characterised by presence of rule-based participation and absence of board 
professionalisation are expected to provide fewer opportunities for consultative 
participation.  
The organisational analysis in Chapter eight assessing the Consultation 
expectation found mixed results of consultative participation across the two 
governing models. I found that only British organisations, irrespective of the 
governing model, provide many opportunities for consultative participation (four 
out of six British organisations), whilst all four organisations in the Netherlands 
provide few opportunities for consultative participation. Furthermore, three of the 
Dutch organisations have membership governing models, meaning the findings 
fit the theoretical expectations. The finding on the Dutch organisation with 
leadership-centred governing model characterised by minimal consultative 
participation suggests that this might be something specific to patient 
organisations. I found that all three British organisations operating in health 
policy, despite their difference in governing models have strong consultative 
participation. The changes in health policy demand non-profit membership 
organisations to adapt and respond to dynamics in the sector. Hence, 
organisations operating in the same policy field invest resources in developing 
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venues for members input on programmatic and policy priorities. The two British 
organisations that do not conform with the findings are environmental groups that 
fundamentally differ in their level of ‘politicalness’ and professionalisation. The 
one with leadership centred model is approaching members as a resource in the 
style of the ‘protest business’ model of campaign groups (Jordan and Maloney 
1997, 2007; Grant 2003), whilst the other is an inward-looking organisation, which 
in line with the expectations for organisations with membership centred governing 
model, does not offer additional opportunities for consultative participation. In 
summary the findings suggest that – unlike the other dimensions of governance 
explored in this thesis being shaped by legal differences - differences in 
consultative participation can be better explained by country and policy specific 
dynamics and organisational mission. 
In the following section of the concluding chapter I will discuss the implications of 
the empirical findings, after which I will discuss avenues for future research. 
9.3. Discussion of Implications of the Study 
 
Only few studies in the literature have paid attention to the link between legal 
forms and indirect benefits on the one hand and intra-organisational 
consequences on the other (Smith and Teasdale 2012; Morgan 1999; Toepler 
2010; Locke et al. 2003; Cornforth 2011; Bolleyer 2018). However, no study has 
investigated the impact of non-profit law on internal governance from a 
comparative perspective focusing on diverse non-profit membership 
organisations operating in different policy fields and contrasting legal regimes. By 
combining legal analysis with organisational-level analysis the study has 
innovatively responded to the call in the literature for comparative studies 
focusing on the relation between regulatory constraints and internal governance 
of non-profit organisations (Cornforth 2011, 1123).  
What are the conceptual and theoretical implications from this study? The 
research shed a light on the impact of the constitutive and regulatory function of 
non-profit law on internal governance of non-profit membership organisations 
(Edelman and Suchman 1997). Building on theoretical and conceptual insights 
from the literature on non-profit regulation, third sector studies and the interest 
group literature the study has developed an analytical framework for analysing 
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organisational responses to non-profit law, which is an important advancement in 
terms of theorising the link between non-profit law and internal governance. More 
specifically, the study ‘introduced’ law as an independent variable that, among 
other variables, affects internal governance of membership organisations 
(Lansley 1996). An important conceptual contribution to the literature is the 
development of the concept of board professionalisation, as a distinct form of 
organisational professionalisation through recruitment of professionals to fill-in 
unpaid executive positions. The concept can be further used to develop 
understanding about the external factors that affect board composition. Another 
useful conceptual distinction was the one between rule-based participation 
defined as the use of formal voting rights enshrined in governing documents and 
consultative participation that entails opportunities for members input which are 
not based in formal voting rights. This distinction can be further used to 
understand what factors enhance one type of membership involvement over the 
other and the links between them.  
What are the broader implications of this study? The empirical findings imply that 
non-profit membership organisations that operate in regulatory regimes like the 
UK (as shaped by the legal forms available and the indirect benefits they access) 
will have more diverse formal governing structures, while non-profit membership 
organisations operating in regulatory regimes like the Netherlands (as shaped by 
the legal forms available and the indirect state benefits they access) will have 
more uniform formal governing structures with central organisational role for 
members. The concept of the charity in Anglo-Saxon countries brings significant 
benefits to organisations, therefore, a diverse set of membership non-profit 
organisations are motivated to obtain tax beneficial status and comply with 
regulatory constraints related to its maintenance (Phillips and Smith 2014; 
Salamon and Flaherty 1997). The findings on charitable companies in this study, 
imply that membership organisations in the UK that access and maintain both 
legal and charitable status are more likely to develop characteristics of a 
leadership centred governing model. This is confirming indications in previous 
studies (Morgan 1999; Breen 2013) which suggested that increasingly complex 
accountability pressures on charities led to professionalisation of trustees’ role. 
Also, it adds to studies that have suggested that charitable status is incompatible 
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with democratic representation of members (Locke et al. 2003; Lansley 1996). 
The findings from the Dutch organisations imply that membership organisations 
that operate in the Netherlands are more likely to develop characteristics of the 
membership centred model of governance. This implies that non-profit 
membership organisations in similar legal context to the Dutch might also be 
‘pushed’ towards such model of governance. The findings on consultative 
participation in smaller groups show that some level of consultative participation 
as a distinct way of involving members exists across different types of non-profit 
membership organisation. Importantly, it suggests that differences in the 
leadership interest to invest in such opportunities can be better understood in 
terms of country and policy specific dynamics and organisational mission, than in 
reference to organisations’ governing models. Deviations from the membership 
centred model of governance, specifically board professionalisation in the 
Netherlands can be linked with normative pressures (Mosley 2012; Zucker 1987) 
coming from professional managers occupying paid or unpaid positions. Similar, 
the deviations from leadership centred model of governance among charitable 
companies in the UK can be linked to leadership judgements about the necessity 
of staying connected to membership due to legitimacy and financial reasons (Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Scott 1987). In that sense, the leadership is central for 
understanding organisational diversity among organisations operating under 
similar regulatory constraints. In reality we find that organisations, due to 
leadership choices, comply and often overfulfill perceived environmental 
constraints to assure access to valued benefits and assure survival.   
The empirical findings suggest a stronger implication from the constitutive 
function of law for the internal governance of non-profit membership 
organisations in democratic countries with civil law non-profit tradition than the 
regulatory function of law related to maintaining indirect benefits. In contrast, in 
democratic countries with common law non-profit tradition there is a stronger 
implication from the regulatory function of law for the internal governance of non-
profit membership organisations than from the constitutive function of law. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that it is important to account for formal voting 
rights, because when given in the governing document, the leadership (board 
and/ or staff) offers actual opportunities for participation and members use these 
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rights in practice. This means that formal voting rights can be used as a proxy for 
rule-based participation, considering that accessing organisational data on rule-
based participation is often more difficult than accessing data on formal rights in 
governing documents. 
Finally, organisations operating as charitable companies and companies limited 
by guarantee in the UK unlike unincorporated associations, commonly own 
assets, have outward looking mission and are publicly visible. This means that 
the former two are engaged in more fundraising and particularly rely on external 
sources of funding and solicit private donations. Therefore, from a leadership 
perspective may be more viable to maintain a supporter base than a membership 
base. In the Netherlands, where funding from private donations is a small part of 
membership budgets, as opposed to funding from membership fees and the 
public sources (Burger et al. 2001), leaders are additionally incentivised to 
maintain membership centred governing model. In this sense, the regulatory 
environment is synchronised with the funding environment in both contexts and 
demands more accountability by groups that are financially linked to the public 
and less from those that have minimal links (financial or otherwise) with the 
public.  
What are the normative implications from the study? The study of internal 
governance of organisations is important because non-profit membership 
organisations provide venues for development of civic and political skills of 
members and because of the linkage function that organisations have between 
constituencies and the state (Warren 2001; Skocpol 2003; Salamon and Flaherty 
1997; Dekker 2014). The empirical findings hence have normative implications. 
Members of organisations operating in civil law regimes that have the legal form 
of the ‘association’ and are lenient in terms of regulatory constraints and external 
supervision, will be provided with opportunities to develop such skills. Members 
will have a chance to attend AGMs, propose issues for discussion and voting, 
elect representatives, and participate in deliberation and authoritative decision-
making over organisational policy. In addition, these members will assume 
executive board positions and take responsibility for organisational strategy and 
development. However, these forms of participation are time-consuming and 
often require considerable personal and voluntary investment, which in times of 
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increased individualisation and social alienation members of groups might not be 
ready to give. Members in a legal environment like the UK seem to have more 
choice of opportunities to participate beyond rule-based participation which are 
less time consuming and more cost-effective. British organisations develop a 
plethora of online and offline venues for members input, however, the question 
remains open about the extent to which members input through consultative 
forms of participation is taken on board by organisational leadership.  
In terms of representational capacities of organisations (Guo 2007; Guo and 
Musso 2007), the implications differ for organisations with different core mission 
and type of membership (Halpin 2006; 2010). Service and advocacy groups in 
the UK that operate as charitable companies operate in a legal environment that 
incentivizes centralisation and professionalisation of decision making in the 
executive board and consultative forms of participation. Whilst organisation that 
represent broader causes may benefit from such governing model, organisations 
that represent direct interests of members will have decreased representational 
capacities to ‘stand for’ and ‘act for’ members (Guo and Musso 2007; Leardini et 
al. 2016). If members of the executive are not recruited organically from within 
the organisation and if the executive is not elected and controlled by the members 
meeting, then there is a risk that the board will not reflect the characteristics of 
the membership they represent (Bramble 2000; Guo 2018). In turn, such 
governance set-up will shift the logic of operation from expressive value-oriented 
mission to an instrumental logic of operation focused largely on organisational 
performance and survival (Frumkin 2002; Stewart 2014, 9-10). 
The main dilemma is then whether the state should play a crucial role in assuring 
accountability of organisations towards society, and if it does, how to craft 
regulation that in content and intensity strikes the right balance between the 
interests of the members and the interests of the public (Irvin 2005; Bolleyer 
2018). Can we reconcile the tension between demands for more accountability 
(Phillips 2013; Phillips and Smith 2014; McDonnell and Rutherford 2018) and 
demands for enhanced representational capacities of membership organisations 
(Cnaan 1991; Guo 2007; Guo and Musso 2007; Holmes and Slater 2011)? And 
should statutory law at all be used as a constitutive and regulatory tool to shape 
internal governance of non-profit organisations in developed democracies? To be 
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able to answer these questions, more research should be conducted on the intra-
organisational consequences of non-profit law and its implications for mission 
attainment of organisations. This brings me to the final section on avenues for 
future research.  
9.4. Avenues for Future Research   
 
The empirical analysis encompassed smaller national membership 
organisations, which are the most common type of organisations in the 
population. The main limitation of the study is related to the small sample of 
organisations. The organisations were selected to encompass service providing 
and advocacy groups, as well as organisations that represent direct interests of 
members and broader constituencies. This means that the empirical findings can 
be transferred to similar legal contexts and are valid for smaller national 
organisations in developed democracies. However, it would be beneficial to 
investigate whether some of the identified patterns apply to larger and more 
influential national organisations in terms of membership size and budget. Also, 
future research should include larger samples of organisations that operate 
across more policy fields. The empirical findings in this research can be further 
investigated with quantitative data. New measures should be devised to capture 
board professionalisation, as well as rule-based and consultative forms of 
participation. In the UK particularly, one can investigate further the differences 
between membership organisations with and without charity status, and whether 
identified differences in governing models hold for organisations with different 
budget sizes, age and policy fields. Future research should aim to account for the 
impact of law related to the receipt of indirect benefits as different from the impact 
of monetary support and rules attached to it. The causes of board 
professionalisation as distinct type of professionalisation should be further 
investigated together with the consequences this phenomenon has for mission 
attainment. Also, future research can explore the drivers behind rule-based 
participation and consultative participation of members, when and why the 
leadership decides to allocate resources for one over the other type of 
membership involvement, use them both or none?  
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The focus here was on developed democracies representative of the civil law and 
common law non-profit tradition. The dynamic relationship between the law, 
organisational type and membership involvement should be further assessed 
across different legal regimes. The findings on the UK are indicative to some 
extent for other Anglo-Saxon countries with the concept of the charity, however 
differences related to availability of other legal forms and indirect benefits within 
countries with common law non-profit tradition should be explored. Beyond the 
civil law and common law contexts, the link between law and internal governance 
should also be explored in countries representative of the Scandinavian and post-
socialist legal tradition in Europe. An interesting question to explore is the extent 
to which organisations operating in Scandinavian and post-socialist non-profit 
regimes differ in terms of intra-organisational development from organisations in 
civil law and common law non-profit regimes?  
The mechanisms through which law affects governance that I discovered 
inductively merit further investigation. The leadership limited formal voting rights 
in organisations in which members did not use such rights and that operated in 
legal contexts that enable such limitation. Also, professional management is 
crucial in the development of professionalised boards. Future research can 
further explore these mechanisms and shed a light on the ways in which 
leadership mediates the impact of law on non-profit governance. Greater 
attention should be also paid to potential cultural differences in the application of 
legal rules by organisational leadership across legal contexts.  
In the past few years the focus of civil society leaders has been on the shrinking 
civic space and implementation of restrictive laws in countries around the world, 
including examples from within the European Union. However, organisational 
responses to restrictive environments are not investigated in a systematic and 
comparative way. Future research should tap into the organisational responses 
to non-profit law which is perceived as restrictive as opposed to non-profit law 
which is perceived as enabling i.e. strikes the right balance between benefits and 
regulatory constraints. By synthesizing legal and organisational research this 
thesis highlighted the need for further investigation of intra-organisational 
consequences of different types of legal regulation. I conclude this thesis with the 
hope that future research will pay increased attention to non-profit law as an 
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external factor shaping internal governance of non-profit membership 
organisations.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
List of legal sources:  
UK (England and Wales)  
Companies Act 2006 accessed at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents on 01.08.2016 
Charities Act 1993 accessed at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/10/contents on 01.08.2016 
Charities Act 2006 accessed at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/50/contents on 01.08.2016 
Charities Act 2011 accessed at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/25/contents/enacted 
on 01.08.2016 
 
Finance Act 2010 accessed at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/13/schedule/6  on 02.08.2016 
 
Companies House, Life of a company – part 1 annual requirements, GP2 June 
2016, accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5
33350/GP2_Life_of_a_company_Part_1_v4.6-ver0.1-6.pdf on 19.07.2016 
Companies House, Life of a company – part 2 event driven filings, GP3 June 
2016 v5, accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5
33350/GP2_Life_of_a_company_Part_1_v4.6-ver0.1-6.pdf on 11.08.2016 
UK Government, Set up a private limited company, last updated 06.2016, 
accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/limited-company-formation/overview on 
04.08.2016 
UK Government, Running a limited company, last updated 30.06.2016, 
accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/running-a-limited-company/company-changes-
you-must-report 
UK Government, Accounts and tax returns for private limited companies, last 
updated 17.02.2016, accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/prepare-file-annual-
accounts-for-limited-company 
UK Government, Choose a legal structure for your business, last updated 
30.06.2016, accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/business-legal-
structures/unincorporated-association 
UK Government, Tell Companies House about changes to your limited 
company, last updated 19.04.2016, accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/file-
changes-to-a-company-with-companies-house on 01.09.2016 
UK Government, Set up a charity, last updated 14.07.2016, accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/setting-up-charity/register-your-charity 
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Guidance on Charitable purposes, last updated 16.09.2013, accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charitable-purposes/charitable-
purposes. 
UK Government, Charities and tax, last updated 27.06.2016, accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/charities-and-tax/get-recognition. 
UK Government, Who can run your charity's finances?, last updated 
20.07.2015, accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/who-can-run-charity-finances 
Charity Commission, Guidance Charity reporting and accounting: the essentials 
March 2015, accessed at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charity-
reporting-and-accounting-the-essentials-march-2015-cc15c/charity-reporting-
and-accounting-the-essentials-march-2015#the-accounting-framework-at-a-
glance on 11.08.2016 
Speaking out: guidance on campaigning and political activity by charities (CC9) 
2008.  Charity Commission, accessed on: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
34427/CC9_LowInk.pdf. 
Charities and Campaigning, 2014, The Electoral Commission, accessed at: 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/165961/intro
-campaigning-charities-npc.pdf  
Charity Commission. 2016. "Guidance Charity Reporting and Accounting: The 
Essentials November 2016 (Cc15d)". Blog. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charity-reporting-and-accounting-
the-essentials-november-2016-cc15d/charity-reporting-and-accounting-the-
essentials-november-2016-cc15d--2. 
Companies House. 2018. Guidance Company Accounts Guidance Updated 4 
April 2018. Ebook. Companies House. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/life-of-a-company-annual-
requirements/life-of-a-company-part-1-accounts. 
HM Revenue & Customs, Guidance on the fit and proper persons test, last 
updated 03.05.2016, accessed at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charities-fit-and-proper-persons-
test/guidance-on-the-fit-and-proper-persons-test 
HM Revenue & Customs Guidance. 2017. "Guidance Chapter 3: Gift Aid." 
HM Revenue & Customs. 2017. "Guidance Chapter 5: Giving Land, Buildings, 
Shares and Securities to Charity." 
HM Revenue & Customs. 2017. "Guidance on The Fit and Proper Persons 
Test." 
 
 
 
 
 252 
 
Netherlands  
Civil Code, Book 2 Legal Persons, Title 2.2 Associations 
Commercial Register Act 2007 (01-07-2016) accessed at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0021777/2016-07-01#Hoofdstuk1 on 
02.08.2016 
Commercial Register Decree 2008 (Applicable from 01-07-2014) accessed at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0024067/2014-07-01 
State Taxes Act, 1959 (Applicable from 01-05-20160), accessed at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002320/2016-05-01 on 01.08.2016 
Regulation implementing the General Law on State Taxes 1994 (Applicable 
from 01-07-2016), accessed at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006736/2016-
07-01 on 01.08.2016 
Amendment of the Implementation General State Taxes Act 1994 (Applicable 
from 1 January 2014) accessed at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2013-20451.html on 02.08.2016 
Financial decision Commercial 2014 (Applicable from 15-02-2014) accessed at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0034829/2014-02-15#Artikel1 on 02.08.2016 
Form for registration of an official of a foundation, association or owners` 
association without company, Chamber of Commerce February 2016 accessed 
at: 
https://www.kvk.nl/download/22%20executive%20staff%20member%20of%20a
%20foundation%20or%20association%20without%20a%20company_tcm109-
365793.pdf on 04.08.2016 
Form for Registration of a foundation, association or owners' association, 
Chamber of Commerce August 2015 accessed at: 
https://www.kvk.nl/download/05%20foundation%20or%20association_tcm109-
365775.pdf on 04.06.2016 
ANBI application form, accessed at: 
http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontentnl/themaoverstijgend/
programmas_en_formulieren/aanvraag_beschikking_algemeen_nut_beogende
_instellingen 
Dutch Tax Administration, New conditions apply to ANBIs as of January 1st 
2014, accessed at: 
http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontenten/belastingdienst/bu
siness/other_subjects/public_benefit_organisations/new_conditions_apply_to_a
nbis_as_of_january_1st_2014/new_conditions_apply_to_anbis_as_of_january_
1st_2014 on 11.08.2016 
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Cited interviews with legal experts:  
Hemels 11.09.2015 
van der Ploeg 09.10.2017 
Steward QC 14.09.2018  
 
 
New conditions apply to ANBIs as of January 1st, 2014, Dutch Tax 
Administration: 
“ANBI must publish the following particulars on an internet site: 
• The institution’s name 
• The RSIN (Legal Entities & Partnerships Identification Number)/Tax number 
• The contact details 
• The ANBI’s object 
• The policy plan 
• The position of the directors 
• The names of the directors 
• The payment policy - refer to the GBA or salary scheme for personnel where 
applicable 
• A report of the activities that have already been carried out 
• A financial statement” 
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Overview of guidelines/publications (on the left) which concern political activity of 
charities and key legal acts which preceded them (right) 
 
1995, 1997, 1999 versions of 
guidelines on political activity of 
charities CC9 
 
1992 Charities Act 
1993 Charities Act 
(Context: Tony Blair became leader of 
opposition in 1994, and prime minister 
since 1997, and the idea of the third 
sector became more prominent (Kendall 
2000, 15; Deakin Commission Report which 
suggested compact between the 
government and voluntary sector (1996)) 
2001 –Independence from the state 
2004 guidelines CC9 
Charities and Elections 2005, (Charity 
Commission) 
2003- RR12 - The Promotion of Human 
Rights 
2005- RR12 - The Promotion of Human 
Rights 
 
PPERA 2000 
Human Rights Act 1998  
(Context: “Compact between the 
government and the third sector in 
November 1998, and the Prime Minister’s 
announcement of a major upgrading of 
the unit within the central government 
responsible for the third sector in January 
1999, represent a step change in the 
relationship between the third sector and 
UK central government” (Kendall 2000, 
22); The Private Action, Public Benefit, 
A Review of Charities and the Wider 
Not-For-Profit Sector, Strategy unit 
Report (2002, 45) suggested changes in 
the guidelines on political activities of 
charities and distinction  between legal 
requirement and good practice to be 
made in order to encourage charities and 
their trustees to advocate more 
effectively) 
2008 Guidelines CC9 
2009, 2010, 2011 - Charities and 
Elections Guidance updates –version 
(Charity Commission) 
2009 April - Charities and Political 
Donations Guidance Update from the 
Charity Commission 
2006 Charities Act 
 
Guidance Charities, Elections and 
Referendums July 2014 (Charity 
Commission) 
Charities and Campaigning, 2014, 
Electoral Commission 
Campaigner updates 2015 by Electoral 
Commission 
2011 Charities Act 
Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party 
Campaigning and Trade Union 
Administration Act 2014 
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APPENDIX B 
 
1.Songbird Survival (SBS) 
Cited documents:  
Membership Leaflet 2015 
Certificate of Incorporation 2000, Companies House 
Report of the directors (continued), Year to 30th September 2004 
Accounts and Reports 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, 
2016, Companies House 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Autumn 2003 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Winter 2003/2004 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Summer 2010 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Winter 2010 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Summer/Autumn 2011 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Winter 2012 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Autumn / Winter 2012  
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Spring / Summer 2013  
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Winter 2013 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Autumn/ Winter 2013 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Spring / Summer 2014 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Autumn / Winter 2014 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Spring / Summer 2015 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Autumn / Winter 2015 
Song Bird Survival Newsletter Spring / Summer 2016  
History of SongBird Survival accessed at: https://www.songbird-survival.org.uk/history 
on 31.08.2018 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/04078747/officers 
 
Cited interviews:  
SBS 26.03.2017 
SBS 06.07.2018 
 
Cited e-mail correspondence:  
E-mail correspondence 20.06.2018 
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2.National Activity Providers Association (NAPA) 
 
Cited documents:  
Certificate for Incorporation, 18th December 1997 
Minutes of Trustees Meeting 14 March 2014, Companies House 
Special resolution, June 2000 
Special resolution, June 2004 
NAPA Spring 2001 Volume 4 Issue 3 
NAPA Spring 2007 Volume 2 Issue 1 
NAPA Summer/Autumn 2003 Volume 7 Issue 1 
NAPA Summer 2005 Volume 9 Issue 2 
NAPA Summer/Autumn 2003 Volume 7 Issue 1 
NAPA Summer/Autumn 2002 Volume 6 Issue 2 
NAPA Winter 2003 Volume 7 Issue 2 
NAPA Spring 2003 Volume 6 
NAPA Autumn 2010 
NAPA Spring 2005 Volume 9 Issue 1 
NAPA Spring 2002 Volume 5 Issue 3 
NAPA 2004, Volume 7 Issue 3 
NAPA Spring 2005 Volume 9 Issue 1 
NAPA Newsletter Autumn 2007 Issue 2 
NAPA Summer 2006 Volume 10 Issue 2 
NAPA Newsletter Spring 1999, Volume 2 Issue 3 
NAPA Living Life Winter 2009 
NAPA Living Life Issue 3 2012 
Annual Report and Accounts 2001 
Annual Report and Accounts 2002 
Annual Report and Accounts 2003 
Annual Report and Accounts 2004 
Annual Report and Accounts 2009 
Annual Report and Accounts 2015 
Annual Report and Accounts 2016 
Director`s report, Financial report 2013 
Our History section accessed at http://www.napa-activities.com/about-us on 
11.04.2017 
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Cited interviews:  
NAPA 30.05.2017 
NAPA 06.06.2017 
 
Cited e-mail correspondence:  
E-mail correspondence 15.09.2018 
E-mail correspondence 13.09.2018 
 
3.Surfers Against Sewage (SAS) 
 
Cited documents:  
Certificate for Incorporation, Articles of Association and Bylaws 1994, Companies 
House 
Articles of Association 2011, Companies House  
Pipeline news 1990, Number 1 
Pipeline news 1990, Number 2 
Pipeline news 1991, Number 2 
Pipeline news 1991, Number 3 
Pipeline news issue 58, 2004 
Pipeline news, issue 58, October 2004 
Pipeline news, issue 63, February 2006 
Pipeline news, issue 64, May 2006 
Pipeline news issue 68 May 2007 
Pipeline news issue 67, February 2007 
Pipeline news issue 70 October 2007 
Pipeline news issue 71, February 2008 
Pipeline news issue 72 May 2008 
Pipeline news issue 73, July 2008 
Pipeline news issue 74 winter 2008 
Pipeline news, issue 76 summer 2009 
Pipeline news issue 77 autumn 2009 
Pipeline news issue 78 winter 2009 
Pipeline news issue 79 spring 2010 
Pipeline news issue 81 summer/ autumn 2010  
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Pipeline news issue 86 autumn/winter 2011  
Pipeline news issue 88 summer 2012  
The Exeter Lectures: Hugo Tagholm, Chief Executive, SAS, May 2016 
Accounts and report 2012 
Accounts and report 2013 
Accounts and report 2014 
Accounts and report 2015 
Accounts and report 2016 
Articles of Association passed on 11.12.2011 
Article 39-40, Articles of Association passed on 11.12.2011 
Register of charities: 
http://apps.charitycommission.gov.uk/Showcharity/RegisterOfCharities/FinancialHistory
.aspx?RegisteredCharityNumber=1145877&SubsidiaryNumber=0 accessed on 
17.09.2018 
 
Cited interviews:  
SAS 26.05.2017 
SAS 16.06.2017a 
SAS 16.06.2017b 
SAS 23.06.2017 
 
Cited e-mail correspondence: 
E-mail correspondence 18.09.2018 
 
4.Young Friends of the Earth Netherlands (JMA) 
 
Cited documents:  
Statute 2010 
Statute 2014 
House regulations [Huishoudelijke Reglement] 2014 
Resolution for the amendment of the statute 2010 
Newsletter 1996 
Newsletter 1997 Number 1 
Newsletter 1997 Number 4 
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Newsletter 1999 Number 2 
Newsletter 2003 Number 1 
Newsletter 2000 13 May 
Newsletter 1996 Number 4 
Newsletter 1997 Number 4 
Newsletter 2003 Number 7 
Newsletter 1999 Number 1 
Newsletter AGM 2000 Number 2 
Newsletter 1998 Number 1 
Newsletter 2001 Number 2 
 
Cited interviews:  
JMA 23.10.2017 
JMA 08.11.2017 
JMA 13.11.2017 
 
Cited e-mail correspondence: 
E-mail correspondence 07.08.2018 
 
5.Vitiligo Netherlands (Vitiligo.nl) 
 
Cited documents:  
Statute 2017 
Newsletter August 2006 
Newsletter November 2006 
Newsletter May 2007 
Newsletter August 2008 
Newsletter August 2009 
Newsletter May 2010 
Newsletter August 2010 
Newsletter 2011 
Newsletter February 2011 
Newsletter August 2011 
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Newsletter February 2012 
Financial Statement 2016 
Influence and control regulations 2012 
 
Cited interviews:  
Vitiligo.nl 14.10.2017 
Vitiligo.nl 16.10.2017  
 
Cited e-mail correspondence: 
E-mail correspondence 10.24.2017 
E-mail correspondence 10.26.2017 
E-mail correspondence 19.09.2018 
 
6.Patient Information Forum (PIF) 
Cited documents:  
Articles of Association 2008 
Articles of Association 2010 
Special Resolution 2011 
PIF Newsletter issue 3 April 2002 
History of The Patient Information Forum accessed at: 
https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/our-history/ on 31.08.2018 
The Patient Information Forum Limited accessed at:  
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06562222/filing-history?page=2 on 
03.09.2018 
PiF to build case for consumer info.11.04.2012, accessed at: 
https://www.digitalhealth.net/2012/04/pif-to-build-case-for-consumer-info/ on 
01.05.2017 
‘Board level opportunities at PiF’ https://www.pifonline.org.uk/leading-the-way-in-
consumer-health-information-board-level-opportunities-at-pif/ accessed on 19.06.2018 
About us: https://www.pifonline.org.uk/about-us/people-at-pif/ accessed on 16.03.2018 
What do other members think of PIF: https://www.pifonline.org.uk/membership/what-
do-other-members-think-of-pif/ accessed on 16.03.2018 
PIF Online. 4.05.2012, accessed at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/voting-results-from-
conference-show-integrating-health-information-into-healthcare-delivery-is-the-biggest-
challenge/ on 16.03.2018 
New PIF Strategy posted on 14 June 2016 at https://www.pifonline.org.uk/pifs-new-
strategy-glance/ accessed on 16.03.2018 
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Services Manager Role description and person specification July 2014 
 
Cited interviews:  
PIF 02.05.2017 
PIF 04.06.2018 
PIF 21.05.2018 
PIF 25.05.2017 
PIF 31.05.2017 
 
7.Dutch Association for Dragonfly Studies (NVL) 
Cited documents:  
Statute 1997 
Statute 2010 
Statute 2014 
House regulations [Huishoudelijke Reglement] 2014 
http://www.odonata.be/nieuws/107-2007-de-nederlandse-vereniging-voor-
libellenstudie-nvl-vierde-haar-tiende-verjaardag accessed on the 26.09.2017 
Newsletter 1997 Number 1 
Written answers from NVL board received on 26.10.2017 
Cited interviews:  
NVL 06.10.2017 
NVL 24.10.2017 
NVL 27.09.2017 
Cited e-mail correspondence: 
E-mail correspondence 27.10.2017 
E-mail correspondence 08.10.2017  
E-mail correspondence 11.10.2017 
 
8.The National Association of Psychosocial Workers (LVPW) 
Cited documents:  
Statute 1995 
LVPW website accessed at https://www.lvpw.nl/vereniging/commissies on 09.11.2018 
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Cited interviews:  
LVPW 10.10.2017 
Cited e-mail correspondence: 
Email correspondence 15.05.2018 
LVPWa E-mail correspondence 08.05.2018 
LVPWb E-mail correspondence 08.05.2018 
 
9.NHS Alliance  
Cited documents:  
Speech 10.12.2015 
Chairman’s New Year Message 2013 January 2, 2013, Dr Michael Dixon 
The Primary Care Alliance Limited accessed at: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03652706/filing-history?page=1 on 
03.09.2018 
Annual accounts submitted to the Companies House 2000 -2018 accessed at: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03652706/filing-history?page=1 on 
03.09.2018 
Report by the Executive Committee 2005/6 
NHS Alliance Report – Leading Primary Care 2008 
NHS Alliance Yearbook 2008 
Constitution 2005 
New NHS Alliance Constitution 13 July 2016 
Michael Dixon Speech ‘Thank you and goodbye’ posted on 10.12.2015 at 
http://www.nhsalliance.org/michael-dixon-thank-you-and-goodbye/ accessed on 
20.02.2017  
Message from Chief Executive August 2005 
Cited interviews:  
NHS Alliance 02.06.2017 
NHS Alliance 23.06.2017 
NHS Alliance 24.05.2017 
NHS Alliance 31.05.2017 
NHS Alliance 31.06.2017 
Cited e-mail correspondence: 
E-mail correspondence 06.09.2017 
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E-mail correspondence 27.06.2017 
E-mail correspondence 11.09.2018 
 
 
10.Hardy Orchid Society (HOS) 
Cited documents:  
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter 2002 
Chairman report 2007, accessed at: 
http://www.hardyorchidsociety.org.uk/HOS%201012/HOSweb5/AGMchair07.htm on 
14.09.2018 
Constitution 2005 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter January 1997 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 3, January 1997 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 7 January 1998 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 24 April 2002 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 12 April 1999 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No. 1 July 1996 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter 21, July 2001 
The Hardy Orchid Society Newsletter No.29 July 2003 Report of the 11th AGM 
Journal of the Hardy Orchid Society Vol. 2 No. 3 July 2005, HOS AGM and Spring 
Meeting 
Notice of Annual General Meeting 2006 Accessed on 07 July 2018 
Report by the Executive Committee 2005/6 
Draft Minutes of the 15th Annual General Meeting, Sunday 20th April 2008 
AGM Minutes report 2013, April 
AGM of the Hardy Orchid Society 19th April at 10.30.2015 
Minutes of the 21st Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid Society 30th March 
2014 
Agenda of the Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid Society at Kidlington, 
Oxford on Sunday, 10th April 2016 
Minutes of the 20th Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid Society at Exeter Hall, 
Kidlington, Oxford on Sunday 21st April 2013 
Draft Minutes of the 15th Annual General Meeting of the Hardy Orchid Society 2007 
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Chairman’s report 2008, accessed at: 
http://www.hardyorchidsociety.org.uk/HOS%201012/HOSweb5/AGMchairman08.htm 
on 14.09.2018 
Chairman report 2007, accessed at: 
http://www.hardyorchidsociety.org.uk/HOS%201012/HOSweb5/AGMchair07.htm on 
14.09.2018 
Cited interviews:  
HOS 06.10.2017 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Interview invitation 
Dear Mr./Ms. [surname], 
My name is Milka Ivanovska Hadjievska and I am a doctoral candidate in Politics at the 
University of Exeter, UK. I am currently a visiting researcher at the University of 
Amsterdam. I am writing to you because the [organisation’s name] would be an ideal 
case study to explore how voluntary membership organisations have evolved in 
changing regulatory environments. 
My doctoral research is conducted within the framework of the major 5-year project 
'Regulating Civil Society' led by prof. Nicole Bolleyer and funded by the European 
Research Council. For more information please visit the project 
website: http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/regulatingcivilsociety/ 
As a [role in organisation] of [organisation’s name] you are ideally suited to answer 
questions about the different reporting requirements related to maintaining legal status 
and tax benefits, as well as the ways in which members are involved in the 
organisation. If you accept my invitation for participation, I would be happy to talk to 
you in person or via phone/ Skype.  
I would like to underline that this research is conducted for academic purposes only 
and your participation is entirely voluntary. The results of the research will be published 
in my doctoral thesis and academic outputs (papers and presentations) of 
the 'Regulating Civil Society' project. Anonymity and confidentiality of the interview data 
are guaranteed.  
Your participation in the interview will be of immense importance for my doctoral 
research and I would be very grateful if you could help me. Thank you in advance! 
Please let me know should you have any questions or need additional information. 
Kind regards, 
Milka Ivanovska Hadjievska 
PhD Candidate and Research Associate 
Department of Politics | ERC-funded project STATORG | University of Exeter 
Address: Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4RJ, United Kingdom 
E-mail: mi269@exeter.ac.uk  
 
Consent form  
Details of Project 
The research is conducted by Milka Ivanovska Hadjievska, a PhD candidate in 
Politics at the University of Exeter, UK. The research is conducted within the 
framework of the 5-year project ‘Regulating Civil Society’, n° 335890, directed 
by prof. Nicole Bolleyer and funded by the European Research Council. The 
aim of the project is to investigate the influence of state regulation on voluntary 
membership organisations (for more information on the project please visit the 
project website: http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/regulatingcivilsociety/). As 
part of my doctoral research I am conducting interviews with people who have 
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been/are employed or actively involved in the work of voluntary membership 
organisations in the UK and the Netherlands. My research taps into questions of 
organisational development, how the receipt of different state benefits affects 
the organisation, how membership involvement, professionalisation and political 
activities evolve since foundation until 2016.  
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to discuss 
with someone else at the University, please contact my first supervisor: 
Professor Nicole Bolleyer, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon UK, 
e-mail: N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk 
Confidentiality and Data Protection Notice 
Personal data disclosed in interview tapes, transcripts and notes will be held 
and treated in strictest confidence. The interview data will be used only for 
academic purposes (PhD thesis, papers and presentations related to the 
‘Regulating Civil Society’ project) and third parties will not be allowed access to 
them (except as may be required by the law). The interview data will be stored 
on my encrypted and password safe MEGA storage cloud and on the University 
of Exeter`s server (U drive). The data from the research will be held for an 
indefinite period of time after the submission of the doctoral thesis in an 
anonymised form.  
Anonymity 
If not agreed otherwise, interview data will be held and used strictly on an 
anonymous basis, with no mention of your name.  
 
Consent 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the project. I have 
voluntary agreed to participate in the research and to the use of the interview 
data in the form and for the purpose specified above. I understand that I can 
withdraw my consent at any time by contacting the researcher.  
 
.............................……………..……..           …………………………………… 
(Signature of participant)                       (Date) 
 
………………………………………….    
(Printed name of participant)   
............................………………..   ............................……………….. 
(Signature of researcher)    (Printed name of researcher) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
General topic guide (revised) 
 
1. Early years  
• When was the first governing document adopted?  
• Who effectively run the organisation back then? (budget allocation and 
setting programmatic priorities)  
o How members participated in decision making processes (AGM 
attendance, election of board, setting programmatic priorities)?  
o How were members included in the activities of the organisation 
(fundraising, volunteering)? 
2. Legal personality  
Why did your organisation decide to incorporate? 
• How incorporation affected the governance of the organisation? Did you 
change the formal governing structure due to registration requirements? 
If yes, what kind of changes were introduced? 
• Were there any changes in the decision-making rights of members?  
• Who effectively governed the organisation in the period after 
registration?  
• Did you seek help from members or volunteers with legal competences 
to be able to maintain legal personality?  
• Who was responsible for maintaining reporting requirements after 
registration?  
3. Charitable status  
Why did your organisation decide to seek ANBI status?  
• Did you change the governing document due to registration 
requirements? If yes, what kind of changes were introduced? 
• Were there any changes in the decision-making rights of members?  
• Who effectively governed the organisation in the period after 
registration?  
• Did you seek help from members or volunteers with legal competences 
to be able to maintain ANBI status?  
• Who was responsible for maintaining reporting requirements after 
registration?  
4. Board and staff  
• How are members of the board recruited (externally or internally)?  
• What kind of professional skills members of the board usually have? Has 
the board characteristics changed over time?  
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• When did the organisation hire its first member of staff? What made that 
possible?  
• How the number of employees changed over time?  
• Change in type of employees?  
• To what extend employees participate in decision making processes 
related to budget allocation and programmatic priorities? Has this 
changed over time?  
5. Membership involvement  
• Are there any changes in the membership structure of the organisation 
since its foundation? 
• What are the ways in which members are involved in the decision-
making processes of the organisation?  
• Do they elect the members of the board?  
• Do they participate in decision making over programmatic priorities/ 
strategy?  
• How many members on average attend the annual general meetings?  
Has this changed significantly since the organisation’s foundation?  
• What are the other ways in which members are involved in the 
organisation?  
• How do you inform members about organisational activities?  
 
6. Milestones of organisational development 
• In sum, what were the major reforms that your organisation underwent 
from its foundation until today? 
• Is there anything that you would like to add in terms of membership 
involvement and internal governance that we did not have a chance to 
cover?  
 
Questions for follow-up interviews and e-mail correspondence  
 
Membership involvement  
1. What is the role of members in an organisation like yours?  
2. What are the main ways in which members are involved in the 
organisation?  
3. What are the ways in which members participate in decision making over 
programmatic priorities/ strategy?  
4. How many members on average participate at the annual general 
meeting?  
5. Are members involved in the appointment of members of the executive 
board? If yes, how?  
6. Were there any changes in the way members are involved in the 
organisation over time?  
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Internal governance  
1. What is the role of members of the board in organisation like yours?  
2. What kind of skills are represented in the executive board?  
3. How are members of the board recruited? 
4. To what extent employed staff is engaged in decision making?   
5. Who effectively governs the organisation?  
6. Were there any significant changes in the way the organisation is 
governed over time?  
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